Interplay of intentions : an ethnography of institutional work within a hybrid organisation by Bain, Carole Ann
Interplay of intentions : an ethnography of institutional 
work within a hybrid organisation
BAIN, Carole Ann
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/19152/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
BAIN, Carole Ann (2017). Interplay of intentions : an ethnography of institutional 
work within a hybrid organisation. Doctoral, Sheffield Hallam University. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
 1 
 
 
 
 
INTERPLAY OF INTENTIONS: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL WORK WITHIN A HYBRID 
ORGANISATION 
 
 
CAROLE ANNE BAIN  
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
the Sheffield Hallam University for the degree of Doctor of 
Business Administration  
 
 
 
Submitted September 2017  
  
 2 
Abstract 
This thesis is the outcome of a study which takes institutional work 
(purposive action of individuals and groups aimed at creating, maintaining and 
transforming institutions) in hybrid organisations (those constituted by multiple, 
often competing institutional logics) as its focus. Through a longitudinal, 
embedded ethnography I explore the nature of institutional work undertaken to 
navigate institutional logics, who undertakes such work and how, and what 
happens if ‘insiders’ do not see the proffered logic as legitimate. Through long 
term participation in and observation of micro processes I identified two forms of 
institutional work. The first, termed identification work, is undertaken by senior 
managers to encourage other actors to identify with a proffered (commercial) 
logic but within the existing (social) mission. Taking place at an ideological level 
this work aims to ensure widespread acceptance of a system of ideas and 
ideals within the prevailing mission of the organisation, which would normatively 
appear contradictory or illegitimate. The second, termed practice work, is work 
undertaken to promote adoption of practices. Taking place at the level of 
policies, procedures, processes and systems this work aims to diffuse the 
system of collective ideas and ideals.  I found that such work is undertaken 
cautiously over time, is mutually reinforcing and often overlapping.  
This theorisation problematizes current understandings of institutional 
work in that it highlights the ‘messiness’ of institutional work in hybrid contexts 
in ways that challenge the appropriateness of both the linear, binary 
presentation of logic change and the cleanly delineated forms of institutional 
work that dominate the literature. Furthermore understanding this complexity is 
a long-term endeavour, requiring observation of the actual processes of 
institutional work. The prevalent retrospective accounts of institutional work 
collected at a single point in time are likely inadequate for developing rich 
understandings of the role of ‘everyday talk’ and sense-making in hybrid 
organisations or the practicalities of change efforts. These conclusions will not 
comfort researchers of or managers in hybrid organisations with promises of 
easy solutions, but will hopefully contribute to a more nuanced account of 
organisational life which encourages fruitful future lines of thought and action. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
1.1 Chapter Introduction 
This thesis is the outcome of a research study which takes institutional 
work (the purposive action of individuals and groups aimed at creating, 
maintaining and transforming institutions) in hybrid organisations (those 
constituted by multiple, often competing institutional logics) as its focus. In this 
introductory chapter I outline:  the research context; methodological approach 
(which is covered in detail in chapter 3) and contributions of this thesis. 
1.2 Research context and questions 
Institutional scholarship on hybrid organisations and institutional work 
has developed largely along separate tracks. This research aims to bridge 
these two conversations through a longitudinal, embedded ethnography that 
contributes to understandings of actors’ daily realities in making sense of and 
acting upon and within hybrid organisations.  
Accepting that hybrid organisations are gaining prevalence in modern 
societies (Kraatz & Block, 2008) and that organisational actors have an active 
role in the maintenance and transformation of institutions (Zilber, 2002; Kellogg, 
2005; Billis, 2010; Lok, 2010; Coule & Patmore, 2013; Jay, 2013; Jager & 
Schroer, 2014), this research study matters for its contribution to understanding 
the function and arguably survival of hybrid organisational forms. Some authors 
present hybrids as arenas of contradiction unlikely to survive over time 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 2001; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Turco, 2012) 
because they become ‘blocked, dysfunctional, and unable to resolve tensions 
between competing logics’ (Skelcher & Rathgeb Smith, 2014, p. 440). Others 
suggest they are ‘an inevitable and permanent characteristic of the non-profit 
sector’ (Brandsen et al., 2005; Billis, 2010) and possess the ability to blend and 
synergise different logics (Haverman & Rao 2006; Galaskiewicz & Barringer, 
2012; Jay, 2013; Jager & Schroer, 2014; Skelcher & Rathegeb Smith, 2014).  
The setting for this research is a non-profit professional association (see 
appendix 1 for an overview of the focal organisation).  As a chartered 
institute, registered charity and increasingly commercial entity, I believe it is a 
particularly appropriate form of hybrid organisation to study the opportunities 
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and tensions presented by institutional hybridity. Such organisations are 
‘subject to multiple regulatory regimes, embedded within multiple normative 
orders, and/or constituted by more than one cultural logic’ (Kraatz & Block, 
2008, p. 2). The focal organisation is incorporated through a charter which sets 
the ‘overall legal purpose and top line agenda’ (Focal Organisation, 2004, p. 2). 
Whilst the core emphasis as displayed in the charter, is on public benefit, the 
most recent strategy document, highlights the tensions that play out within the 
organisation and arguably depicts a setting of competing pubic good (social) 
and commercial logics.  
‘The challenges faced by us as a non-profit organisation are 
considerable and tensions between making a sustainable income 
and staying true to the mission are inevitable.  We recognise and 
embrace the rival metaphors of mission and business; our driver 
remains ‘to make money to do more things to deliver to our public 
good agenda’ (Focal Organisation, p. 6) 
As a member of the ‘leadership team’ of the focal organisation, 
responsible for ensuring delivery of the strategy and business plan, I have 
become increasingly fascinated by the hybrid nature of the organisation and the 
interplay of associated divergent beliefs and practices.  Against this backdrop, 
the following questions guide this study:  
1) How do organisational actors deal with the presence of multiple institutional 
logics and what implications does this have for the nature of organisation 
(structurally, politically, symbolically and rhetorically)?   
a) What is the nature of institutional work undertaken by organisation 
actors to navigate multiple logics? 
b) Who influences such work and how? 
c) What happens if ‘insiders’ do not see the dominant logic as 
legitimate?  
1.3  Methodological overview 
This research comprises of a longitudinal, embedded ethnography that 
contributes to understandings of actors’ daily realities in making sense of and 
acting upon and within hybrid organisations. It thus adopts an interpretivist 
stance which ‘…emerges from a scholarly position that takes human 
interpretations as the starting point for developing knowledge about the social 
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world’ (Prasad P. , 2005, p. 13). The outcome of this research is a context 
specific, time-bound understanding of individual and organisational action; the 
goal was to understand the process of ‘world making’ (Schwandt, 1994) and the 
way that people actively establish and re-establish the meanings they use to 
organise their experiences. Notably I describe myself as an embedded 
researcher (Rowley, 2014) as I worked within the research organisation for 14 
years prior to beginning the study and continue to do so until July 2017.   The 
research underpinning this thesis, was undertaken between April 2014 and 
August 2016. An ethnographic approach was chosen for its synergy with my 
practical and theoretical research interests which have sense making 
(sensibility), social interactions and processes of meaning-making as its central 
focal point (Weick K. E., 1995). This enabled me to make sense of my current 
practice environment and had a pragmatic advantage in terms of access to the 
research setting.  
A critical aspect of ethnography is the stylistic approach of the author:  
 ‘Put starkly, there is simply no such thing as ethnography until it 
is written...if ethnography is something of an art, science, and craft 
rolled into one, writing style (and pride), cannot be overlooked... 
the virtues and felicities of stylistic writing and the narrative 
conventions and experiments that carry ethnography to readers 
are more than a passing concern’ (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 224)  
Whilst this ethnography is told in my (researcher) voice, I would be a failure not 
to recognise my active role in the research and knowledge creation process and 
my dual role ‘insider researcher’ (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007) .  I do not presume 
that I (the researcher) am some impartial, value-free entity engaging in the 
research process to produce objective accounts of ratified truth. Rather, I bring 
implicit and explicit theories to the research process and context and accept 
that my task is to surface theoretical insights which represent a ‘balance 
between theory in the researcher’s head and theory employed by the people in 
the research situation’ (Musson, 2004, p. 35). To that end: 
a) When writing as researcher I use the first-person description (e.g. I, me, 
mine); 
b) When representing myself as an organisational actor I use third person 
(e.g. Carole or Director) (see appendix 2 for author pen picture) 
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c) When reflecting on my insights / experience and thoughts I present them 
as ‘musings’.   These musings are placed in the thesis as they occurred 
in my thinking.  They typically emerged as I was writing up my notes and 
reflecting on my experiences and interpretations of events and 
presentation of events by institutional actors. I provide my first musing 
below which emerged following a conference on organisational 
development and during the process of writing up the first draft of this 
chapter where I was attempting to position this research, what I was 
observing and whether it mattered 
d) When referring to the focal organisation from my perspective I use the 
term organisation.  When I use the terms ‘company’ or ‘business’ this is 
to reflect the terms used by other organisational actors.  All refer to the 
focal organisation.  
Musing 1 
7th May 2014:  Patterns and events appear to emerge without any conscious plans.  
Through the politics of everyday life, processes of negotiation and persuasion, people 
interact with each other and create patterns of behaviour. Eventually, if the pattern 
exists long enough we believe that this way of thinking is the only way.  The problem 
as I observe it is that we think our way, our plans determine the outcome. It often 
doesn’t because we are all doing ‘it’ and trying to get our own way. What happens is 
the outcome of all our intensions and this interplay of intentions forms the 
politics/activities, outcomes and how we experience everyday life.  
In our quest for power, winning, harmony or, stability are we forgetting the 
importance of difference? If we all act the same and produce only one pattern, are we 
falsely chasing simplicity and in the changing world environment is this the most 
sustainable thing anyway?  Should we argue for embracing different levels of thinking 
and being, different logics to ensure our evolution?  Is adopting a hybrid strategy a 
way of embracing different ways of being and therefore a pragmatic, approach to 
sustainability and evolution?  Do we have choice to do anything other anyway?   
1.4 Contributions 
Through this study, I identify two forms of institutional work that is 
undertaken cautiously over time, is mutually reinforcing and often overlapping. 
This theorisation problematizes current understandings of institutional work in 
hybrid organisations in several ways. First, it challenges both the 
appropriateness of the linear, binary presentation of logic change and the 
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cleanly delineated forms of institutional work that dominate the literature (see 
for example: (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987; Pffer, 1982; Meyer, Brooks, 
& Goes, 1990; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Suddaby & 
Hinings 2002; Greenwood, Oliver , Sahliin, & Suddaby, 2008; Thorton, Ocasio, 
& Lounsbury, 2012). Secondly, understanding this complexity is a long-term 
endeavour, requiring observation of the actual processes of institutional work 
over time. The prevalent retrospective accounts of institutional work collected at 
a single point in time (see: Zilber, 2002; Coburn, 2004; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; 
Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Darcin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Turco, 2012; Gawer & 
Phillips, 2013) are likely inadequate for developing rich understandings of the 
role of ‘everyday talk’ and sense-making in hybrid organisations or the 
practicalities of change efforts.  
At a practice level, the research holds significant insights to inform the 
work of both professional associations and other non-profit organisations that 
are characterised by hybridity. Specifically, it highlights how organisational 
structure, rhetoric and politics can be used by elite actors to advance and resist 
the ideological and practical implications of divergent institutional logics and 
what happens when internal actors experience dissonance with the proffered 
logic. In doing so, it illustrates the necessity of constructing and reconstructing 
rhetoric, structures, processes and practices that are congruent with the 
organisation’s stated ideology. This may go some way to prevent ‘harmful 
internal coalitions’ occurring (Glynn, 2000) due to incoherent and conflicting 
logics.  
On a personal level, the DBA journey has significantly changed my 
worldview (see appendix 2) and acceptance of multiple interpretations of 
events.  The demand for reflexivity presented by my methodological choices 
has raised my awareness of the attitudes, assumptions and values I bring to my 
working life and interpretations of my own and others’ meanings, experiences 
and feelings. On a day to day basis I am more equipped to examine situations, 
problems and solutions from a variety of perspectives; question my own 
assumptions and practices and engage with others’ world views.  
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1.5  Structure of the thesis 
 The remainder of this thesis is broken into 3 key parts. The first part sets 
out the theoretical and research backdrop.  For example, chapter 2 is a 
literature review, the purpose of which is to get a critical appreciation and 
understanding of what the extant literature offers in relation to the research 
question.  Chapter 3 is the methodology chapter, and includes discussions on 
philosophical positioning, research strategy and design and research methods. 
The next part consists of four findings chapters the first of which (4) looks to get 
an understanding of the logics that were experienced by organisational actors.  
The subsequent three chapters (5-7) relate to separate but interlocking 
incidents, giving an appreciation of the nature of institutional work undertaken to 
navigate and manipulate institutional logics, who undertakes and interrupts 
such work and how, and what happens if ‘insiders’ do not see the proffered 
logic as legitimate. The final part consists of a discussion chapter (8) which 
syntheses the four findings chapters with the literature foreshadowed in chapter 
2 to address the research questions.  The thesis concludes with chapter 9 
which states the contributions of this study, discusses its limitations and 
identifies areas for further research.   The body of this thesis is supported by 
appendices which include supplementary but none critical information to 
support the reader’s understating of the study and its context.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1  Chapter Introduction  
This research emerges from an interest in understanding how individual 
and groups of actors shape their daily work activity in the context of hybridity – 
i.e. in organisations that incorporate elements of different logics (Zilber, 2002; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Informed by an institutional 
perspective, the study specifically seeks to enhance understanding of how 
organisational actors deal with the presence of multiple institutional logics and 
what implications this has for the nature of organisation (structurally, politically, 
symbolically and rhetorically).  
Early institutional theory portrayed organisations as ‘social machines 
designed for the efficient transformation of material inputs into material outputs’ 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 571) giving focus to understanding the relationship 
between an organisation and its environment, examining how organisations 
adapted or attempted to adapt at a macro level (Greenwood, Oliver , Sahliin, & 
Suddaby, 2008).  An underlying assumption of early institutional theorisations is 
bounded rationality; that organisations are influenced by their institutional 
context and are bound by powerful rules (cultural prescriptions), norms and 
ideologies of wider society (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Greenwood et al., 2008) 
ensuring a common understanding of what is appropriate and fundamentally 
meaningful behaviour. Consequently, the notion of isomorphism (similarity) 
received scholarly attention (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987) as it was 
assumed organisations instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative 
symbols to signal their conformance to social prescriptions to; garner societal 
support (Suchman, 1995), be received as legitimate (Meyer & Rowan 1983) 
and therefore increase their chances of survival (Scott, 1983).  
More recently, institutionalists have given more credence to complexity, 
recognizing that institutional contexts often consist of competing demands and 
that conforming to institutional rules might conflict with the requirements of 
technical efficiency. For example Pfeffer (1982) and Zucker (1987) posit that 
conformity may be ceremonial - ‘a form of confidence game’ (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 
246) occurring through surface isomorphism (Zucker, 1987) involving a process 
of deliberately decoupling symbolic practices from the organisation’s technical 
  
 
v2.0 29 Jan 18 Final  
13 
core. This acknowledgement is to a degree at odds with the bounded rationality 
presentation of hegemonic (bound by taken for granted assumptions) 
institutions that are resistant to change as it implies a degree of intentionality, 
foresight and choice, presenting institutions as enacted and reconstructed 
through responses to institutional pressures. This shift in scholarly focus has led 
to a productive stream of research on institutional work (Berger & Luckmann 
1966; Zilber 2002; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Mutch, 2007; Dacin et al. 2010; 
Jay, 2013; Jager & Schroer, 2014) – the ‘purposive action’ of individuals and 
groups in organisations aimed at ‘creating, maintaining or disrupting institutions’ 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, Institutions and institutional work, 2006). Arguably, this 
has allowed a deeper investigation of ‘how institutions and strategic action 
affect each other’ (Rojas, 2010, p. 1266).   
Against this backdrop and with the goal of critically assessing what 
understanding extant literature offers in relation to the research questions (see 
page 7) this chapter is divided into three sections (see Figure 1 below). Section 
2.2 explores the concepts of institutional logics and hybrid organisations while 
section 2.3 considers institutional work undertaken by human agents within 
such contexts. The justification for this choice of literature is rooted in the 
insights institutional logics can provide into the competing organising principles, 
belief systems and practices associated with multiple and often divergent logics 
and their implications for the nature of organisation. Such ‘structural’ insights 
alone, however, downplay the role and power of human agency and the role of 
actors. It is for this reason I subsequently turn to the literature on institutional 
work. Finally, section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
Figure 1: Literature review map 
 
(2.1) Introduction 
to 
institutionalism
(2.2) Institutional 
logics
Hybrid organisations
Identity, identification & 
institutional logics
(2.3) Institutional 
work 
Strategies for hybrid
organisations 
Types of institutional work
Practice work 
Identity work 
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2.2 Institutional logics, identification and hybrid organisations 
The literature on institutional logics presents institutions as being 
organised around shared practical understandings (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & 
von Savigny, 2001), sets of material practices and symbolic systems (Lok, 
2010) and legitimized through theorisation (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 
2002). Institutions are viewed as patterns of logic activity rooted in material 
practices and symbolic systems underpinned by assumptions, values and 
beliefs by which individuals and organisations produce, reproduce and make 
sense of their lives (Thorton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), very much in the 
same fashion as the rationally bounded organisation. For example, the seminal 
work of Friedland and Alford (1991) continued with a rational approach but 
rather than emphasising isomorphism at the societal level, positions institutional 
logics or organising principles as available to individuals and organisations: 
‘Each of the most important institutional orders of ... society has a 
central logic – a set of material practices and symbolic 
constructions – which constitutes its organizing principles and 
which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate’ 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991, pp. 248-49)  
Positioning logics in this way creates a sense of malleability, an arena 
where (rational) actors can elaborate principles and practices for their own 
advantage. In taking this stance the authors create a link between the macro-
structural perspectives of early institutional theory and the emerging micro 
perspective whereby individual, agentic actors can shape organisations. This 
presentation of an enacted organisation where actors can ‘actively mediate 
logics’ (Coburn, 2004, p. 212) is of interest to this study as it acknowledges their 
ability to make sense of, construct and transform institutionalized organising 
principles. It is also important to note that deterministic linearity, probably a 
natural companion to rationality, dominated early theorisation of institutional 
logics and institutions more broadly. The common view within this literature was 
that institutional logics are binary and that organisations are stable or static until 
an event or jolt occurs (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990) which destabilizes the 
organisation and enables the formation of new definitive practices and, a new 
steady state (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Suddaby & Hinings 2002).  See figure 2 
below for a depiction of this perhaps overly sequential and linear process.  
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Figure 2: Stages of Institutional Change (adapted from Suddaby and Hinings 2002 (p.60) 
 
 
Such theorisation is problematic in the context of this study, which takes 
as its focus an organisation where several different logics are at play 
concurrently. Arguably, within the process presented above there can only be 
one dominant logic at any one time, yet recent scholarship on hybrid 
organisations that incorporate elements of different institutional logics 
undermines this assertion (see for example, Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
Nevertheless, agreement regarding the prospects of hybrid organisations does 
not prevail. Some authors situate the problem of hybridity at the nexus of 
‘fundamental and distinctive governance  and operating principles’ (Billis, 2010) 
presenting hybrids as arenas of contradiction unlikely to survive over time 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 199; Scott, 2001; Turco, 2012) 
because they become ‘blocked’ or ‘dysfunctional’, suffering from an  ‘inability to 
resolve tensions between competing logics’ (Skelcher & Rathgeb Smith, 2014, 
p. 440) and ambiguity about whether certain organisation outcomes represent 
success or failure (Smith & Lewis , 2011). Typically, hybrids are considered to 
face excessive change and run the risk of the resulting instability and flux 
depleting organisation’s capability to solve complex problems (Jay, 2013).  
Other scholars meanwhile suggest hybrids are ubiquitous (Billis, 2010) and  ‘an 
inevitable and permanent characteristic of the non-profit sector’ (Brandsen, van 
de Donk, & Putters, 2005, p. 758), possessing the ability to blend and synergise 
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different logics (Haverman & Rao 2006; Galaskiewicz & Barringer, 2012; 
Skelcher & Rathegeb Smith, 2014) and that it is their very ability to integrate 
different logics that enable them to manage and solve complex environments 
and problems (Jay, 2013)  
What there is, however, is consensus that the challenge for a hybrid 
organisation is that they are dynamic entities, and that as the level of hybridity 
becomes more complex, so do the competing aims, values and norms of 
stakeholders and the governance process (Cornforth & Spear, 2010). As such, 
hybrids must negotiate the rules of the game in multiple, contradictory games 
(Heimer, 1999; Zilber, 2002; Glynn, 2008) and be ‘so many different things to so 
many different people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself’ 
(Kerr, 1963, p. 8).  This ‘war’ is often experienced through the emergence of 
subgroup identities that exacerbate tensions between logics, thereby making 
their combination untenable (Battilana & Dorado, 2010).  Taking organisations 
to be rationally bounded, working within a common understanding of what is 
appropriate and fundamentally meaningful behaviour to gain societal support 
and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1983; Suchman, 1995), in this context 
becomes problematic. If we take legitimacy as a: 
 ‘generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574) 
then what constitutes legitimate behaviour, goals and means to achieve those 
goals in hybrid organisations?   This question occupies much of the literature on 
hybrids which are argued to face a ‘politician’s dilemma’ (of not being able to 
please everyone) (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 261), be in danger of experiencing 
‘mission drift’, having a marginalised majority (volunteers) (Ellis Paine et al., 
2010), of having significant structural, political and symbolic issues, and 
‘growing schisms’ between carriers of different logics (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Turco, 2012).  
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2.2.1 Identity and identification  
If institutional logics codify the way that a social world works by providing 
a set of material practices and symbolic constructions that constitute organising 
principles, actors’ identification with such logics is central to their acceptance 
and legitimation. The development of shared practical understandings provides 
social actors with vocabularies of motives and sense of self and provides 
cognitive legitimacy (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  It follows then that logics are 
more likely to be adopted if they are congruent/legitimate to individual actors but 
will be resisted or adapted if they are not perceived as legitimate (Coburn, 
2004; Gioia, 2013).   
Weick (1993) argues that identity and action are closely linked and that 
the social construction of an identity based on an institutional logic inherently 
involves the conditioning of practice and vice versa. People are argued to 
classify themselves and others into various social categories (Ashorth & Mael, 
1989) such as social classifications (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002), role 
classifications (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003) and institutional classifications 
(Watson T. J., 2008).  Effectively this classification provides a ‘systematic 
means by which a person can define others and themselves in the social 
environment’ (Ashorth & Mael, 1989, p. 21) which leads to social identification – 
the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human aggregate 
(Ashorth & Mael, 1989).  It is posited that this identification leads to activities 
that are seen to be congruent with the identity. In other words, it acts as a 
subliminal guide for how a person, group or organisation should behave to be 
seen (by themselves and others) as legitimate (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; 
King, Clemns, & Fry, 2011). Critically, however, such identification may not 
necessarily result in the individual accepting the espoused values and attitudes 
– ‘an individual may define themselves in terms of the organization they work 
for, but they can disagree with the prevailing values, strategy, system of activity 
and so on’ (Ashforth & Mael, 1989, p22; also see Martin & Siehl, 1983).   
Lok (2010, p. 1306) meanwhile argues that identity has historically been 
treated as relatively fixed against a logic, only flexing in times of ‘an 
entrepreneurial struggle’.  As such, individual actors are portrayed as either 
‘heroic change agents’ or ‘cultural dopes’ (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, 
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p. 1) assumed to simply adopt or maintain the identity that is deemed most 
appealing or in their best interests (Creed et al., 2002; Reay & Hinings, 2005; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) or seen as unwitting victims of coercive pressure  
and / or ‘symbolic violence’ (Oakes et al.,1998).  This view, Lok (2010) argues, 
blinds institutionalists to the possibility of identity work (a form of institutional 
work to which we turn shortly) and that identities can be subtly transformed 
through the ‘everyday talk’ and activities of all actors, not just those of 
institutional entrepreneurs.  Lok (2010) continues that identification with 
practices and discourses desired by management is seen to be able to cut 
across the multiple contested discourses that are continually available to 
employees.  Control is accomplished through positioning actors in a managerial 
discourse that they may come to identify with and commit to.  In other words, 
because multiple, contested and contradictory logics are available to actors, 
one of the most important ways to influence behaviour is to influence their 
identification with a particular logic and its associated practices.   We will now 
explore the types of work undertaken to create, maintain and transform 
intuitional logics, and actors’ identification with them, through an exploration of 
institutional work - the ‘purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed 
at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
Institutions and institutional work, 2006, p. 215). 
 
Musing 2 
June 2015: It is my experience that with a recent influx of (elite) actors (from one 
specific profession) a transformation of logics may be taking place which is emphasising 
contracting, commercial relationships and operational efficiencies associated with a 
commercial logic. I have observed several occasions where the new actors have not been 
invited to meetings because of a fear that they will ‘do the hard sell’ on customers and 
this is not how things are done ‘in the institute’ / ‘because we are a charity’. For those 
individuals, there is a frustration that they are being prevented from joining 
conversations which may enable them to do their job (sell stuff) and some confusion 
about why this is occurring.  
This study should explore this further, to understand the transformation of 
identification with particular logics over time and gain an appreciation of how this 
change is negotiated and the implications this has for organisational scripts, structure, 
governance and politics as well as operating practices.    
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2.3 Institutional work, logics and hybrid organisations 
This section reviews the literature on the work of organisational actors to 
create, maintain and transform institutional logics within hybrid organisations, 
rather than the vast literature on institutional work in general. In addressing the 
central question of the study, it also takes as its focus institutional work that has 
an internal focus (i.e. that which is concerned with constituents within the 
organisation) rather than external institutional work focused at field or societal 
levels. The notion of institutional work is one of the dominant frameworks for 
conceptualising and exploring institutional dynamics and human agency within 
institutional theory, as a response to early, overly deterministic macro-structural 
accounts of organisations (Lawrence & Suddaby, Institutions and institutional 
work, 2006).  I frame the section around three areas, exploring: the strategies 
for dealing with hybridity; who does institutional work and; what constitutes 
institutional work.  
2.3.1  Strategies for dealing with hybridity - structure and form 
Significant scholarly attention has been given to how hybrids might seek 
to accommodate various, and often contradictory, institutional logics in many 
different contexts. In this section I consider the structural strategies of 
decoupling; compromising; logic combination, segregation and segmentation - 
all of which are aimed at managing constituents’ perception of organisational 
legitimacy.   The concept of decoupling, or compartmentalising (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008) is prevalent in the early and current literature (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 1998; 2001; Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2008; Tilcsik, 2010; Bromley & Powell, 2012). These studies purport 
that organisations present a façade by conforming ‘closely to the meanings and 
categories ritually defined by the environment [institutional logic], but do not 
attempt seriously to implement them at an operational level’ (Scott, 1983, p. 
279). One of the underpinning assumptions of decoupling is that an 
organisation understands its core objective and purpose, enabling it to 
determine what contributes to the core objective and what is (for them) merely 
symbolic so that they can decouple the two.  The view that it is possible to 
compartmentalise different institutional logics without inadvertently invalidating 
  
 
v2.0 29 Jan 18 Final  
20 
another (Stryker et al, 2000; Pratt & Foreman, 2000) is criticised as over-
simplistic (Pache & Santos, 2013) in its assumption that an organisation’s 
attempts to comply with the demands of one constituency are inevitably 
observable by others, who may assign different values to the same displayed 
symbols (Stryker & Burke, 2000; Glynn, 2000).  
 Decoupling suggests a process whereby organisational actors create 
and maintain gaps between symbolically adopted polices which are defined and 
promoted externally to the organisation and organisational behaviour guided 
by actors internally to the organisation, but whose interests are being served 
by this? Dacin (2010), Coburn (2004) and Coule & Patmore (2013) argue that 
elite and the less-powerful organisational actor can draw upon institutional 
logics to frame and serve their interests. If this is the case, how does the 
organisation ensure that different groups/coalitions have complementary 
interests, indeed do they and should they if we accept the view that individuals 
have the capacity to respond to dual logics (Lok, 2010)?   
Musing 3 
June 2015:  As I was reading the literature on the potential for coalitions to occur 
within hybrids, I asked myself if there were different categories of internal actors.  I 
identified the potential for coalitions across the following groups: 
• salaried employees (staff), 
• elected volunteer trustees (Trustee’s)  
• CEO and Chariman of Trustees 
• the elected representational member group 
I observe  
• a dichotomy between employed staff dependent on their length of employment and 
their alliance with the ‘public good’ (social) and commercial agendas,   
• the Trustees as guardians of the entity (for some this is charity and for others ‘a 
business’),  
• the CEO and the Chairman of Trustees as the work as an ‘operational team’ 
• group Y as guardians of the social agenda (public good). 
My reflections led me to identify that I experience the focal organisation attempting to 
compartmentalise different activities between different groups. An example is an 
internal discourse relating to Group Y and Trustees and how the respective groups are 
managed, meetings shaped and information presented to meet their needs.  A potential 
area of interest to my research is how the focal organisation recruits and sustains 
cooperation between groups driven by a deep commitment to the business entity and 
those to the social mission? 
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Compromising (Oliver, 1991) is presented as an alternative to 
decoupling and is suggested as a viable strategy for organisations facing 
institutional complexity that need to placate diverse external constituent groups 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2013).  Compromising 
involves crafting an acceptable balance between competing logics by 
conforming to minimum standards of what is expected within each (Scott W. R., 
1983) and/or bargaining with institutional referents so that they alter their 
demands. Both approaches aim to avoid the risk of losing endorsement from 
referent groups and other significant actors. This approach is positioned as 
having an important limitation in that the organisation may not fully secure 
support from important referents, particularly over the long term (Pache & 
Santos, 2013).  
 Greenwood et al. (2011) and Tracey, et al. (2011) criticise the 
assumption that the logics that organisations embody are always compatible 
and argue that a central feature of hybrids is that the institutional logics they 
embody are not always so. In response to this incompatibility, hybrids may have 
to incorporate ‘antagonistic practices’ which may not work together and 
compromise is not always possible. A potential example of this was the case of 
Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) discussed by Powell & Colyvas (2008, pp. 289-
290). Here, the not-for-profit organisation created a separate trading company 
but constituents (politicians, media and competitors) were highly critical of the 
status of both companies and challenged their legitimacy, illegal nature and lack 
of transparency.  
A further approach is that of selective coupling / logics combination.  
This is purported to occur when	 significant complementarities exist between 
institutionally given identities, such that the organisation’s ability to successfully 
be one thing enhances its ability to be another (Kraatz & Block, 2008).  For 
example, Pache and Santos (2010; 2013) study into four work integration social 
enterprises (recycling and temporary work) identified how organisations 
embedded in competing social welfare and commercial logics were able to use 
a strategy they termed ‘Trojan Horse’ (p. 972). The Trojan Horse strategy, saw 
the organisations ‘symbolically and substantively adopting behaviours 
prescribed by the dominant (social) logic whilst maintaining those of the 
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competing (commercial) logic’ (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 37) in an attempt to 
gain legitimacy and acceptance.   
The authors take the stance that organisations can combine logics to 
create a competitive advantage and, contrary to research suggesting otherwise 
(Raa, Monin & Durand, 2003; Thornton, 2002; Chen & O’Mahony, 2006, Glynn 
& Lounsbury, 2005), can gain legitimacy in the dominant market enabling them 
to be sustainable over time.  Selective coupling is different from compromising 
as it requires the organisation to meet the full needs of the pluralistic 
environment, sending the signal of adhesion to a several logics. Skelcher and 
Rathgeb Smith (2014) suggest that segregation and segmentation strategies 
are used by non-profit hybrids to enable them to manage the relationship 
between two logics, for example between a community logic emphasising 
service delivery and a market logic reflecting the need to generate income.  
Musing 4 
July 2015:  In a similar way to Minnesota Public Radio (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), the 
focal organisation has a limited company.  The argument for doing so is that the 
interests of the two entities are indistinguishable and that the surplus from the limited 
company be covenanted back to the main organisation to fund the social agenda. 
Additionally, the focal organisation has set up a separate charity ‘Foundation’ to 
which 10% of the surplus of the main charity is covenanted. The purpose of the 
foundation is set out separately to the main organisation and has separate Trustees. 
 
What is the purpose of these different forms, with their interdependent activities and 
funding mechanisms?  Is this a compromising strategy which enables the focal 
organisation to use structure and form to: 
(1)  present argument that some of the overtly trading activities are legitimate under 
the trading company as the surplus is returned to the not-for-profit arm to fund 
the delivery of the social agenda and/or  
(2) defend against the criticism that the organisation is too commercial in that it can 
demonstrate its charitable activity under the ‘foundation’ structure and activity? 
  
Is this an example of surface isomorphism  (Zucker, 1987) through which the focal 
organisation is seeking to manage the perception of the organisation’s legitimacy?   
 
Whilst the above theoretical developments are useful in highlighting the 
socio-structural challenges of multiple logics and the strategies organisations 
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may adopt to cope with hybridity, it is in danger of reifying both institutional 
logics (by presenting them as real, concrete social structures independent of 
human agency and action) and hybrid organisations (by assigning agency to 
strategic responses independent of organisational actors). In other words, the 
thoughts and actions of human agents in making sense of and acting within the 
pluralistic world they are faced with is largely absent from the above accounts. 
In keeping with the spirit of the questions underpinning this research, I therefore 
align with the growing stream of research on institutional logics that places the 
interests of individual and groups of organisational actors at the heart of 
institutional logics. Here, theorisation of institutional logics concerns itself with 
‘the enduring paradox of embedded agency’ (Gawer & Phillips, 2013, pp. 1035-
6), seeking to understand how actors envision and enact change despite their 
actions, intentions, and rationality being conditioned by the very institutions and 
logics they wish to change (Holm, 1995; Coule & Patmore, 2013; Thorton & 
Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahliin, & Suddaby, 2008).  
2.3.2  Agentic actors and power  
But who does such institutional work? In section 2.2 (above), I surfaced 
the ongoing debate within institutional scholarship around agency and the ability 
of actors to translate ideas and practices to ‘fit their own wishes and specific 
circumstances in which they operate’ (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008, p.225; see also 
Coburn, 2004) versus the depiction of actors as cultural dopes – people who 
simply act out the directives provided by cultural, organisational and societal 
norms (Garfinkle, 1967; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  Much of the literature on 
agency positions only a sub-set of actors – the resource rich institutional 
entrepreneur (Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; Dacin, 
Munir & Tracey, 2010) – as having the ability to construct and impose logics 
through the monopolization of ‘symbol system’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
However, there is a growing stream of literature which critiques this depiction, 
challenging the view that only resource rich, elite institutional entrepreneurs are 
agentic (Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002; Coburn, 2004; Coule & Patmore, 2013; 
Coule & Bennett, 2016). Turco (2012) provides a particularly lucid account of 
how non-elite actors can turn against a dominant discourse and lead it to 
failure. In her study, Turco discussed the challenges of decoupling within 
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Motherhood Inc. (MI) and how organisational elites made visible, public 
commitments to satisfy the demands of their external environment, which were 
often just ‘myth and ceremony’; the real day-to-day, behind-the-scenes work of 
employees is unaffected by them and is organised for technical efficiency and 
profit instead.  This study involved a project to ‘commercialize a personal 
sphere of life, namely, the support and instruction that new mothers traditionally 
received from their families and communities’ (p. 389) and identified how the 
external discourse was used by internal actors to resist the commercialisation 
project:  
‘MI executives … carefully controlled what language the organization 
used with clients. They promoted a euphemistic discourse that 
specified who MI clients were and what MI’s role was in serving them 
and that obscured the organization’s status as a self-interested 
market actor. Keying off the idea that motherhood was stressful and 
traditional support eroded, they cast MI’s clients as overwhelmed, 
vulnerable, and fragile; MI as a ‘safe haven’ that offered these 
women the support and community they otherwise lacked; and MI 
employees as ‘trusted advisors’ with unique expertise to help lower 
clients’ stress…. We are here to build our community of families and 
help them navigate through childbirth and parenting. We’re not about 
the hard sell.’ (Turco, 2012, pp. 392-393) 
Specifically, it identified that internal actors could disrupt commercialisation 
activity by refusing to adopt the new narrative in its entirety due to great 
discomfort with the ‘commercial nature of the business’ (p. 398). Instead they 
appropriated the ‘trusted advisors’ and ‘safe haven’ aspects of the narrative in 
order to challenge commercialisation.  What this study points to, is the need for 
sensitivity to (often asymmetrical) power relations within institutional work.  
In the context of this study, I take the stance that all individual actors 
have agency and participate in institutional work that contributes to the creation 
and evolution of organisation’s logics through ‘everyday talk’ (Lok, 2010) and 
action. So, I will now discuss what constitutes such work. 
 
2.3.3  Types of institutional work   
The seminal work of Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 215)  defines 
institutional work as the ‘purposive actions of individuals and organizations 
aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’. For completeness, I 
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will briefly introduce Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) taxonomy of institutional 
work, which categorized the types of work associated with institutional creation, 
maintenance and disruption. The main emphasis, however, will be on the 
institutional work literature within the context of shifting and pluralistic 
environments given the research context and questions guiding this study. 
The work undertaken to create organisations is often presented as the 
area of institutional work ‘most extensively examined in the literature’ 
(Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, p. 8). This type of work involves activity 
concerned with the construction of rules, property rights and boundaries and the 
configuration of work practices.  Critical to this type of institutional work is the 
notion of institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; Eisenstadt, 1980) in 
defining the types of actors who attempt to create new institutions. The 
introduction of the institutional entrepreneur as the solution to all the stasis and 
conformity within institutional theory has nevertheless been criticized for its 
functionalism (Clegg 2010) and tendency to evoke ‘heroic imagery’ (Lawrence 
et al., 2011). 
Maintaining organisations, in contrast, has historically been 
unproblematic and routine in that organisations were assumed to be self-
reproducing and thus hold a taken for granted status (Lawrence, Suddaby, & 
Leca, 2009, p. 8). As such, institutional maintenance initially was a largely 
neglected and under theorised area of institutional work. Recent scholarship 
has challenged these earlier assumptions, arguing that ‘relatively few 
institutions have such powerful reproductive mechanisms that no ongoing 
maintenance is necessary’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 229).  Instead, most 
organisations require sustained institutional work to preserve them over time 
(Townley, 1997; Zilber, 2002; Dacin et al., 2010), respond to threats to existing 
institutional arrangements (Dacin et al., 2010); prevent change and ensure 
other actors adhere to ‘routine reproductive procedures’ (Jepperson,1991 
p.145; also see Berger & Luckmann, 1967).  
Disruption and transformation of organisations are positioned as the 
least documented research area, with little knowledge about the practices 
associated with actors attempting to undermine institutional arrangements and 
relatively little concrete descriptions of work undertaken to disrupt 
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institutionalized arrangements (Lawrence et al., 2009; Coule & Patmore, 2013; 
Coule & Bennett, 2016 for rare examples). This is significant to this study which 
looks to gain a greater understanding of the nature of institutional work 
undertaken by organisation actors to navigate multiple logics, who influences 
such work and how. Previously non-profit scholars have claimed that non-profits 
should be cautious about transformation and disruption, instead valuing 
continuity, due to the relative ‘constancy of societal need and non-profits’ 
missions’ (Salipante & Golden-Biddle, 1995, p. 3).  Recent institutional 
scholarship, however, suggests hybridity has become ‘an inevitable and 
permanent characteristic of the non-profit sector1‘ (Branden et al., 2005, p. 
758). Therefore, gaining a greater understanding of the nature of institutional 
work in the context of non-profit hybridity and how actors make sense of and 
work to disrupt, transform, blend and synergise different logics (Haverman & 
Rao 2006; Galaskiewicz & Barringer, 2012; Skelcher & Rathegeb Smith, 2014) 
could help such organisations survive in the current context of significant global 
social, political and economic change. At a practical level, this may prevent 
organisations becoming blocked or dysfunctional from their inability to resolve 
tensions between competing logics which is currently theorised as a common 
outcome of hybridity (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Scott, 
2001; Turco, 2012; Skelcher & Rathgeb Smith, 2014).  
This study takes the nature of institutional work within a non-profit hybrid 
organisation as its focus. It is for this reason that I limit the remainder of this 
section to literature on internally focussed institutional work.  As a starting point, 
I refer to Gawer and Phillips’ (2013) study exploring forms of institutional work 
performed within an organisation responding to external field level changes.  
Specifically, through an in-depth case study of Intel Corporation, a firm involved 
in 
‘a fundamental shift in the institutional logic of its field in the late 
1980s and 1990s as the field moved from a traditional supply 
chain logic dominated by computer assemblers to a new platform 
logic following very different organizing principles’ (Gawer & 
Phillips, p. 1035).   
                                            
1	The	focal	organisation	is	a	non-profit	organisation	
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They distinguished between externally and internally focussed institutional 
work, highlighting participation in the processes that drive change in the 
institutional logics that characterize an organisation’s field, and of relevance to 
this study, the work associated with responding to the shift as it occurs within 
the organisation.  They categorised internal work into two interdependent 
categories of: internal practice work (performed by organisational members to 
develop and legitimise new practices) and internal identity work (carried out by 
managers on actor’s perceptions of the organisations identity) (Gawer & 
Phillips, 2013).    
In relation to internal practice work there were three sub-categories of 
institutional work: 1) innovating new practices; (2) enrolling people in new 
practices and; (3) managing tensions resulting from new practices. I will review 
each one in turn.  Innovating new practices involved the creation of new work-
groups whose sole purpose was to engage in new practices which did not rely 
on traditional practices and which were consistent with the new logic.   Enrolling 
organisational members in the new practices was necessary to convince 
organisation members that the new practices were appropriate and encourage 
them to engage in them enthusiastically.  This was presented as a difficult and 
time-consuming activity which required consistent input from senior managers 
to communicate why the new practices were important; creating a sense of 
danger and urgency; practical explanations of what these practices look like; 
reinforcement through visual reminders and; aligning individual and group 
performance indicators and individual incentives with corporate logics. Finally, 
managing internal tensions resulting from new practices focused on sensing 
and acknowledging tensions; establishing a new vocabulary of job 1 and job 2 
to clarify and legitimize divergent objectives and; establishing an organisational 
decision-making process for managing these tension in a practice sustaining 
way.  This process was described as encouraging and stimulating direct 
discussions and at times ‘confrontational’ and ‘fairly intense’ argumentation 
between different points of view (Gawer & Phillips, 2013, p. 1057). 
Internal identity work – carried out by managers on actor’s perceptions of 
the organisations identity – emphasised responding to an internal sense of 
uncertainty as to whether engaging with these new practices was coherent with 
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Intel members’ perception of its identity. This led to identity work that 1) 
attempted to make sense of the tensions between the organisations (in this 
case Intel) identity and the new practices and 2) make new identity claims that 
aligned with the new practices.   Work centred on making sense of tensions 
between identity and new practices and creating a climate where tension was 
acknowledged, tolerated, stimulated and legitimated was important:  
‘These tensions exist, but they are definitely not a war….’ I don’t 
think tension is bad. Tension focuses strategic thinking. It focuses 
people to figure out what’s important and what’s not so important. 
It’s a bit like the judicial process in that it uses advocacy method 
to get at the truth. Here, the advocacy method and the arguments 
get the best results of strategy’- Intel CEO   (Gawer & Phillips, 
2013, p. 1058) 
Creating new identity claims associated with the new logic and new 
practices involved, for example, shifting the ‘old’ identity of ‘builder’ to a new 
identity as ‘architect of the industry’.  Gawer & Philips identified how new 
identity claims were carefully expressed through use of ‘evocative metaphors’ 
(p. 1060).  Such metaphors retained the vocabulary of Intel’s technological 
foundations but reconstructed them in a manner that portrayed intel as a 
powerful leader in a new industry logic. For the remainder of this section I take 
Gawer and Phillips (2013) categorization of internal practice and identity work 
and develop it through the inclusion of other literature. Figure 3 (see page 33) 
provides a schematic overview outlining the nature and intentions of internal 
institutional work suggested by extant literature, which I expand on within this 
section. 
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2.3.2 Internal practice work  
The literature is suggestive that the intention of practice work is to aid the 
diffusion and adoption of new practices in support of a particular logic. Several 
writers (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1997; 
Kraatz, 1998) have explored the patterns and mechanisms by which ideas are 
transported within organisational communities.  Examples of such practice work 
include; innovating new practices – forming new teams/roles, developing new 
polices, processes, products and utilising new technologies; enrolling 
organisations members into new practices – through discourse, training, setting 
objectives that align to new practices, creating sanctions (formal and informal) 
for non-adoption.  The common theme is that as new practices diffuse they be-
come ‘objectified’, gaining social consensus concerning their pragmatic value 
(Suchman, 1995), and thus they diffuse even further (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) 
providing ideas and practices with cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In this 
sense, they become taken-for-granted as the natural and appropriate 
arrangement.  
2.3.3 Identity work  
Internal identity work is that work aimed at reinforcing the moral 
acceptance and therefore adoption of new logics.  Fundamental to this activity 
is identity work to encourage actor’s identification with dominant logics (Gawer 
& Phillips, 2013). In his study into identity and logic construction of shareholder 
value, Lok (2010) found that both managers and institutional shareholders 
(re)worked their identities in everyday talk in ways that enabled them to 
translate logics in particular ways.  Lok concluded that the ‘everyday identity 
work of actors in response to a new institutional logic is an important form of 
agency through which they can resist some of a new logic’s identity cues and 
action implications while paradoxically reproducing the logic at the same time’ 
(Lok, 2010, p. 1306). He suggests that ‘everyday talk’ enables actors to 
‘reflexively accomplish self-identity through active identity work - the process of 
continuously forming, repairing, maintaining, strengthening or revising self-
constructions that are productive of a precarious sense of coherence and 
distinctiveness’ (Lok, 2010, p. 1307).     
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Coburn’s (2004) study of the relationship between changing ideas about 
reading instruction in California from 1983 to 1999 and teachers' classroom 
practice, identified the role of pre-existing beliefs and practices in the adoption 
of new practices.  This study focused on three teachers across two schools and 
concluded that teachers (actors) exercised agency and autonomy in their 
response to institutional pressures and in doing so refined, constructed and 
reconstructed their world-views and beliefs.  Coburn identified that there was a 
greater propensity to reject ideas that did not correlate with existing world views 
but acknowledged that world views could be changed, for instance through 
exposure to ‘new ways’ such as attending a training course.   However, Coburn 
also reported that there were other factors that determined whether a new 
practice was adopted.  First, actors were more likely to adopt practices where 
they had an opportunity to engage with the message in sustained iterative ways 
(Coburn referred to as the intensity of messaging). Second, actors were more 
likely to adopt new practices where the benefit of doing so was communicated 
through multiple and interlocking ways (Coburn referred to this as 
persuasiveness). Third, the perceived voluntariness of response had the 
potential to impact in that actors were less likely to respond to regulatory 
messages which are controlled and sanctioned but more likely to respond to 
normative messages (Coburn termed this voluntariness).    
Other examples of identity work include the recruitment of new actors 
who are carriers of the preferred logic (Schein, 1979; Battilana & Dorado, 2010) 
and the incentivisation of existing actors to adopt new logics (Gawer & Phillips, 
2013). For example, Battilana & Dorado (2010)  suggest that the crucial early 
levers for developing an organisational identity that supports the sustainability 
of a novel logic combination are hiring policies, which define who can become 
an organisation member.  In their study of two microfinance organisations, they 
compared the hiring process finding that one organisation hired candidates who 
worked in organisations that embodied the different institutional logics with an 
attempt to combine the respective logics. This resulted in coalitions forming 
because of preconceived notions as to what to expect and how to behave in 
organisations – i.e. because the individuals were carriers of the logics they were 
previously socialised with. The other organisation preferred to recruit individuals 
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with no preconceived ideas (e.g. little or no work experience) and build a new 
(combined) logic, focusing on early socialisation against an identity that 
combined the various logics thus preventing the formation of coalitions. Gawer 
& Phillips (2013) additionally provide examples of how tailored incentive 
programmes can be used to reinforce new practices and encourage their 
adoption to reduce tensions resulting from ‘old’ logics. There is, of course, a 
tendency in such work to present organisational actors as mere ‘carriers’ of 
institutional logics and thus cultural dopes (as discussed previously). By way of 
summarising the above discussion, figure 3 (below) provides a summary of the 
literature within the categories of internal practice and internal identity work.  
2.3.4  The role of rhetoric  
The role of rhetoric in the process of identity maintenance is one that is 
recognised in the extant literature (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997; Coburn, 2004; 
Heracleous & Marshak, 2004; Lok, 2010; Blomback et al., 2013)  for its ability to 
reassure stakholders of the stability and legitimacy (Whetten & Mackey, 2002; 
Golant et al., , 2015) of the organisation and for its structuring of meaning 
making for participants (Cheney, 1983; Lok, 2010).   Rhetoric is also recognised 
for its abilty to be a disruptive force (see for example Coburn, 2004 and;  Turco, 
2012).  In their study Gawer and Philips (2013) position rhetoric both as practice 
work (theorizing) and identity work as shown in the diagram on the following 
page. In doing so, they emphaised the powerful role of rhetoric work in 
maintaining, transforming and disrupting organisations.  Problematic, however, 
is the presentation of the homogenity of discourse within a hybrid organisation 
where arguably there are multiple identies at play and which is something that I 
return to throughout this thesis as we observe potentially conflicting discourses.  
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Figure 3: Map of internal institutional work 
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2.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I introduced the core concepts of institutional logics and 
institutional work with an emphasis on hybrid organisations given the research 
context and questions set out in chapter 1 (see page 9) Acknowledging the 
body of work that reflects on the increasing hybrid nature of organisations 
(Billis, 2010), I concur with need for ‘tougher’ conceptual frameworks to improve 
understanding.  Specifically, through this review, I identified several 
shortcomings in the literature which questions the fullness of current micro-level 
understanding of how organisational actors make sense of, respond to and try 
to influence multiple logics. I problematize the presentation of logics as binary 
(Meyer, Brooks, & Goes 1990; Tolbert and Zucker 1996), logic transformation 
as a sequential process (Suddaby and Hinings 2002); rhetoric as homogeneous 
and hybrid organisations as inherently unstable (Scott and Meyer, 199; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002; Battilana and Dorado, 
2010). I also argue that the literature suffers from a tendency to reify 
institutional logics and organisations, presenting actors as cultural dopes rather 
than agentic in making sense of complex hybrid organisations and reworking 
associated organisational scripts.  
My intuition as an embedded actor turned researcher in a hybrid 
organisation is that the interplay between logics and the work of actors to 
reconcile competing logics is more fluid and messy than the literature presents 
and that multiple aspects of institutional work can be undertaken 
simultaneously. Actors can behave intentionally, and as such are powerful and 
practiced at managing consensus, constructing, maintaining and disrupting 
institutional boundaries and behaviour, and at times like cultural dopes following 
directives unconsciously.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design  
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapters, this research emerges from an 
interest in understanding how individual and groups of actors shape their daily 
work activity in the context of organisational hybridity.  Specifically, it seeks to 
enhance understanding of how organisational actors deal with the presence of 
multiple institutional logics and what implications this has for the nature of 
organisation (structurally, politically, symbolically and rhetorically). In this 
chapter I examine the research design for the study, the chapter structure is as 
set out in figure 4.  
 
Figure 4:  Chapter three structure map 
 
Figure 5 (below) provides a synopsis of the overall research design; 
each of these elements, how they interrelate and give meaning to my research 
is discussed in further detail in the remainder of this chapter. In summary, the 
core assumption I bring to the research is that humans have autonomous 
potential and give meaning to their surroundings; knowledge is personal and 
experiential and research methods need to explore individual understanding 
and subjective experiences of the world.  
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Figure 5: Research Design – adapted from Crotty (1998) 
Research Question: 
How do organisational actors deal with the presence of multiple institutional logics and what 
implications does this have for the nature of organisation (structurally, politically, symbolically 
and rhetorically?) 
a) What is the nature of institutional work undertaken by institutional actors to navigate 
multiple logics? 
b) Who influences such work and how? 
c) What happens if ‘insiders’ do not see the dominant logic as legitimate? 
 
 
 
 
Philosophical 
Tradition 
 
 
 
 
Interpretivism 
Epistemological 
position (nature and 
purpose of 
knowledge)  
 
Subjective 
How I understand the nature of knowledge:  
a) Embrace the notion that we are dealing with 
situated world-making and meaning developed 
by individuals and groups.   
b) Reject the view that it is possible to neutrally 
observe organisational phenomena.  
Ontological 
position (nature of 
social reality and 
what it means to be 
human)  
Objective 
My sense of reality:  
a) Social structures (in the context of this study - 
institutions) have an existence independent of 
human cognition, but are not necessarily 
cognitively accessible to researchers 
b) Social structures are amenable to manipulation, 
creation, maintenance, transformation and 
destruction by agentic actors. 
I am placing human interpretation as the starting point for developing 
knowledge about the social world; I’m interested in the ways individual’s 
sense making schemas are put into practice, accepted, altered or rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
Research 
methodology 
and methods 
 
Qualitative   A craft rather than a scientific endeavour.  
 
 
 
 
 
Embedded 
ethnography 
I understand ethnography as action orientated 
fieldwork carried out over a long period of time to see 
cycles of activity.  Ethnography   requires me (as 
researcher) to immerse myself in the day-to-day 
extraordinary stuff of everyday cultural life and 
through observations, encounters and conversations 
come to an understanding/interpretation of the 
actors, actions, chaos and complexity of everyday 
life.   By being ‘embedded’ I recognise and 
acknowledge my role as a team member, co-worker 
and senior manager. As a contributor to the creation 
of everyday life, as a researcher, employee and 
colleague, I position myself as a ‘native going 
researcher’ rather than a ‘researcher going native’.  
Fieldwork 
 
a) Interviews: Respondent interviews and incident-
focussed interviews – participants asked to 
share their own perspectives and experiences 
b) Document analysis:  explore the range of ways 
multiple logics are experienced, narrated and 
navigated  
c) Participant observation: Acting as participant 
observer to explore in situ, how different logics 
and work activities interplay. 
Analysis  
 
a) Committed to Verstehen and embrace that 
through the process of interaction with 
participants and privileging my interpretations, I 
co-create research accounts and knowledge 
claims 
b) Use of critical reflexivity to challenge my taken 
for granted assumptions. 
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3.2 Philosophical positioning 
In this section I discuss the philosophical positioning of my study, why it 
is appropriate for my chosen area of study and research questions and 
summarise the implications this has for knowledge production and the status of 
my research outcomes. The importance of understanding metatheoretical 
assumptions is supported by many commentators (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; 
Cunliffe, 2011; Coule, 2013) for its ‘practical consequences’ for the way that we 
do research, how topics are approached, where researchers focus their studies, 
what constitutes ‘data’ and how it should be collected and analysed, how we 
theorise, and how we write up research accounts:   
‘There is considerable diversity in the different methods available 
to the researcher seeking to access the organizational world... any 
process of methodological engagement inevitably articulates, and    
is    constituted    by an    attachment    to    particular 
philosophical or metatheoretical commitments’ (Duberley, 
Johnson, & Cassell, 2012, p. 15) 
3.2.1  Interpretivism  
The intended outcome of my research is a context specific, time-bound 
understanding of individual and organisational action.  The goal - to understand 
the process of ‘world making’ (Schwandt, 1994) and the ways that people 
actively establish and re-establish the meanings they use to organise their 
experiences within a specific hybrid organisation.  To this end, my research 
approach is undertaken within the interpretive tradition.  In aligning with this 
tradition my stated ontological position (or my sense of reality - whether 
phenomena exist independently of my knowing and perceiving them) is realist. I 
see social structures – in the context of this study, institutions – as having an 
existence independent of human cognition, but are not necessarily cognitively 
accessible to researchers. Importantly, I do not take social structures to be 
fixed, enduring realities; rather they are amenable to manipulation, creation, 
maintenance, transformation and destruction by   human   actors.    
  Research within the interpretive tradition ‘takes human interpretations 
as the starting point for developing knowledge about the social world’ (Prasad 
P. , 2005, p. 13).  Whilst some scholars would dismiss interpretive research as 
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a limited approach suffering because it centres exclusively on micro-worlds of 
individual interactions, Prasad argues that: 
‘As interpretive organizational research comes of age it begins to 
bridge the gap between micro-practices and macro-structure and to 
work on establishing the connections between local subjective    
worlds    and    macro    organizational   and institutional processes 
and phenomena’ (Prasad P. , 2005, p. 7).  
This ability to bridge the micro and macro worlds of individuals, structures and 
external environments aligns to my interest in the interplay between macro level 
institutional logics and micro level institutional work and therefore an 
appropriate tradition for my research. 
Central to Interpretivism is an acceptance of Verstehn (Outhwaite, 1975) 
so it would be remiss not to acknowledge the significance of this and how it 
played out in my research.  Verstehn suggests the possibility for researchers to 
access and understand, through investigation, the meanings and interpretations 
research participants subjectively ascribe to phenomena to explain how they 
experience, sustain, articulate and share with others their socially constructed 
everyday realities.   Whilst this ability to access and understand is critical to this 
research, it comes with the implication that I inevitably privilege my 
interpretation of the participants’ experiences and realities and, in this very act, 
contribute to the creation of research accounts and knowledge claims. As such, 
reflexivity plays a central role in ensuring interpretations have strong 
congruence with research participants’ accounts (see section 3.3.2, page 40 for 
discussion of my approach to reflexivity).  
3.3  Research Strategy (Methodology) 
My research constitutes an embedded ethnographic study.   I position 
ethnography not as a research method, but as a way or writing about and 
analysing social life that prioritises close and intensive observation in the 
gathering of information and insights and uses many research methods to ‘get 
into’ the head of organisational members’ (Watson T. J., 2011, p. 202). 
Considered to ‘occupy a surprisingly important position’ in terms of competent 
and interesting management research (Fine, Morrill, & Surianarain, 2009, p. 
602) with its ability to reduce puzzlement – of researchers as well as readers 
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(Van Maanen, 2011) – ethnography contributes to organisational studies in 
numerous areas of enquiry including:  
‘The elaboration of informal relations; organizations as systems of 
meaning; organizations and their environments; organizational 
change; ethics and normative behaviour and; power, politics and 
control’ (Fine et al., 2009, p.602). 
By ‘embedded researcher’ (Lewis & Russell, 2011) I mean that I am a 
‘complete member’ (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007) of the focal organisation and 
present myself as being  been in the ‘waiting room’  (Mannay & Morgan, 2015) 
for some 14 years prior to starting this study  as opposed to temporarily joining 
the focal organisation for the purpose and duration of the research.   
Placing human interpretations as the starting point for developing 
knowledge about the social world (Duberley et al., 2012), this ethnography 
sought to understand and interpret how individuals make sense of their life-
worlds, the ways in which individuals construct and make sense of social 
situations (Garfinkle, 1967; Weick, 1995) and the ways schemas are put into 
practice and accepted, altered or rejected (Prasad, 2005) in the face of 
hybridity. As such, providing localized understanding of meaning making as it 
occurs from a few vantage points within the focal organisation required a high 
level of ‘ethnographic being there’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Bate, 1997; Van 
Maanen, 1998; Brannan & Oultram, 2012). The process deployed rested on a 
‘logic of discovery and happenstance rather than logic of verification and plan 
… subjecting the self... to a set of contingencies that play on others such that 
over time… one can see, hear, feel and come to understand the kinds of 
response others display (and withhold) in particular social situations’ (Van 
Maanen, 2011, pp. 219-220).  
That said, ethnography is not without criticism. Three main criticisms are 
levelled against it, namely: that there is a lack of control over what is studied; 
that it is susceptible to the possibilities of researcher bias and; that it lacks 
enumerative generalizability.  These are generally countered by the potential of 
ethnographic approaches to allow for deeper understanding of the topic being 
studied, and provide for multiple perspectives and opportunities to examine 
processes (Fine et al., 2009). Its strength as a methodology has been 
positioned as: its ability to ‘elucidate (two) aspects for which other 
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methodologies are less suitable - its hidden dimensions and its actor-context 
relations’ (Yanow et al., 2012 p.335); its ability to discover subtleties in both 
meaning and behaviour as they unfold in situ (Dalton, 1959); its ability to reveal 
unintended consequences of intended managerial decisions (Goffman, 1956) 
and; its ability to illustrate ‘how things work’ (Van Maanen, 2011 p.218).  
Because this research aim is to reflect on and understand the 
experiences of actors within a given context and time to gain some insights 
which may provide an understanding that extends beyond the individual and 
into the wider context of organisations and institutions (Musson, 2004, p. 35), 
ethnography is an appropriate methodology for my research.  The attention it 
allows me to give to how the focal organisation operates as on-going concern, 
the exploration of daily social interactions, routines and rituals and to the 
identification of mechanisms through which organisational behaviours occur 
(Fine et al., 2009) is a real strength.  In short, it is well suited to generating 
greater understanding of the processes and logics at play in the focal 
organisation and how they are used to achieve and or subvert actions and 
behaviours and to inform future planning and operations to support the focal 
organisation’s sustainability.  
3.3.2  Reflexivity 
Being an embedded researcher meant that I benefitted from immediate 
access to many different actors and data sources and an ability to participate in 
daily routines and concrete work situations (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Dent, 
1990). This enabled me to see contradictory rationales and divergent 
viewpoints, highlighting similarities and difference between the perspectives as 
they emerged and evolved over time. That said, whilst my ‘natural access 
(Alvesson M. , 2003) was of practical benefit, it did require me to give much 
thought and planning to the avenues of exploration.  Without this I was at risk of 
chasing many different discussion’s and disappearing like the preverbal ‘rabbit 
down a rabbit hole’.  My 14 years in the organisation prior to beginning this 
study could be deemed valuable time spent in the ‘waiting field with the 
opportunity to explore the times when real lives carry on before the intrusion of 
the data production process’ (Mannay & Morgan, 2015, p. 166). Arguably, 
however, this also carries the risk that I may be blind to the assumptions, beliefs 
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and knowledge claims that I bring to any interpretation; there is after all 
‘something of the judger involved in the judgment’ (Emerson & Pollner, 1976, p. 
244). Therefore, the critical appraisal of my own assumptions and research 
practices and my ability to turn back upon and take account of myself (Weick, 
2002) was an important part of the research process. In pursuing a rich 
congruent interpretation, reflexivity must go beyond simply questioning the truth 
claims of others and considered my role in making knowledge claims.   
Furthermore, as an ‘insider researcher’ I was cognisant of the potential 
risks, personal stakes and emotional investment that I had in the research 
setting. There were occasions where I felt that my access was of a sensitive 
nature and this impacted on my ability to share and validate my interpretations.  
See for example chapter 6 where I was both the researcher and the line 
manager of one of the protagonist.  Whilst such closeness can be challenged 
as reducing the ability for objective, valid research (Anderson, Herr, & Nihlen, 
Studying your own school, 1994 Anderson & Herr, 1999) as a result of personal 
stakes I conteract this percieved limation by suggesting  that this closeness 
enabled a level of pre-understanding (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007, p. 72) that 
when combined with activite reflexivity enabled a particulary richness of 
interpretaiton and understanding which is a stregth of this research.  
My reflexive processes therefore incorporated multiple layers and levels 
of reflection within the research, including (also see figure 6 below):   
 ‘The relationships within   the   production   of   knowledge 
(epistemology), the   processes   of   knowledge   production 
(methodology), and the involvement and impact of the knowledge 
producer (ontology)’ (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012, p. 73) 
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Figure 6: Four stage reflexive process - adapted from (Hibbert, 2012) 
 
 
In practice, my reflective processes included the following 
Table 1:  Reflective processes 
 
Interactive 
engagement 
(a) Reading scholarly articles to get an appreciation of approaches to 
reflection in practice  
(b) Negotiated frequent study days from work to enable me to create 
quieter space to reflect upon and challenge my interpretation  
(c) Set up internal reviewer group and employed open communication 
and talked about progress, thinking and interpretations (non-
personalized) in several forums to develop perspectives (e.g. dining 
room, team meetings, peer groups)  
Disruption (a) Set up supervisory meetings to challenge my thinking and look at 
alternative ways of thinking.   
(b) Committed to writing up my reflections and frequently reviewing to 
understand and challenge the assumptions and feelings that I have 
expressed at different stages of the study  
Extension (a) Through reflection continually challenged what I was bringing to my 
interpretation.   
(b) Gave much consideration to my ‘work role’ and how this may 
impact on my interpretations but also how others presented things 
to me.  
Repletion 
 
(a) Created opportunities to speak to others who were outside of the 
organisation to get their perspectives on my findings and 
interpretations – these included financially successful 
entrepreneurs; pure charity workers and academic peers.  
 
I spent time focusing on the thoughts and assumptions that guided my 
interpretation of the discussion that had taken place. I recorded how I had made 
sense of the conversations and elicited new observations for future lines of 
Interactive 
engagement
• Prepare for 
reflection and 
make space for it 
in the curriculum
• Engage with 
others to transform 
thinking
Disruption
• Question own 
ideologies and 
hidden 
assumptions; use 
critical dialogue to 
engage with 
diversity and 
foreground power
Extension
• Question own 
practices, 
assumptions and 
role in  the creation 
of meaning of 
accounts; Unsettle 
comfortable 
viewpoints / 
familiar concepts 
Repletion
• Reflect in a self-
focused manner 
about particular 
issues
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enquiry through use of a research log.  I noted the emotions that conversations 
and observations evoked in me and by doing so acknowledged that they are 
‘crucial to how the social is reproduced and the relationship between the 
process of research and the final research product’ (Haynes, 2012, p. 85).  As 
part of this reflection I considered the effectiveness and processes of data 
collection, considering issues such as ethics, power relations and language 
use.   
This post reflection raised my awareness of and helped me deal with 
challenges in conducting the research as an embedded researcher. One 
example of reflection in practice was when I almost corrected an interviewee 
who I felt had incorrectly described a technical process (that I had implemented 
in a work role some 5 years previously) during an interview.  As I was about to 
make the correction I realised that the interviewee’s representation reflected 
how they made sense of the process within the current context and making the 
correction was outside of the scope of my researcher role.  This experience 
highlighted the need for me to be aware of the role that I was playing during 
discussions as I was at times both a researcher and a member of staff with a 
role in logic creation, maintenance and transformation. It was important that I 
maintained a reflexive awareness of ‘my shifting sense of self as both the 
subject and the object of research… belonging to the research and being 
outside it’ (Hynes, 2012, pp. 84-85)	 
Another example of reflection in practice occurred whilst reflecting on the 
relationship between my work role and those that I was researching which 
arguably ‘goes beyond the temporal parameters of my research project’ (Tietze, 
2012, p. 54). I felt that the seniority of my work role had potential implications 
for my researcher role, for example, it brought with it potential issues of ethics, 
the use of the information collected and power relations within the data 
collection process (Waddington, 2004).  Talking with my academic peer group 
and my supervisor I acknowledged the potential that others may; (a) hesitate to 
share their experiences or feel under pressure to present their experiences in a 
way that they felt was acceptable because I was a director and/or, (b) may use 
the opportunity to lobby me for some changes they wanted to make and /or (c) 
may react emotionally to my findings if they felt that I was making judgements 
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on them or, representing them incorrectly or sharing some information that was 
given to me in confidence.  By becoming aware of the constitutive nature of the 
research conversations it became clear that I needed to be open and 
transparent about my dependence on the researched, implement steps to 
check the interpretations of meanings I assigned to the data and, ensure that I 
continued to reflect on the established relationships that will be taken into the 
research project and which may influence the data generating, collection and 
interpretation processes. Following this reflection, I implemented several 
actions. At an organisational level I published my research programme on the 
intranet and through new staff induction briefings explaining the goals of the 
research, how it would be carried out, how data would be used and a clear 
escalation plan – both internal to the organisation and externally through my 
supervisory team should anyone have any concerns about the research 
programme or my conduct. (see Appendix 3 – Research Notice (Bain, 2012)).  
For formal interviews, each participant received a written letter outlining the 
purpose of the research and how I would use the information. Each participant 
was given a unique reference to make their comments anonymous and 
recordings of the interviews were transcribed by an independent external 
organisation ensuring that no one in the focal organisation apart from me and 
the participant had knowledge of the conversation.  Copies of respective 
transcripts were provided to participants with a commitment to amending any 
comments retrospectively for whatever reason if they wished – no one 
requested to amend their transcript following review.  
I selected three reviewers from the organisation, asking them to reflect 
and feedback on my interpretations from the focal incidents, whether they 
recognised my interpretation and if it had any congruence with their 
experiences and perceptions and if my interpreted was credible to them.   All 
reviewers have central roles that span across the focal organisation giving them 
breadth of experience of the different teams and actors; none was directly 
involved in any of the incidents.  One reviewer had been employed within the 
focal organisation for over 20 years (and five CEOs), bringing a breadth of 
background knowledge and perspective; the second was from the same 
profession as the CEO which arguably has some commonality of sense making  
(see musing 2 on page 20) and finally, reviewer 3 was an external consultant 
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who has worked within the focal organisation in a central management role for 
six years and thus brings a relatively ‘outside’ perspective. See Appendix 3 – 
Profile of interviewees / reviewers for an overview of the reviewers and 
Appendix 5 – Example of Internal Reviewers Feedback for an example of the 
quality of feedback received.  This feedback was received in respect of Chapter 
4, Making Sense of a Hybrid, and alleviated my initial concerns around whether 
the organisation was experienced as a hybrid by others (see musing 5 below). 
I discovered reflexivity in action required me to think about my 
experiences, question my way of doing and reflect on the intellectual, 
perceptual, theoretical, ideological, cultural, textual and cognitive principles and 
assumptions that informed my thinking (Hynes, 2012).  The ‘musing box’ (5) 
below represents some of my thoughts as I considered my own role in this 
research. Taking this musing into a supervision session we discussed how my 
instinct that something big was happening should be used to motivate me to 
explore how others made sense of the organisation and how (or indeed if) they 
experienced different logics and made sense of them.  The discussion from this 
musing became quite significant in my research design.  It resulted in my   
implementing a two-phase approach to my research, with phase 1 being 
specifically directed at answering my questions around whether the focal 
organisation was experienced as a hybrid by anyone other than me and if it was 
experienced how was it experienced (see the next section for further details). 
 
Musing 5 
September 2014:  After reading ‘We’re real here: Hooters girls, big tips and provocative 
research methods’ (Rasmusson, 2001) specifically around the researchers reflections 
around the assumptions and beliefs that were driving their interpretations I began 
thinking around what led me to believe that the focal organisation was a hybrid  and 
what position I had on logics I perceive to be at play – was I coming from a critical 
perspective, a perspective that ‘judged’ one logic to be better than another, were there 
indeed even different logics at play or was I simply struggling to cope with a change of 
CEO?  I asked myself the following?  
1. Is my research interest constructing a hybrid organisation where for others it does 
not exist? 
2. What if the problem isn’t the existence of competing logics but my reaction to 
changes being made by a new CEO 
3. What do the competing logics even look like - how will I be able to recognise them?  
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3.4 Research methods 
This research design chapter opened by noting the ‘considerable 
diversity’ of methods available to the researcher seeking to access the 
organisational world and the need for methods to align with a methodology that 
articulates and constitutes attachment to metatheoretical commitments 
(Duberley et al., 2012 p.15). So far, I have sought to articulate my philosophical 
stance and its implications for the production of knowledge claims.  In this 
current section I expand on the phases and methods of the study, namely 
interviews, direct observations and document analysis aimed at describing and 
interpreting the experiences of organisational members (Fine, Morrill, & 
Surianarain, 2009) 
I approached ‘data’ collection in two distinct but interrelated phases, 
which are summarised in figure 7 below. The first phase focussed on the 
research context and if and how organisational actors experienced and made 
sense of different logics within the organisation. The second phase focussed on 
incidents that appeared to have potential to shed light on the substantive 
questions guiding the overall research programme. 
Figure 7:  Research phases and associated methods 
 
 
In sum, I undertook a total of 26 in-depth interviews (or purposeful 
conversations) (see table 2 on page 48) which were recorded and transcribed. 
A copy of the full transcript was provided to participants for review and 
clarification through a supplementary interview if they felt they had not 
•Phase 1 Questions
•Do different/competing logics exist? 
•How are they experienced (seen, felt, described, 
actioned)?
•Research methods
•Document analysis 
• Interviews with organisational actors
•Observation
1:	Contextual	
research
•Phase 2 Questions
•What  is  the  nature  of  institutional  work  undertaken  to  
navigate multiple logics?
•Who influences such work and how?
•What happens if ‘insiders’ do  not  see  the  dominant  
logic  as legitimate?
•Research methods
•Document analysis
• Interviews with actors involved in critical incidents
•Observation
2. Incident 
research
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represented a response as they wished - in the event, this type of addendum 
never happened. A field journal was kept and updated regularly to include my 
reflections (musings) and observations. During formal and informal discussions, 
I provided a description of the locations, situations and actions being observed 
and emotions evoked.  For instance, during meetings, the people (those 
present, their dress code, positions around the table) and their conversation 
(order of speaking, content of discourses, tone including jokes, serious humour 
and small talk) were recorded.  This proved unproblematic in that I had freely 
communicated my research within the organisation and my research log quickly 
became somewhat like the furniture – unquestionably accepted. Documents, or 
written texts, were useful in exploring the construction of stories and shared 
narratives about individuals and the organisation over time (Hodder, 2003; 
Paulson, 2011; Lee, 2012).  The texts analysed included strategy documents, 
records of management meetings, published annual accounts, staff newsletters 
and films/presentations from staff away days. Table 2 (page 48) provides an 
overview of the various data sources before they are discussed in detail in 
relation to the two research phases. 
3.4.1 Phase one 
Returning to my earlier musing (see musing 5 page 45) I firstly wanted to 
understand how individual actors experienced the focal organisation from a 
logics perspective, specifically looking to: get an understanding of whether 
different logics were experienced; if they were experienced how they were 
seen, felt, described, actioned and; how actors made sense of navigating them.  
This was the purpose of phase one and to that end I immersed myself in 
analysis of organisational texts, interviews with organisational actors and 
participant observations.  
This initial phase consisted of fourteen audio-recorded and transcribed 
interviews, lasting approximately one hour each, with: two trustees; one current 
and one previous CEO; three senior managers, three middle managers; three 
(non-management) staff and one graduate. In total, there were 251 pages of 
interview transcripts.  Participants were chosen both for pragmatic reasons 
(ease of access) but also to get a breadth and variation of experience amongst 
interviewees (King, 2004; Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012) (See Table 3 page 49 for 
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profile of interviewees). Specifically, I was looking to get perspectives from the 
different areas of activity, job seniority and length of employment with the focal 
organisation. I did not select on age or gender of the participants as I did not 
feel it was relevant to the context of the study.   
In the interviews, participants were asked to share their own 
perspectives and experiences (Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012, p. 241) beginning 
with their interpretation of the core purpose of the organisation and how their 
role fitted within this.  Interviews were loosely structured and conversational in 
style, allowing participants to pursue topics they regard as interesting and 
important, thus facilitating a richness of content (Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012, p. 
248) and reducing the potential for participants merely to respond to researcher 
determined parameters. This approach comes with the risk that participants 
move in directions that are of little or peripheral relevance to the research (Fine, 
Morrill, & Surianarain, 2009). I counteracted this risk through reference to a 
loosely structured interview guide (King, 2004) or aid memoir, which evolved in 
respect of topics as they emerged throughout the process and centered on the 
aims of the organisation and how work is prioritised and success measured.  
Interviews were recorded and copies of transcripts were provided to each 
participant for their review and comment.  Following each interview, I reviewed 
the format and experience as part of the reflexive process (see page 40 for a 
discussion on reflexivity).  In addition, I observed two functional team meetings 
(finance and governance team and sales team) to get an appreciation of the 
issues that they were dealing with and the types of language they used.  I read 
three strategy documents (from the period 2007-2016) to see what issue were 
being dealt with, how the organisation was being positioned, what the key 
priorities were and what constituted success. I undertook a physical 
environment scan, walking around the offices looking at the physical set up and 
symbolic messaging on the walls to understand what key messages were being 
presented. I referred to minutes of previous meetings I had attended and copies 
of my personal appraisal and other institutional documents that I had gathered 
within the context of my role. I acted as participant observer in meetings that 
took place throughout my study and included Board meetings (volunteer 
trustees); management meetings; meetings of the member representational 
group and functional team meetings (see Table 2 below for details).   
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Table 2:  Summary of sources 
 
Phase Title Individual interviews / 
purposeful conversations  
Documents Participant observation 
Total  
26 interviews with 19 
individuals [350 interview 
transcript pages] 
98 documents [2,566 document pages] Attendance at 25 meetings as 
participant observer 
1 Making sense of hybridity 
14  
[251 pages of interview 
transcript]  
1374 
pages  
Strategy documents; Website pages; 
charter document; Trustee meeting 
minutes; Senior executive meeting minutes; 
Staff away day films and presentation; 
Project and budget documents  
 
• Trustee strategy setting meetings 
• Senior executive meetings 
• Functional team meetings 
(finance, governance and sales) 
2 
Incident 1: Public 
good versus 
commerciality 
6 
[118 pages of interview 
transcript] 
114 
pages  
Job descriptions; Key performance 
indicators; ICT data flow document; Project 
document (P&L scoping Nov 14); Training 
handouts; Reflective log  
• Monthly senior executive meeting 
• Training presentation (preparing 
for audit) 
Incident 2: The 
bonus setting 
process 
1  
[27 pages] 
500 
pages 
Job descriptions; Regulations / terms of 
reference; Email; Meeting report; Citations; 
Pay policy; Meeting minutes; Staff away 
day films and presentation; Reflective log 
• Finance committee  (July 2015) 
• Trustee meetings (8 Sep 2015, 
Dec 2015, Mar 2016) 
Incident 3: 
The governance 
setting 
5  
[102 pages] 
578 
pages  Job descriptions; Regulations / terms of reference; email; Trustee meeting minutes; 
Reflective log  
• Trustee meetings 
• Senior executive meetings 
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Table 3:  Interview candidates phase 1 
 
 
At times, it was difficult to remain a ‘conscious researcher’ at meetings 
as I was often acting as a routine participant, forming relationships and 
participating in activities at the same time making no secret of my intention to 
observe events (Waddington, 2004).  In doing this I needed to consider my own 
experiences as an important and legitimate source of data (Tietze, 2012, p. 55).  
To mitigate against lapse of attention (privileging participation rather than 
observation) I systematically recorded data through a mixture of note taking on 
descriptions of people, events and conversations as well as recording and 
transcribing the recordings where possible. For more formal meetings I could 
use the formal minutes of the meeting to supplement observational data but 
being mindful that minutes are themselves a political artefact and shaped by 
individual sense-making of the meeting conversation.  Respectful of the need to 
be able to approach the data from multiple possible interpretations (Tietze, 
2012), the process of reflexivity was an essential feature of participant 
observation (Waddington, 2004).  
Phase one analysis.  The purpose of phase one was to establish 
whether organisational actors experienced different/competing logics within the 
organisation and if so how they are seen, felt, described, actioned. It was these 
questions that shaped my analysis. As I listened to the tapes, read through 
transcripts and documents and reflected on my experience in the field I noticed 
several phrases that individuals used to position the different areas of the focal 
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organisation.  This caused me to review the sources in relation to Bakhtin’s 
(Bakhtin, 2002) notion of living conversation (seeing conversation among 
people as a never-ending process whereby one person's message joins with 
that of another and one person's meaning joins with that of another) and my 
question then changed to ‘what is the nature of the work undertaken within 
these different positions; how is such work influenced and how do individual 
actors navigate across and make sense of these different positions?’ 
In this way, I began to build a schematic (see chapter 4) of the different 
ways people position the organisation and the logics that underpin these 
positions through an iterative process of reading and re-reading accounts. This 
reassured me that others, besides me, experienced different logics at play 
within the focal organisation. Specifically, these coalesced around notions of 
public good and commerciality. This insight enabled me to move onto phase 
two and identify ‘incidents’ to develop understanding of how organisational 
actors deal with the presence of multiple institutional logics and what 
implications this has for the nature of organisation (structurally, politically, 
symbolically and rhetorically). 
3.4.2 Phase two 
This second phase involved the identification of incidents or cases of 
institutional work that cut across competing logics.  It is important to note, 
however, that I did not endeavour to undertake the traditionally positivistic 
approach of critical incident technique (Chell, 1998; Chell & Pittaway, 1998; 
Pittawell & Chell, 1999), but rather used ‘critical incidents’ as the mechanism to 
guide the focus of data collection and write up the findings. This was helpful in 
terms of bounding the purposeful fieldwork within an embedded, longitudinal 
ethnography and offers an alternative to the commonly adopted thematic 
presentation of data. In identifying what seemed to be a ‘critical’ incident, rather 
than just another incident, I observed the level and significance of ‘noise’ or 
‘turbulence’ created within the organisation (i.e. how much and what kind of 
attention did the incident receive, from whom, for how long and why). In practice 
this study, involved three ‘events’ or ‘incidents’ where there were opposing 
perspectives, as summarised in the Table 4 below. 
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Table 4:  Summary of incidents  
 
 
 At this point, it is important to again acknowledge the influence of my 
‘insider’ role (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007) on the identification of incidents.   As 
an ‘elite actor’ (though my role on senior management team), I had access to a 
certain type of conversation shaped both by my leadership and my functional 
remit.  As such my access to conversation and therefore awareness of potential 
incidents is undoubtable shaped by the theoretical and experiential knowledge 
and access that I brought to incident identification process   Equally it was my 
awareness of this influence that enable me to use the reflexive process (see 
table 1 and figure 6) to reframe and develop my understanding and 
interpretation of the situation.  
Incident 1 – Data sharing.   Fieldwork relating to incident one consisted 
of three taped and transcribed interviews, lasting approximately two hours each 
with two senior managers and a consultant involved in a specific project.  In the 
interviews participants were asked to share their perspectives and experiences 
(Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012, p. 241) on the incident and how they made sense 
of the issues involved. Additionally, I revisited the transcripts of three phase one 
Ref Location Title of 
incident 
Summary of incident  How incident was 
identified  
1 Chapter 5  Data sharing  Involved a challenge from 
one department that 
another department had 
sent out an un-authorised 
marketing email and in 
doing so restricted data was 
accessed in an unfair way, 
putting the organisation at 
risk of regulatory breach.  
In my everyday work, I 
became aware of 
emotionally charged 
conversations between 
three departments (A-
made challenge; B – 
potentially misused data 
and C – used the data to 
send out a 
communication). 
2 Chapter 6  The bonus 
setting 
process  
This incident explores the 
institutional work 
undertaken to bring in a 
change to the bonus 
structure and the 
challenges faced from 
protagonists.  
In my role, I was directly 
involved in the 
development of the 
proposal and attending 
meetings to gain approval.  
3 Chapter 7  The 
governance 
setting  
This incident relates to a 
Board challenge to the 
legality, authority and 
process of another body. 
I attended several 
meetings where I became 
aware of a narrative of 
challenge around the 
governance of an elite 
committee. Specifically, 
this came to my attention 
due to of the longevity of 
the narrative of challenge.  
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interviews where interviewees had referred to the incident in their phase one 
interview to get an appreciation of how the incident was made sense of by 
those who were not directly involved.  Again, I brought to the process my 
experiences as an organisational actor.  For example, in my time with the focal 
organisation I had been responsible for the Information Technology (IT) team 
(so was familiar with the data sharing policies and data protection regulations) 
and for the operational activity that caused the incident (so was also familiar 
with the regulatory framework). Furthermore, as a colleague of the two senior 
managers, having worked directly with them for more than 5 years, I had my 
own relationship with them and brought to the discussion my experiences of 
their personalities and motivations and knowledge of their individual roles and 
relationships with other parties involved.  
I termed each interviewee a protagonist in recognition that they were an 
advocate of a logic in this case ‘public good’ or ‘commercial’. Analysis involved 
an iterative process of reading and re-reading the protagonists accounts to build 
up an understanding of the different perspectives, what institutional work was 
undertaken and what strategies they deployed (rhetoric, structural and political) 
to perpetuate and defend their respective preferred logics.   As with the 
interviews in phase one, participant identities were anoymised, interviews 
recorded and externally transcribed.  Participants were provided with their 
transcript and I completed a reflective log after each interview, recording my 
initial interpretations about what was going on for the protagonist. Finally, I 
provided a copy of my interpretations to three reviewers and invited their 
feedback on my interpretations and the extent to which it made sense and 
appeared credible to them, thus contributing to the reliability and authenticity of 
knowledge claims (Fine et al., 2009). 
Incident 2 - The bonus setting process.   This incident was of a more 
confidential, sensitive nature in that the context of the incident (approving a new 
bonus) was one with the potential to affect staff terms and conditions of 
employment.  I was closely involved with the events as they unfolded as, at the 
time, my job role included responsibility for Human Resources (HR) and I line 
managed the HR team.   This allowed for a direct observation and involvement 
in conversations and processes as the incident unfolded.  For these reasons, I 
did not feel the need for additional methods of data collection and as such the 
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sources of data for this incident are organisational documents in the form of 
minutes of meetings, drafts of formal papers, nominations for bonus awards to 
map the changes made to the bonus scheme over time (2007-2016); 
observation field notes of committee meetings and a reflective diary.    As in 
previous chapters, to enable interactive engagement I provided early drafts to 
the reviewer group asking if ‘it make sense to them, was it a credible 
interpretation’- thus contributing to the reliability and authenticity of the 
knowledge claims (Fine, et al., 2009).  Importantly due to the sensitivity of the 
subject matter I did so only after the approval process was completed.  
What struck me most about this incident, was the strength of individuals’ 
positions and that, on this occasion, there appeared to be two opposing 
perspectives towards a bonus scheme.  The first view reflected a belief in 
‘economic man’ with its assumption that human behaviour is driven by financial 
reward. As such, the status of a bonus scheme was important, the focus was on 
maximising the value of the bonus and the success measures were purely 
financial.  The alternative view positioned the bonus as ‘nice to have’, a means 
of showing what matters in terms of input (behaviours and means of 
achievement).  As such the bonus was a way of messaging what mattered and 
a way to say thank you to staff.  
Incident 3 - The governance setting. This incident was of a political 
(distribution of power) and regulative nature and one that was causing a good 
deal of frustration to elite actors (as indicated by the tone and volume of 
conversation around this matter).   My research consisted of four taped and 
transcribed semi-structured interviews, lasting between one and two hours with 
one trustee and three senior managers, two of whom had more than twenty 
years service within the focal organisation.  My initial interview questions were 
positioned around the current structure of governance and how interviewees 
made sense of the changing governance structure.  From this other questions 
emerged regarding the work undertaken by specific individuals in relation to 
structure changes and what challenges they faced in doing so. Additionally, I 
returned to the transcript of one interview in phase one who had referred to the 
governance setting.  
Additionally, ‘my insider role’ enabled me to be observer participant in 
eight trustee meetings during September 2014-December 2016 where this 
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matter was discussed.  At the end of each meeting I recorded my reflections, 
thoughts and feelings in my research journal which were used as part of my 
reflexive and interpretation process and in discussion with my supervisor.  
Trustee meetings were supported by organisational documentation (such as 
presentations, minutes, draft proposals for changes to terms of reference) 
which related to the structural changes undertaken and the discussions relating 
to them which I used in conjunction with the interviews and my journal notes. As 
I listened to the tapes and reviewed the transcripts, documents and journal 
notes, what struck me most was the iterative changes made to structure over 
time - almost as if by making small incremental changes, actors were reducing 
the risk of challenge and making changes by stealth. Ironically, however, the 
‘professionalization’ rationale for the changes resulted in the recruitment of 
agentic powerful actors with knowledge of governance to the extent that they 
directly challenged the structure that brought them to the organisation in the first 
place. 
Phase two - analysis of the incidents.  The purpose of phase two was 
to understand the implications hybridity has on the focal organisation 
(structurally, politically, symbolically and rhetorically), how actors navigate and 
operate within an environment of competing logics and what happens if other 
actors do not see the proffered logic as legitimate. I first repeatedly listened to 
the audio-recordings, reviewed documents and research journal entries. I drew 
free-hand sketches to develop visual mind maps of who was involved, what 
roles they played, what was occurring and how different aspects of the incidents 
related to other aspects.  I then wrote an incident narrative, including a) precis 
of the incident b) the data that relates to the it c) identification of the 
protagonists and where appropriate d) how the incident relates to the wider 
organisational environment e) what happened from the protagonist perspective 
and f) a summary of my interpretation. The findings chapters are structured 
around these major headings (see chapters 5-7).  From the individual incident 
mind maps and narratives, I noticed some recurring concepts and themes 
which were again mapped visually to aid theorisation across the incidents and 
form the basis of the discussion in chapter 8. In having this approach to my 
analysis, I am respecting the role of ‘noticing’ as an important part of the 
research process. (Cunliffe & Eriksen, 2011, p. 1431).    
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As before, I read and re-read the documents and transcripts in an 
iterative manner, looking for surprises or unexpected data and at times cycling 
between the documents and the literature to refine and build a picture of 
understanding.  I sense-checked and refined my understanding through the 
group of people who reviewed chapters and in conversations with my 
supervisor, looking to ensure that my interpretation was received as authentic 
and credible, that it resonated and had meaningful congruence (Johnson, 
Buehring, Cassell, & Symon, 2006) with this group of organisational actors. 
(See figure 8 below for a pictorial overview of the process). For example, I 
developed the idea of rhetorical work because I read the work of Turco (2012) 
who puts at the heart of organisational change euphemistic discourse, or 
creating the appearance of inoffensive messages.   What was noticeable in the 
transcripts and documents was the use of this tactic by elite actors within their 
rhetorical work.  I then went back to the transcripts to see exactly how they 
were doing this and found three core processes: elite actors gave protection to 
an existing symbolic order to provide an underlying structure of meaning for 
participants; elite actors used a nestling strategy which embedded new ideas 
into the existing script to provide legitimacy; from the nestling approach the 
existing discourse was evolved to create a bridging narrative (see chapter 8 for 
a full discussion).  
Figure 8: Illustrative sequence of analysis 
 
   
1.	Read	
transcripts	/	
documents	
and	noticed	
significance	of	
rhetoric	
2.	Read	the	
literature	
[Turco	2012]	
and	identified	
the	concept	of	
euphemistic	
discourse
3.	Revisited	
literature		to	
understand	
'the	how'	of	
discourse	
[Cheney,	1983;	
Suchman,	
1995;	Battilana	
&	Dorado,	
2010]
4.	Revisted	
transcripts	/	
documents	to	
understand	
'the	how'	of	
discourse
5.	Presented	
interpretation	to	
reviewers	&	
supervisor	to	get	
feedback	on	
congrugence	etc
6.	Refined	
interpretation	
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As another example, I developed the notion of institutional work taking 
place at different levels from reading the work of Gawer and Philips (2013).  
Whilst their research question was broader than mine, in that they were 
considering institutional work at a field and organisational level, their findings 
from an in-depth case study into Intel Corporations sensitised me to the notion 
of institutional work at both ‘practice’ and ‘identity’ levels. Specifically, I reflected 
on the activities I had identified in the focal organisation relating to hiring, 
performance management and reward strategies against Gawer & Phillips 
discussions to develop a process model of institutional work within the focal 
organisation. I discussed early drafts of this process model with my reviewers to 
get their perspective on the types of activity and my supervisors to refine the 
terminology I used to describe constructs. ‘What phenomena does a label 
represent’ proved to be a frequent topic of conversation.  Thus, the outcomes of 
my analysis are the rich points of my interpretation of documents, transcripts, 
research journal entries and observation notes.  This thesis includes words and 
moments that appear to carry significance to the organisational actors (of which 
I am one) within the temporal boundaries of this study, interwoven with insights 
from the literature to theorise and highlight features of institutional work.  
3.5 Assessing my research  
The methodological choices I have laid out hold implications for how my 
research should be assessed. I have taken the approach suggested by Symon 
and Cassell (2012, pp. 204-223) by making explicit the basis or quality criteria 
on which this work should be judged. This is outlined in Table 5 on the following 
page.  
3.6  Chapter Summary 
This chapter described and justified the research design for this study.  
The intended outcome of this research is a context specific, time-bound 
understanding of individual and organisational action within a specific focal 
organisation. Aligned to the interpretivist tradition, I take human interpretations 
as the starting point for developing knowledge about the social world, 
acknowledging my role in knowledge creation.  In this chapter I discussed how I 
used interviews, documents and participant observation to achieve the 
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overriding aim of telling the story of individuals’ experiences and sense-making 
within a given context and time and provide insight into the process of 
navigating multiple logics that could contribute to the sustainability of the focal 
organisation. Specifically, I outlined the philosophical tradition underpinning the 
research, the overall ethnographic research strategy, the two phases of 
research in respect of data collection and analytical processes and the quality 
criteria by which the thesis should be judged. Having done so, the next chapter 
is the first of four findings chapters establishing the focal organisation as a 
hybrid and identifying what logics actors construct in their accounts of the 
organisation. 
 
 58 
Table 5:  Suggested Quality criteria (adapted from Johnson et al. (2006); Tracey (2010); Symon and Cassell (2012)) 
Objective Quality Criteria  How I have honoured the quality criteria 
Worthy topic / 
significant 
contribution  
• Provides practical outcomes 
 
• Use of active incident as they occur to show how institutional work emerged in action and 
associated intended and un-intended consequences  
• At an organisational level, the thesis is supported by an executive report to share with 
trustees and CEO on tactics and approaches that support the maintenance of the hybrid 
organisation  
• Interesting - addresses the 
‘so what’ issue 
• Challenges and extends existing theoretical and practical understanding around complexity of 
institutional work, agentic actors and challenges faced by hybrids in a context where hybridity 
is becoming increasingly commonplace 
Rich and 
transparent 
rigor 
• Technically competent  
 
• Demonstrated by the level of fieldwork undertaken 
• Extensive and critical analysis of literature  
• Transparency of analytical process 
• Acknowledges complexity  • Using protagonists, I seek to show the ‘messiness and complexity of everyday life’  
• Challenging the literature’s binary, linear and rational presentation of shifting logics 
• Includes rich descriptions 
and a variety of relevant 
theoretical and 
methodological concepts 
• Capturing the richness of participants’ stories through incidents  
• Inclusion of lengthy passages of transcripts supplemented by detailed analysis rather than 
small broken segments of text that are removed from context  
• Building the richness of descriptions through multiple data sources 
Sincerity • Evidence of reflexivity, 
honesty and transparency 
• Logical inference – not 
going beyond the data 
• Use of reflective journal and musing boxes to share my thinking and feelings at various 
stages of the research  
• Continual checking back with the review group on my interpretations  
• Use of supervisions to challenge assumptions and open up alternative interpretations 
• Giving a balanced account • By using a protagonist approach, I have aimed to provide multiple and conflicting 
perspectives   
• By including musings boxes, I seek to expose my perspectives and assumptions throughout 
the study.  
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Objective Quality Criteria  How I have honoured the quality criteria   
Credibility  • The report appears trustworthy 
and morally actionable 
 
• Despite providing copies of individual transcripts, no interviewee asked for any changes to 
be made and there were no requests for transcripts to be retracted   
• Use of independent but embedded reviewer group  
• Although this thesis is embargoed I have provided an executive report for the organisation 
which focuses findings but removes political sensitivities  
• Theoretically informed • Interpretations of actor’s accounts interwoven with theoretical understanding from extant 
literature  
Ethical • The research process has 
encompassed SHU ethical 
practices 
• Frequent reference to Director of Studies, specifically when issues of confidentiality arose.   
Compliance with SHU research ethics and research integrity guidance including full 
research ethics approval by the faculty research ethics committee and completion of 
(DBConf) due to political sensitivities and to ensure no harm to focal organisation and 
interpersonal relationships within it.  
Meaningful 
coherence 
• Research outputs and 
conclusions are meaningful to 
the audience 
• Continual checking back with the review group on interpretations 
• Epistemologically congruent   
 
• This study does not presume that I (researcher) am some impartial, value-free entity 
engaging in the research process to produce objective accounts of ratified truth. My 
analytical strategy is coherent with this tradition. Rather it embraces the perspective that I 
bring implicit and explicit theories to the research process and context and accepts that my 
task as the ethnographer is to surface theories which ‘balance between theory in the 
researcher’s head, theory employed by the people in the research situation’ (Musson, 
2004, p. 35) and theory as it is already understood (as shown in extant literature) 
 • An eloquent interconnected 
research design, data collection 
and analysis that align with the 
theoretical framework and study 
goals 
• Use of narratives to provide a richness of descriptions and activities within an overall study 
aimed at subjective meaning or world-making.     
• Continual practice of reflexivity and in additional frequent reference to extant literature 
 • Convincing, telling a believable 
story  
• Through incident-focussed data collection and analysis, I have used contextualised events 
told through rich narratives from participants, organisational documents and observations.  
 60 
Chapter 4 - Making Sense of a Hybrid Organisation  
4.1 Chapter Introduction   
 The purpose of this first findings chapter is to: 
(a) Elicit if the focal organisation is experienced as a hybrid organisation 
by organisational actors – other than myself (see musing 2 on page 
20 and musing 5 on page on page 45);  
(b) Explicate the nature of the logic(s) at play in the focal organisation to 
contextualise the subsequent findings chapters; 
(c) Understand how people make sense of the organisation they work 
within to understand the institutional work that this subsequently 
drives.  
Structured into three sections, this chapter begins with an exploration of 
how actors frame (make sense) of the organisation and its purpose. The 
second section builds on these framings to give an overview of the nature of the 
logics at play (beliefs, assumptions, governing regimes, normative orders, 
rhetoric and organizing practices). The concluding section discusses 
implications for my research.  
4.2 Positioning the focal organisation 
In the strategy document 2013 – 2016, the CEO depicts the organisation 
as operating within multiple institutional perspectives (one of ‘business’ and one 
of ‘public good’):   
‘The challenges faced by us as a non-profit organisation are 
considerable and tensions between making a sustainable income 
and staying true to the mission are inevitable.  We recognise and 
embrace the rival metaphors of mission and business; our driver 
remains ‘to make money to do more things to deliver to our public 
good agenda.’ (Focal Organisation, 2013, p. 6) 
In a research interview, one organisational actor narrates this hybridity in 
respect of her individual role:  
‘I think I'm possibly the only director that is both revenue 
generating and also has to protect public good and standards.’ [A] 
This suggests that the focal organisation is well versed in the challenges and 
practices of negotiating the rules of the game in several games concurrently 
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(Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 243) and at the same time potentially at risk of being 
‘so many different things to so many different people that it must, of necessity, 
be partially at war with itself’ (Kerr, 1963, p. 8).  
Through interviews and organisational documents, I looked to 
understand how the ‘rival metaphors’ (Focal Organisation, 2013, p. 6) were 
experienced in everyday context.  My interpretation suggests a complex picture 
with the metaphors being both recognised and embraced to varying degrees by 
different organisational actors.  Provided below are several interview excerpts 
highlighting the interplay between different organisational framings and the 
coalitions who favour them:  
‘There’s definitely… some people think oh, we have to make sure 
we’re doing right for the charity, and then there’s another group in 
the middle who are like oh, we can be commercial and be 
charitable; why don’t people get that?  And they get kind of quite 
self-defensive around what they’re doing and people judging them 
to be wholly commercial.  And whether they are being wholly 
commercial or not I think is irrelevant really; it’s the interaction 
between the two.  And then I think there’s another third group 
which are about my job is to be commercial, I have a target to hit, 
I’ll let the others worry about the need to be charitable.  So, yeah, 
I think the tension involved is between those who want to be 
charitable and those who are commercial but see themselves as 
being commercial in the right way versus those who … recognise 
that the organisation is a charity and that’s their first port of call.  I 
think that’s the biggest tension…’ [C]  
‘The conflict probably is sometimes internally in that there's a 
sense of well I can't bring you sales people into this meeting 
'cause you'll just try and sell to them, and there is that tension at 
times, 'cause there is the perception that we won't just sit there 
and have a nice conversation, we'll actually sit and try and sell 
something… but, you know, there needs to be some payback at 
some point for all the advice that we put in there.’ [D] 
 ‘I think others are so driven by the demands of the business… 
that they lose that focus and it becomes all about achieving the 
revenue or the target… the overwhelming pressure at times to 
deliver supersedes perhaps the right thing.’ [A] 
On reading and re-reading interview transcripts, I noted several different 
presentations of the organisation and represent these pictorially in figure 9 
(below).  The figure illustrates a ‘continuum’ wherein actors simultaneously 
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construct multiple organisational realities as they made sense of the 
organisation’s purpose as expressed during interviews.   
Figure 9: Continuum 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Position A - Charity 
Whilst the formal organisation incorporation documentation and a 
trustee talks of the focal organisation as a charity this representation was in 
the minority throughout the interviews. 
 ‘We are a charity devoted to supporting those who struggle to get 
into, and further themselves within, the [name removed] 
profession (Focal Organisation, n.d.)‘.  
‘The Foundation is offering a number of bursaries and 
scholarships, to help those of you in desperate need to complete 
your studies and develop your knowledge of [profession name 
remov and to support the brightest and best in achieving 
excellence in the [name removed] profession. (Focal 
Organisation, n.d.)‘ed] 
‘I don’t see it as a business.  I see it as a charity that needs to 
generate income in order to deliver its core purpose.  So, no, I 
A: Charity as 
a discrete 
activity 
B: Charter as 
our reason 
for being 
C: Revenue 
growth to ‘do 
stuff’ 
D: Growth 
is our 
reason for 
being  
PUBLIC GOOD LOGIC 
1. Doing public good is the core goal 
2. Success is measured by impact on 
delivering charter objects 
3. Trustees play a governance role  
4.  Commerciality is acceptable but 
linked to a need for organisational 
survival ‘it is oxygen’  
5.  Staff rewarded on doing things the 
right way against several criteria  
 
COMMERCIAL LOGIC 
1. Growing the financial strength and 
size of the organisation are the core 
goals  
2. Success is measured by growth and 
financial performance  
3. Trustees are used for strategic 
advice and discouraged from 
governance / regulatory role  
4. Commerciality for its own sake is 
prioritised in the strategy  
5. Single reward criteria for staff is on 
profit generation   
 
Social impact  
is what drives this organisation 
Commercial impact  
is what drives this organisation 
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don’t.  I mean, it’s not going to be the next big global PLC, I really 
don’t believe that.  If it wants to be a training company, then it 
should not have charitable status’ [H] 
The notion of charity, when presented in interviews, was decoupled from the 
‘core’, positioned as a discrete activity undertaken through a discrete entity ‘The 
Foundation’:  
I don’t have strong thoughts about [focal organisation] as a 
charity.  I know it is, but I don’t have it in my head that we’re doing 
lots of good things for desperate people.  I know we’ve got the 
foundation side, but it feels a small part of what we do’. [F] 
‘I think it [the Foundation] hasn’t been widely or that well 
publicised as part of the whole corporate social responsibility arm 
of [focal organisation].’ It is in a way kind of like a side arm’. [E]  
‘I don't see us as a charity, if I'm honest.  I... I think we...we pick it 
up and put it down when it suits us. [D1] 
As such, charity was expressed more as an organisational form, reduced to a 
function rather than expressed as a set of organisational values or ethos 
embedded within the focal organisation.  The Foundation, for many, was the 
symbolic face for the focal organisation’s charitable work rather than a core 
activity given equal priority to other activity:  
‘Primarily, it [the foundation] was formed to divorce itself from the 
main body, main business so that it can…  It's ring-fenced funds, 
it's got its own funds ring-fenced, where it can give bursaries and 
all the rest of it, and something which is ring-fenced and properly 
managed.  It would just generally get lost in the mainstream 
business so at least it has more focus now, being divorced from 
the parent.’ [G] 
Despite the external rhetoric (as shown on the website and marketing 
literature), the internal presence of ‘charity’ was such that there was a low-level 
recognition by internal actors that the parent company is itself a charitable 
organisation.  Arguably, this decoupling narrative enables the mainstream 
business to not be concerned about its charitable impact:  
‘There are a lot of people within the organisation … don't actually 
appreciate we've a charity.  What that actually means, they 
certainly won't understand the public good piece and they just 
think that we're there as any other commercial organisation to, 
you know, survive and thrive; make loads and loads of money.’ 
[G] 
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‘We have a Board of Trustees because we are a charity and we 
have charitable status because it gives an exemption to 
corporation tax ‘(G).   
4.2.2 Position B – Charter  
Position B, ‘Charter’, highlights the emphasis placed on the organisation 
having charter status as a reference point for individuals’ sense making:   
‘[Focal organisation] has got a royal charter, it’s there to do public 
good and it explains in the royal charter the four ways it’s 
supposed to do it.  So, it’s not difficult to define what the purpose 
of the organisation is if people decide they want to have a look.  
Very simple.’ [CEO 1] 
Within this position, I experienced charity as secondary to the charter, which is 
privileged as ‘guiding our purpose in life and how we are supposed to do it’ 
[CEO 1].  Charter is presented as being used to guide decision-making on 
activity and assessment of performance with activity being geared towards 
delivering the stated chartered objectives and in doing so there is a taken for 
granted assumption that public good will result:   
‘It’s a chartered body, it’s not a charity, and a chartered body is 
there to do public good. If you investigate what chartered bodies 
are for, it’s about doing public benefit, do public good and that 
links to charity ‘cause to become a charity you have to define how.  
And in order to achieve that, you have to be able to say well how 
do we do public good?  And then you go back to the charter that 
says you do public good by doing these four things …money is 
our oxygen, we have to make money to survive and create a 
surplus to do more things in order to be able to deliver public good 
but making money is not the end game  … As a business, it [focal  
organisation] has to be business-like, but it’s not a business. This 
is where you’ve got to define the end game.  The end game of a 
business is to make money for shareholders or for the owners.  
[Focal organisation]  is not like that.  [Focal organisation]  has to 
make money but not to pay shareholders but to do things, which 
then fulfil the charter.  It’s very simple… Being business-like 
means you have to make money, but money isn’t the end game.  
If that makes sense to you.’ [CEO1] 
 ‘if we can carry on spending that sort of money and reinvesting 
that into what [focal organisation] does and therefore improving 
the profession because of what we do for that, I think it is a great 
cycle to be in’ [D] 
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Significant in the charter position, is rhetoric on exactly how public good 
is achieved: 
So, it’s not difficult to define what the purpose of [focal 
organisation] is if people decide they want to have a look…. There 
are four things I used to say.  It’s about helping individuals, 
helping organisations, representing the profession, and 
developing improved methods. [CEO1]  
4.2.3 Position C -  Hybrid  
Position C, ‘Hybrid’, represents a group of people who simultaneously 
frame the organisation around two organising principles shared by frame B-
Charter and D-Commercial (described below).  Like the charter position, 
contained within the Hybrid frame is a sense that the organisation’s purpose is 
to enhance and represent the profession.   What is notably different however is 
that there is a greater acceptance of the priority given to making money than 
among those constructing frame B.  Yet, they still conditioned making money 
with a requirement that the organisation did not become ‘too commercial’ as it 
would take us away from ‘who we are’. In this sense, they share the belief that 
making money is not the end game: 
‘It is good [that the team was repositioned into a profit centre] I 
think it's showing what we can do in this area.  I think it's enabling 
us to spend that money in other areas where we need to spend 
some money in terms of development’ [I] 
 ‘We need to be commercially focused.  However, it's about 
maybe not being too commercial.  We need to be aware of what 
we are and what we stand for and not forget that.’ [J]  
‘We are a not for profit organisation…. the benefit of being not-for-
profit is we don't have shareholders.  We don't have partners in a 
consultancy.  We don't have an individual owner, who is trying 
bankroll his villa in wherever.  So, we don't have those individuals 
as such, so therefore what we're doing is we are providing, you 
know, the money we make, we can put to good use….’ [D]  
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‘I think there’s [name removed] who is very connected to that kind 
of public good type work, because obviously [they] run the [name 
removed] function and that is the real core of I suppose the more 
charitable element of [the organisation].  So, I think yeah, you 
would hear [them] talk about the number of people that have got 
to a certain qualification level.  However, even at that extent I feel 
that can be disguised sometimes by oh, we’ve got so many 
people through these exams, that represent this revenue here.  
And that just comes down to [them] owning that P&L [this is a 
reference to making the profitability of a specific activity] and it’s 
kind of a self-preservation thing; I have to get those numbers 
through because I have to adhere to this profit and this target, this 
financial target to ensure that I get my objectives for my boss.  
And, to be honest, in general do I see people getting excited 
about serving the more charitable elements?  Not really.’  [C] 
The rhetoric of ‘making money to do more things’ continued to be 
prevalent in interviews, but in a departure from A (Charity) and B (Charter), in 
position C (hybrid) actors never articulated the nature of such ‘things’. Nor was 
there reference to the charter as a framework to guide decision-making and 
action. This is very different from position A which emphasises making money 
‘to help desperate people’ and position B where money was made to achieve 
four clearly articulated ‘public good’ goals. The lack of clarity on the ‘end game’ 
makes ‘we must make money to do more things’ feels more like an internal 
strapline within frame C rather than something guiding behaviour.  
4.2.4 Position D - Commercial 
Position D, Commercial, constructs a narrative that privileges making 
more money and more net financial return (NFR) as legitimate and an 
organisational driver in its own right:    
‘…CEO’s ethos is to make loads and loads of money, yeah, but 
he doesn't necessarily want to do things with it.  He wants to 
basically, it's a horrible phrase, but to hoard it and basically make 
[focal organisation] a lot more financially stable than it is.  So, he 
wants to accumulate, you know, a reserve, cash reserves and all 
the rest of it, but ultimately, that's not there to do things; that's just 
to make us more financially secure.’[G] 
‘…I think it’s hard for me to interpret what [focal organisations] 
purpose is.  I think that fundamentally the kind of common threads 
that I can identify seem to be about a global presence; about 
being the biggest and the best; about achieving that kind of 
recognition.  So, I think there’s quite a lot of sense of purposes to 
make [the organisation] more and more unassailable.’ [K] 
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‘I can’t speak for the entire [organisation] but I don’t think I’ve seen 
anything which is a measurement of our success in our charitable 
status and what that looks like, and, you know, it’s difficult to 
measure a softer, not-for-profit target.’ [H]  
 ‘… The overriding one [KPI] is a financial target.  You know, we 
report on management accounts and budgets and margin, all of 
that financial analysis, on a monthly basis.  At my level and my 
position in the organisation, I’m not aware of anything else that we 
measure on a monthly basis that is in the limelight as such… 
there’s nothing around measuring how did we relate to this 
charitable objective number one and this charitable objective 
number two?  I think there’s an automatic assumption that as long 
as we make sure we’re selling, we’ll be doing the charity work; 
that’ll happen…but, from my opinion, if we’re set up as a 
charitable organisation then you should have a bit of an internal 
feeling that you are contributing to that.’ [C] 
‘We're a not-for-profit organisation…. Now that doesn't mean we 
don't need to make the money to do things with that money.  So, 
are we commercial?  Of course, we're commercial, and I don't 
think there's anything wrong with being commercial because what 
we have is some service that companies want and they're 
prepared to pay for.  So, I don't think there's anything wrong with 
us saying there's a real value here, you've got to pay for it.’ [D] 
Achieving positive NFR is expressed as the key performance metric and a 
driver of organisational and individual behaviour due to its alignment to 
individual bonus payments:  
‘We are measured, we are rewarded on certain metrics.  So, you 
know, sales revenues are clearly an important one.  So, there are 
some things that I do purely because there's some revenue there. 
[Researcher] Important to whom?  They’re clearly an important 
metric. Researcher: For [Focal organisation]? Okay, anyone 
else? Okay.  And to me, for my bonus.’ [D] 
‘The commercial pressure was that if we didn’t give them [a client] 
something they wouldn’t finish off.  I don’t know whether they 
wouldn’t have paid us completely, but one of the… their company 
is a chain of many companies and they said that if we developed 
this product for them, they would roll that out to several other of 
their sister companies and things…. Researcher: Did you feel 
that you had any choice but to introduce a new lower 
standard?  Honestly?  No. … Because of commercial pressure 
from [senior actors name removed].’ [J] 
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The following conversation took place at a senior leadership meeting in October 
2015 and provides a further example of an individual (director) being so driven 
by financial impact they he was happy to sacrifice the learner’s (user of service/ 
customer’s) experience.  
‘I would like them (existing students) to be affected [have a bad 
experience, have poor pass rates] because they [the paying 
organisation] will move onto the [name of a newly launched 
programme] and I will get a better margin from them.’  [B -  
Observed by Participant Researcher] 
A notable departure from position C (Hybrid) is that within D 
(Commercial) personal reward (bonus) is presented as a legitimate outcome in 
defining what ‘more things’ should be with little consideration for delivering the 
charter objectives:  
‘It is fundamentally wrong for the organisation to be making 
significant profits and not distributing some of these back to staff’ 
[CEO 3] 
‘Increasing profits although required for pension liabilities and 
growth investment, should morally go to staff making the 
growth….’ [extract from proposal for amendment of pay and 
reward policy – July 2017].  
4.2.5  Section Summary  
The section above summarises various perspectives on the positon of 
the focal organisation as constructed in interviews, observed meetings and 
organisational documents, namely the focal organisation as: 
(a) A Charity focused on helping individuals in need and supporting 
humans to ‘flourish’ though accessibility to education 
(b) A Chartered organisation focused on delivering public good by 
meeting the objectives of the charter 
(c) A Hybrid organisation focused on growing the business in order to ‘do 
more things’   
(d) A Commercial entity – making money to grow the business and 
individual staffs reward through the delivery of products and services 
that are deemed legitimate (against the need to make money and 
public perception) 
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4.3 Nature of Logics within the Focal Organisation  
Taking the four positions elaborated above as the starting point, I 
returned to the interviews and organisational documents and synthesised the 
four positions into two logics supported by material practices and symbolic 
systems (Lok, 2010) that were expressed by individual actors in their accounts. 
Significantly, rather than individuals constructing a single view of the 
organisation within the interviews, they simultaneously constituted the 
organisation in multiple ways thus highlighting its hybrid nature, often oscillating 
(Jay, 2013) between different perspectives In the next section I present these 
positions as being informed by institutional logics.  
Figure 10: Institutional logics within focal organisation  
 
 
  
Charity Charter
Hybrid
Delivering	public	good	is	positioned	as	the	
‘end	goal’
Growth	of	the	’business’	is	positioned	as	
the’	end	goal’
Commercial
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4.3.1 A Logic of Public Good 
This logic is constituted by the charity and charter position (A & B) 
presented in figure 9 (page 62).  Delivering public good is positioned as the 
organisation’s raison d'être and the ‘end’ it exists to achieve. The means to 
achieving this ‘end’ reflect the service ethos (through serving the profession), 
decision making is based on contribution to public good and measurement of 
performance is aligned to this goal.  ‘Commerciality’ is accepted under the guise 
of being business-like to ‘make money to do more things to deliver the public 
good objectives’. As shown by the continuum (figure 9), such assumptions hold 
implications for the nature of work and organisation, this is depicted in figure 11 
(below).  Within the public good logic, commerciality has a place in the 
institutional narrative, its purpose is to generate surplus to invest back into 
public good activities.  As such there is a circular relationship between 
commerciality and public good; charter objectives are privileged and guide what 
is deemed to be legitimate activity. Strategic conversations focus on activities’ 
potential to deliver on the public good agenda. Such organising principles were 
prevalent under CEO1.  
Figure 11: Public Good Logic 
 
 
  71 
4.3.2  A logic of commerciality   
Being global, financially strong and unassailable as a business drives the 
commercial logic constituted by the hybrid and commercial positions (C & D) in 
figure 9 (page 62).  The organisation positions itself as a global business, the 
growth of which is the end goal; being a chartered organisation is a means to 
that end through utilising the brand and associated notions of impartiality, 
ethical, quality assured etc. for competitive advantage.  Revenue, profit growth 
and the ability to share success with staff are the main drivers for decision 
making and organisational activity; measurement of performance is primarily 
through financial metrics.   
Strategic discussions are focused on the impact of decisions on growing 
profit and making the organisation unassailable.  There is greater emphasis on 
presenting the organisation as ‘a business’ where the growth agenda is the 
main objective and an acceptance, to varying degrees, that institutional growth 
and financial strength, is, in its own right a valid way to deliver public good. The 
charter has become the means to serve economic or financial ends. Such 
organising principles and practices are prioritised by CEO3.   
 
Figure 12: Commercial logic  
 
4.3.3  Interplays within a field of tensions 
The hybrid nature of the organisation explored above means that 
decision-making and action often occur in a contested field of tensions where 
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actors appropriate the organising principles and symbolic systems of their 
proffered logic to exert power over organisational outcomes. By way of 
illustration, I attended a senior management team meeting on 20 May 2016 as 
a meeting participant and as a participant researcher.   The annual budgeting 
setting process had just begun and annual membership fee setting was on the 
agenda.   Below is an excerpt from a supporting paper from the Director 
responsible for membership which positions the ‘member’ as a consumer of a 
product.   
‘It is salient that (focal organisation) should focus its effort on 
membership retention as well as acquisition, it always costs less 
to service existing customers than it does to win new customers.’ 
(Membership Retention Strategy, 2016) 
I suggest that this presentation sits uneasily with the ethos of the charter which 
positions the organisation as existing to serve the members (see quote from 
organisation website below) 
 ‘[The focal organisation] was awarded the charter in [1990s] in 
recognition of its leading role in supporting and furthering the 
interests of the [xxx] industry.We represent the interests of the 
profession and the views of our members. In fact, our special 
interest groups, online and face-to-face, encourage members to 
share their opinions and knowledge with the wider community. 
We’re also directly involved in shaping [reference to professional 
function] policy for the UK Government and European 
Commission, and our consultative response process allows us to 
represent members’ views at the highest level.’ (Focal 
Organisation, n.d.) 
Within the paper there was a proposal to increase membership fees in 
the UK by 2%.  The paper argued that as 2% was the Bank of England’s upper 
target for inflation it would be hard to justify any more. In response, the CEO 
asked the meeting for their views, arguing that in the previous year inflation had 
been lower and fees had been increased by 5% with no negative effect. In fact, 
he went on ‘membership was steaming ahead like a train’ so why should we not 
increase it further as it seems to be ‘price inelastic’. One director [G] agreed, 
responding that we should charge, ‘as much as we think we can get away with 
as margin is high’ while two directors [B and D] argued for the minimum price 
increase as it was hard to justify anything more given that members were not 
receiving increased or enhanced benefits. Another director [A] argued against a 
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membership fee increase but posited that should this occur a percentage of the 
increase could be given to ‘The Foundation’ so that we ‘could use it for public 
good’. After much debate, the decision was that a 5% increase would be 
recommended to the Board for their approval as ‘they (Trustees) would change 
it anyway and as there was a lack of rigour in terms of indices to base our 
decision, 5% was as good a number as 2%’.   Three things were striking in this 
conversation. 
(a) No one challenged the presentation of the members as a 
consumer.  I suggest that an alternative view would be that 
members are part of the wider community of practice the 
organisation exists to develop and therefore the funding raised from 
membership fees should be used for the activities that develop the 
wider community rather than simply servicing members as direct 
consumers. Arguably the positioning of members as wanting a 
transactional relationship with the organisation is working from a 
commercial logic, which assumes that in return for their fee 
members (as consumers) expect a personal tangible benefit rather 
than to contribute to the organisation’s mission to serve wider 
development of the profession.  
(b) By making a proposal to transfer a proportion of the increase to the 
Foundation, the director who made the proposal constitutes public 
good activity as a sub-set of the main organisation not its core 
purpose, which is often a structural arrangement in the corporate 
sector as a mechanism for discharging social responsibility.  Whilst 
said director represented themselves as being the only director 
responsible for public good and therefore   ‘the protector of public 
good’ (see following chapter), an alternative interpretation is that 
they are unconsciously reinforcing the member as a consumer and 
thus a commercial logic within a charitable, chartered organisation.  
(c) Outside the conversation around the Foundation, no one asked 
how the funds would be used. The generation of more money was 
the objective in and of itself without reference to serving the 
profession through meeting charter objectives.  
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4.4  Reflexivity in action 
As discussed in chapter 3, the critical appraisal of my own assumptions 
and research practices was an important part of this research.  To that end, I 
provided a draft copy of this chapter to three colleagues, seeking their feedback 
on the following (see p.44 for an overview of the reviewers): 
(a) Whether they recognised the image of the organisation I had 
presented; 
(b) If my interpretations resonated with them and/ or;  
(c) Whether my personal interpretations created a scenario that 
they had not experienced.   
One of the reviews was particularly detailed and in depth and can be 
found in full at appendix four. Extract from the three reviewers are below: 
 ‘I definitely recognise your account of the tensions between 
competing tracks of public benefit and commercial success, and I 
would say with the benefit of a 25-year view of [the organisation] 
that the balance between them is fluid and changes over time…  I 
think perceptions of [the organisation] as charitable or commercial 
or both depend almost entirely on where a person sits in the 
organisation and what their KPIs [key performance indicators – a 
method of attaching number to an activity which is used to see if 
the activity is successful] are … The comments about the 
Foundation are revealing and ring true….Reading your section on 
the effects of charter on the ethos and organisational logic of [the 
organisation], I agree that the charter objectives do themselves 
create ambiguity and create the paradigm for a hybrid 
organisation…  You are right to identify that people often repeat 
the received wisdom (to justify revenue generation) that [the 
organisation] makes money to do things that deliver our charter 
objectives, but then struggle to articulate what that actually 
means…Looking at the kind of language your respondents have 
used to describe, ‘doing more things’, I recognise the difficulty 
people have once you get beyond a certain point in the 
argument… You talk about both sensibilities being diluted, noting 
that people who are naturally more commercial or public minded, 
depending on their role in the organisation, show awareness of 
the other point of view and its place in the culture.  That does 
chime with me too.’  (reviewer 1)  
‘I totally recognized your description of [the organisation] and 
could guess where different people would sit on your frame… Just 
after I read your chapter I was interviewing someone for a new 
role and I used some of your content to describe [the organisation] 
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as it was really clear.  However, it’s also really complicated…. I 
am not sure they (the interviewee) will be back…’ (reviewer 2)  
‘I thought that I had understood [the organisation] and knew that 
there were different outlooks but on reading your work I 
recognised it all and realised that it was even more complicated 
that I realised… I guess that having been here for over 6 years 
you just get used to it and make up your own priorities and ways 
of working to balance other people’s demands…’(reviewer 3) 
4.5  Chapter summary   
The purpose of this chapter was to develop understanding of if and how 
the focal organisation is experienced as a hybrid and how people make sense 
of/frame the logics at play.  I presented four positions of understanding drawn 
from actors’ accounts, observations and documents.  From this, I returned to 
the narratives and documents to achieve a more nuanced level of 
understanding of the different drivers, priorities and objectives constructed by 
organisational actors.  This resulted in the identification of two perhaps 
conflicting logics – namely a commercial and a public good logic. Through 
phase one of the fieldwork and reviewer feedback on my interpretations, I have 
alleviated the concerns expressed in my musings of 14 September 2013 (see 
musing box 2, page 20) around whether the organisation as a hybrid was 
merely my sense making or something that others experienced.   
The purpose of phase two was to understand how organisational actors 
deal with the presence of multiple institutional logics and what implications this 
has for the nature of organisation (structurally, politically, symbolically and 
rhetorically). Specifically, I explored the nature of institutional work undertaken 
to navigate (and manipulate) institutional logics, who undertakes (and 
interrupts) such work and how, and what happens if ‘insiders’ do not see the 
proffered logic as legitimate through an ‘incident’ approach. I now move onto 
the first of three incidents involving one department challenging another that 
they had acted inappropriately over data sharing and put the organisation at risk 
of a regulatory breach.  
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Chapter 5 – Data Sharing   
5.1 Chapter Introduction   
The purpose of this chapter is to review the first in a series of incidents to 
explore: the nature of institutional work undertaken to navigate the multiple 
logics of public good and commercial; who influenced such work and how, and; 
what happened when ‘insiders’ do not see such logics as legitimate.  
I identified this incident as part of my everyday work where I became 
aware of emotionally charged conversations between several departments (see 
p.55 of the methodology chapter for detailed information of the fieldwork 
underpinning this incident). A primary concern I had as I began the fieldwork 
process was the expectations of the interview candidates, specifically the two 
senior managers insofar as they could use me as a ‘go-between’ by giving me 
messages to pass to the other.  This lead me to emphasize my role as 
researcher at the start of the interview and to repeat how the information given 
would be used (as part of my research) and would not be used in my role as a 
peer and staff member.  
I position each interviewee as a protagonist in recognition that they 
advocate different logics: public good and commercial.   In this chapter I aim to 
build up an understanding of the different perspectives, what institutional work 
was undertaken and what strategies they deployed (rhetorical, structural and 
political) to perpetuate and defend their respective logics. The chapter proceeds 
as follows, firstly I provide a summary of the incident which provides contextual 
background and introduces the key characters (protagonists), section two 
includes protagonist narratives which are interpreted in section three. 
5.2 Précis of incident  
Writing this section, I experienced a tension in trying to balance the need 
to provide context against the risk of writing an overly descriptive commentary 
which could be received as un-interesting and irrelevant.  I consider that having 
an appreciation of the environmental context is both critical to understanding 
the perspectives (on organisational position) the actors are working within and 
underpins an ethnographic methodological approach (Bjerregaard, 2001).  
Therefore, I ask for your acceptance of this section, which comprises a 
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summary of the activity involved; a schematic overview of related data-sets 
which is a central component to the incident; an overview of the key 
protagonists utilising job-description to illustrate their role position and 
alignment to the various logics and finally; my reflections of other relevant 
activities that were taking place in the organisation around the same time of the 
incident.  
5.2.1 The incident 
The incident involved a challenge from one department (A) that another 
department (B) had sent out an un-authorised marketing email promoting a new 
product.  From A’s perspective, they felt that B had used privileged access to 
data in an unfair way and to the detriment external stakeholders (namely 
training providers). A suggested that B had put the focal organisation at risk by 
highlighting a conflict of interest; the conflict being that Department B used data 
of Department A to promote their products when the data had been obtained for 
another service; both services however are provided by the focal organisation.    
5.2.2 The data 
Different work activities within the organisation, often by specific 
functions, produce several different data sets (a specific group of information 
held within the focal organisation’s database) that enable the organisation to 
deliver its services. This incident relates to the use of data-set 3 (‘owned’ by 
department A) by department B to promote a new learning product.  
Department A’s claim was that Department B was not authorised to access or 
use data-set 3 and by using it B compromised the integrity of the Awarding 
Body.    Table 6 and figure 13 below provide further detail.  
Figure 13: Data-sets pertaining to this incident  
Community
[Data	set	1]
Membership
[Data	set	2]
T&L
[Data	set	4.2]
Awarding	Body	
[Data	set	3]
T&L
[Data	set	4.1]
T&L	
[Data	set	4.3]
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Table 6:  Detailed explanation of data set (read in conjunction with figure 13) 
Data Set Descriptor 
1. Community • Any individual who is identifiable and contactable is part of the ‘Community’ represented by the focal organisation (data set 1). 
2. Member 
 
• Some communities access a product/service called membership (data set 2). There are several grades of membership, an example of 
membership products/services is access to resources to support work tasks or to support learning to achieve a qualification. 
• Membership is subject to payment of an annual subscription fee. 
3. Awarding 
Body  (AB) 
 
 
[Dept. A] 
• A function of the organisation is as an AB. This activity, led by Department A means that the focal organisation can award educational 
qualifications.  The AB is regulated by Ofqual (Office of Qualifications) as it provides a public qualification.  For simplicity, I refer to this 
public qualification as ‘Professional Diploma [Prof Dip]’.  
• The AB provides the assessment process (primarily examination) and is responsible for setting the syllabus, setting and marking 
assessments, confirming awards and monitoring the quality of teaching. 
• Prof Dip teaching/learning is provided through study centres (approx. 234) which are accredited by AB to offer the teaching and 
learning of the focal organisation’s qualification. 
• Individuals who are progressing on the Prof Dip are studying members.  They are likely in the first instance to become registered with 
a study centre.  They are required to register with the AB to take an assessment and at this time they become a member and part of 
the community (1), member (2) and AB(3) data-sets   
• Individuals who complete the Prof Dip are removed from the AB data-set (3) but remain in sets (1) and (2)  
4. Teaching & 
Learning 
(T&L) 
 
[Dept. B] 
 
• Another function of the organisation is to provide teaching and learning, led by Department B. There are several teaching and learning 
programmes and this causes three sub-data sets.  All members of data-set 4 are included in community (1)  
• One of the programmes offered by Department B is the Prof Dip and in this context Department B is classed as a study centre 
regulated by Department A (4.1). The sub-set of individuals progressing on the Prof Dip through Department B are included in data-set 
3 until they complete the programme. 
• Another sub-set are taking a programme that leads to membership but not Prof Dip (data-set 4.2)  
• Finally, a sub-set are taking a programme that does not lead to Prof Dip or to membership (4.3) 
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5.2.3 The protagonists  
 There are two protagonists, A and B. They are peer-to-peer senior roles. 
Actor A has worked in several regulated environments in a number of different 
organisations.  For the majority, this has been within education, and in small 
and medium sized Charities and not for profit organisations. A is responsible for 
the activity of Department A. B has worked for 25 years prior to joining the focal 
organisation in privately owned large commercial organisations, this is their first 
charity/not-for-profit and small-medium sized organisation. B is responsible for 
the activity of Department B. 
Prior to interviewing the two protagonists and to help me understand the 
context and framing of the two roles, I read the respective job descriptions.  The 
following pages provide a copy of these, against each entry there is a unique 
reference, this indexing system is used throughout this chapter to cross-
reference interpretations to the source documents.  
Job Summary 
Actor A Actor B 
A1.  Responsible for the development and continuous improvement of a global 
education standard that meets regulatory 
& market needs, & positions [focal 
organisation] as the leading authority & 
standard setter for the profession. 
B1.  Accountability for the delivery of all B2B products & services maintaining 
margins leading to increased returns 
(financial & volume) 
 
Key Responsibilities [in order of presentation on Job Description] 
Actor A Actor B 
A2.  Develop, manage & deliver a global Plan 
that promotes & adheres to professional 
standards 
B2.  Input into the Corporate Strategy & 
business Plans, with responsibility 
& accountability for the delivery of 
corporate products & services, 
maintaining margin & maximising 
financial return. 
A3. Develop, manage, deliver & maintain the 
[name removed] International Standard 
ensuring that it meets the needs of global 
markets & supports the Public Benefit 
needs of the charter 
B3.  Lead & direct Group Product 
Development activities, developing 
new leading edge products & 
enhancing current offerings to 
maximise profit & increase market 
penetration & reputation 
 
A4. 
 
Develop, manage & deliver new global 
education products & services that will 
support & continuously raise standards & 
meet the needs of the corporate market 
B4.  Lead & direct the maintenance & 
expansion of local & international 
senior professional networks 
(member & non-member), 
Corporate & individual stakeholder 
groups) to support reputational 
growth & influence & exploit 
business opportunities. 
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A5. Lead & direct the continuous development 
of educational/assessed programmes to 
meet current & future market needs – both 
in the academic world to ensure world-
class status & to meet the needs of the 
corporate market  
B5.  Lead & direct key/strategic supplier 
networks to ensure continued 
quality of delivery & availability of a 
range of appropriate partners to 
meet current & future demand. 
 
A6 Lead & direct alternative routes to 
membership ensuring no detriment to 
standards of entry. 
B6.  Control & manage the department’s 
finances to ensure effective 
budgeting & cost control. 
A7. Lead & direct the management & 
continuous improvement of a range of 
academic consultants/providers to ensure 
on-time, quality provision of examination 
material, coupled with robust marking & 
assessment to agreed standards.  
B7.  Direct & develop staff of the 
department to ensure they are 
appropriately motivated, trained & 
are working towards the 
achievement of plans & objectives  
A8.  Lead, direct & protect the independence of 
the Awarding Body, ensuring strong 
compliance, clarity of purposes & 
continuous improvement. 
 End of Document  
 
 
 
A9. Responsible & accountable for protecting 
the legally binding regulatory compliance 
status of the Awarding Body 
  
A10. Lead representative/ambassador in the 
global education arena & wider into the 
corporate market to support reputational & 
business growth. 
  
A11.  Responsible & accountable for the 
provision & continuous maintenance & 
growth of a global network of education 
providers, ensuring fairness, open access 
& formal auditing to maintain standards & 
to meet the charter objectives of ‘access 
for all’. 
  
A12.  Responsible & accountable for 
assessment methodologies to support the 
currency & credibility of the global 
standard & lead current thinking in the 
academic world & to ensure relevance to 
other stakeholders. 
  
A13.  Responsible & accountable for the 
continuous monitoring of Government, 
agencies & other global educational 
bodies to assess potential impact & 
opportunities for professional development 
activities. 
  
A14.  Control & manage the department’s 
finances to ensure effective budgeting & 
cost control. 
  
A15.  Direct & develop the staff of the 
department to ensure that they are 
appropriately motivated, trained & are 
working towards the achievement of 
business plans 
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The job descriptions position A’s role as an internal regulator; an 
authoritative role, responsible and accountable for setting standards [points A2, 
A3, A4, A5, A7] and ensuring regulatory compliance on a global level [points 
A2, A8, A9, A10].  The role is arguably framed by a public good logic 
encompassing public benefit, independence, fairness and equal access [points 
A4, A9, A12].  Whilst there is a reference to ensuring solutions meet corporate 
market needs [points A2, A5, A6, A11] and business growth [points A10] this is 
linked to: ‘position[ing] the organisation as the leading authority and standard 
setter for the profession’ [points A2, A11].  
In respect of Actor B’s role, I note the absence of any reference to 
delivering public good or meeting charter. In its place is reference to a 
commercial logic encompassing accountability for increasing financial returns 
[points B1, B2, B3]; and market penetration [point B3]; exploiting business 
opportunities [point B4] and; meeting demand [point B5].  This arguably 
positions making money as the end game with the charter (public good) brand 
as the means.  This firmly aligns to the commercial logic depicted in figures 10, 
p.69 and 12, p.71.   
Notably, product development is included in both job descriptions.   In 
point A4 we see that A is charged with product development ‘in order to raise 
standards and meet the needs of the corporate market’ which arguably relate to 
charter and public good and also, commerciality, whereas point B3 charges B 
with product development purely to ‘maximize profit’ and ‘increase market 
penetration’, which is firmly entrenched in the commercial logic. So even when 
there is shared activity, the end game is rhetorically expressed within the 
opposing logics of public good and commerciality.  
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Musing 6 
March 2016 
When interpreting the job descriptions, how significant is the development process?  
Reflecting on this question I have discovered that the respective (current) role holders 
[A and B] wrote these job descriptions before submitting them to HR who then added 
standardised elements of people and budget management.  With this in mind, have the 
individuals written their job descriptions in a way that aligns with their belief, value 
and assumption systems and if so can the job descriptions serve as an external 
expression of how they make sense of their roles?  
 
Or have they written their job descriptions in a way that does not reflect their internal 
sense making but in response to what they think is expected of them? If so, are the job 
descriptions a guiding frame to be used to socialise how they behave, and the activities 
that they prioritise in their role? 
 
Or both? My intuition is that the human element of writing job descriptions means 
that there substance may be self-consciously or unconsciously driven by taken for 
granted assumptions, fantasy and / or emotionally needs, through ego or a quest for 
power.  Because the author of these job-descriptions are the role holders themselves, and 
given the interview discussions, I feel that they do serve as an external expression of 
their individual sense-making rather than an ‘externally imposed’ guiding frame.   
 
5.2.4 The environment  
I invite a small pause in the review of the protagonists and turn your 
attention instead to a couple of contextual points surrounding the incident.  
Before I provide greater detail, I direct you back to first musing box in chapter 1 
(page 11) where, I reflected on the interplay of everyday intentions, how they 
may form the politics/activities, outcomes and experiences of everyday life.   It 
is for this reason that I present two examples of everyday activities, which I 
refer to as CEO Rhetoric and Regulatory Audit and suggest that the politics and 
processes of negotiation and persuasion of these apparently unrelated events 
may well have a role in shaping how the individual actors experience everyday 
life and influence their intentions.  
Values,	beliefts,	
assumptions Job	description
Job	description Guiding	frame
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5.2.4.1 CEO Rhetoric  
The current CEO (CEO3) had brought a focus on financial sustainability 
from the time he first started with the organisation [May 2009] where he 
presented the following: 
‘To meet these challenges [name removed] has to change to 
ensure we are fit for purpose… [Strategy June 2010 Para 
2.3]…We are dependent on three principal revenue streams  … 
Our aim is to maintain these three revenue streams in broad 
balance to mitigate against any sudden changes ‘[Strategy June 
2010 Para 5.0] 
I experienced a new, strengthened commercial rhetoric emerging, centred on 
the need to ensure that all major activity streams deliver a surplus financial 
result. The following extract from the Strategic Plan FY14-16 (Aug 2013 p11-12) 
states: 
‘Within the next three years it is planned that total sales will reach 
£30m; over double where they were in FY09 and representing 
consistently strong year-on-year growth. P&Ls will be targeted to 
be profitable at net financial return (NFR) level in FY14 to counter 
the fall in [product name removed] contribution as we move to a 
new segmented customized offering.  Essential to our on-going 
growth is stronger cash reserves, which will be driven by targeting 
a minimum of £1m cash, returned to reserves from FY14 
onwards.  Underpinning this will be an improving return on sales 
to 8% and balancing debtor/creditor days at 45 days each 
average.  This will allow us to actively address the pension deficit 
and build a ‘war chest’ for potential acquisitions.’ Strategic Plan 
FY14-16 (Aug 2013 p11-12) 
In response to the objectives of ‘stronger cash reserves’ and building a ‘war 
chest’, focus was given to the financial performance and most notably ‘surplus’ 
of what was referred to internally as the ‘three P&Ls’ (a term given to the three 
areas of activity, which had the largest percentage of revenue across the 
organisation which are membership, education and activity relating to a 
corporate customer).  A separate Director manages each of them, two of them 
being Actor A (education) and Actor B (corporate).  
Department A was achieving a break-even position with income being 
sufficient to cover its cost base. A argued against increasing costs to achieve 
more revenue citing the regulator’s interest in cost modelling to ensure 
accessibility and warned that an over focus on ‘making money’ would be 
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deemed by the regulator to be inappropriate. This argument appears to have 
been accepted as there has been no request by the CEO for Department A to 
move from this break-even position.  
At the time of the incident Department B was making a loss with its 
revenue being insufficient to meet the defined cost base. At the end of the first 
year of the 2014-2016 strategic period and in response to continual loss making 
a ‘CEO taskforce’ was created.  A summary from the taskforce scoping 
document is provided below.  
‘This document provides a scope for the [name removed] P&L Task 
Force, which is being undertaken at the request of the CEO  
Sponsor CEO Accountable for the realisation of objective/success 
criterion, oversight of the task force and 
management of senior project stakeholder 
Accountable  Role B Responsible and accountable for ensuring [name 
removed] business becomes profitable in FY15  
Project Lead Direct 
report of 
Role B 
Responsible for leading a sub-project to review costs 
at margin 2 l (departmental indirect costs, 
departmental payroll costs, centralised cost).  
Background  
Corporate business (sales to business, rather than individuals) accounts 
for 41% of total group revenue for FY14 [financial year 2014] and this is 
budgeted to increase year on year (representing 51% of total revenue 
by FY18 [financial year 201]). However, at a group level, this area of 
business returns a negative contribution at margin 4 (NFR) [currently 
this activity is making a loss]. 
Success Criteria 
The overriding objective and success criterion for this project/task force 
is to ensure that [name removed] becomes profitable in FY15 [financial 
year 2015].’ (Focal Organisation) 
At a management team meeting [April 2015] B presented the objectives 
as ‘Keeping me in a job project’, using serious humour to express a level of 
concern around personal consequences. B’s comment resonated a view 
expressed during an interview around how people express success in a way 
that ensures ‘self-preservation’:  
‘[talking about how one team expresses success] … even at that 
extent I feel that can be disguised sometimes by oh, we’ve got so 
many people through these [products], that represents this 
revenue here.  And that just comes down to that role owning that 
P&L and it’s kind of a self-preservation thing; I have to get those 
numbers through because I have to adhere to this profit and this 
target, this financial target to ensure that I get my objectives for 
my boss.’ [C] 
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I posit that it is entirely possible that B perceived a considerable personal 
risk to their job if this objective was not met.  The pressure to meet financial 
objectives was expressed by B again during a meeting when they suggested 
that it would be beneficial if learners had a bad experience and failed their 
exams as they would then transfer onto a new programme giving greater 
financial returns.  This suggests that B was willing to sacrifice the learner’s 
result and experience in return for increased financial performance:   
‘I would like them (existing students doing a learning programme) 
to be affected [have a bad experience, have poor pass rates] 
because they will move onto the **** [name of a newly launched 
assessed learning programme] and I will get a better margin from 
them’.  [B Observed by Participant Researcher 21 August 2014] 
The second cotangential event taking place at the same time was an 
institutional regulatory audit which I now discuss.  
5.2.4.2 Regulatory Audit 
 The focal organisation was notified by Ofqual (an external education 
regulator in the UK) that a regulatory audit was imminent.  Department A is 
responsible for ensuring compliance and took the lead in preparing for the audit.  
As part of this A commissioned a ‘workshop’, which was developed and 
delivered by an external regulatory expert.  As there was an open invitation to 
anyone who wished to attend I decided to do so in my role as a researcher.  I 
had no views prior to attending this workshop and the workshop invite was 
simply ‘to hear more about the regulators’. Summarising my notes from the 
workshop, I received it as having four objectives:  
(a) To provide evidence of staff training to the regulators  
(b) To manage risk during the audit –providing key messages to staff 
on what to/what not to say to the auditors 
(c) To educate staff in the risks of non-compliance with education 
regulations as dictated by the regulator 
(d) To promote department A as competent in their activity and 
provide reassurance that ‘we were in safe hands’ (extract from 
research journal 17 March 2014).  
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Post workshop, I spent time focusing on my thoughts, assumptions and 
reactions to the discussion.  Wishing to understand if my interpretation of the 
workshop’s purpose had coherence I interviewed the workshop ‘expert’ to better 
understand the intentions (see excerpt below).  
Regulatory expert (April14) 
Researchers questions:  How did you get to work with us? 
E1.  I suppose I should preface anything I say with the fact that I’ve worked with 
E2.  Ofqual and its predecessors since 2000.I know A because we were 
E3.  both on the Board of [name removed] and so we’ve known each other for 
E4.  about ten years or so. A felt that, to protect [focal organisation]  
E5.  against any ‘foot in mouth’ moments.  
Researchers question:  In the workshop I experienced phraseology and messaging 
as informing those present about how competent Department A were at defending, 
protecting, doing good stuff on behalf of the rest of us. Was that intentional? 
E6.  Nope.  That must have been just because I believed it to be true 
E7.  If I hadn’t felt that, I wouldn’t have let that impression come across, 
E8.  I don’t think, but I think that was part of the attempt to be reassuring,  
E9.  that people haven’t got to be terrified that Ofqual would come in in a  
E10.  weeks’ time and close the place down because there’s a team of people  
E11.  who’ve got their finger on the pulse and they know what they’re doing, 
E12.  I did deliberately try to get the message across that it’s no small task to gain  
E13.  the confidence of Ofqual. 
Researchers question:  I also got a sense that you were trying to instruct us on 
what we should and should not say to the auditors, was that an objective?  
E14.  A focused in quite strongly on the fact that she was concerned that there  
E15.  would be people, who were relatively new, wouldn’t have very much  
E16.  understanding about what Ofqual was, let alone about what the  
E17.  implications of Ofqual coming to do a visit were, and so she felt that, to  
E18.  protect against any, you know ‘foot in mouth’ moments when Ofqual  
E19.  people turned up, this piece of work ought to be done.  We both knew that  
E20.  Ofqual have taken it upon themselves, not only to turn up anywhere  
E21.  unannounced if they choose to, although they rarely do it because they  
E22.  don’t have the resource to do it, but also to decide to break out from the  
E23.  programme for the day on the two days or the three days that they’ve  
E24.  booked themselves in and just whizz off through corridors and into offices.  
E25.  We both knew that from the past and so we were both concerned that,  
  87 
E26.  whilst, if at all possible, the Ofqual visitors would be contained and  
E27.  controlled in a room with chosen people, it was not impossible that they  
E28.  might… one of them might just go off and one of the things they need to  
E29.  look for, for example, was blank certificates of the Awarding Body lying on  
E30.  tables and things so that anybody walking through could just take a handful  
E31.  and go away and then print on qualifications.  So, we know that they’ve done  
E32.  that in the past.  So that was another part of the anxiety that if there was an  
E33.  Ofqual visit due, we needed to be sure that not only were the people who  
E34.  legitimately might be called in to speak to these people understood the  
E35.  whole business, but even those on the fringe of that who might be one of  
E36.  the ones in the corridor when the Ofqual person walked past ought to have  
E37.  some kind of understanding.  So it was on the basis of that that she asked  
E38.  me if I would do that piece of work. 
The interview provided some confidence in the credibility and 
trustworthiness of my interpretation of the workshop objectives.  Specifically, 
the expert confirmed that one purpose of the workshop was a conscious intent 
to provide direction on the discussions with the regulator.  The interview 
conversation also served to reiterate what was potentially an unconscious 
presentation of the high regard the external expert had for the team in terms of 
understanding regulatory processes and procedures and preparing for the 
audit. As such they were creating a rhetoric that although it could be ‘terrifying’ 
and ‘no easy task’ to meet the needs of the regulator, the organisation didn’t 
need to worry as they were in safe hands with a team who ‘have their finger on 
the pulse’.  
This was not the only time that the rhetoric of A having a competent 
team was used.  For example, during the incident, A arranged for B to speak 
with a regulatory expert (see below interview excerpt):  
Researcher: ‘I understood that as part of this process A got you 
to directly interface with an ex-Ofqual regulator?’ 
B: ‘Yeah we had an hour with him and just kind of talked through 
the scenario and tried to understand what his perspective would 
have been if he'd been coming in and was looking into the conflict 
of interest question.  He was, I'd say, a little bit non-committal.  He 
said he needed to know much more about the scenario and the 
background before he could really give us any direct feedback.  
He did also say that we are in very safe hands from a regulatory 
point of view provided [A] is in charge.’ 
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Parallel to but independent of the workshop, I interviewed a senior 
manager who drew my attention to an organisational narrative around the 
consequences of regulatory breach.   They presented an understanding that if 
there was a regulatory breech there were some considerable consequences at 
a personal and organisational level:  
Senior Manager ‘In a sense, A is owner of the kind of regulatory 
side.  In fact, there’s a great responsibility on A.  We always hear 
they could go to prison’.  
Researcher:  Can I just check that you are saying that you have 
been told that if someone does something that didn’t meet 
regulatory standards A would go to prison? 
Senior Manager: That’s the ultimate message we get given.  
That’s the end story, but yes, I mean it’s the one thing we all fear.  
We would hate to put A in prison.  That would be a nightmare, 
wouldn’t it?  [Laughs] But no, we’d hate to have [regulator] coming 
down on us and putting serious financial penalties in as well.’ [F]  
I have been unable able to locate where this myth first started but have 
referenced it with five other organisational actors, some directly involved in this 
area of work and some not involved at all.  They all concur that they have heard 
the narrative and appear to accept it at face value. No wonder, therefore, that 
those involved in regulatory activity are so keen to comply with instructions from 
A and their team in this ‘terrifying’ and ‘risky’ regulatory environment.  
5.2.4.  Section summary 
In this section, we have heard about the incident which occurred when B 
in the view of A, incorrectly used data to promote a new product. I highlighted 
two contextual activities going on within the focal organisation at the same time, 
both of which have a time-bound ‘moment of truth’ for the two protagonists who 
may be operating within a culture of ‘self-preservation’.  One is experiencing a 
personal time-bound threat to role and has an immediate need to deliver a task 
force requirement relating to profit generation.  The other is bound by role 
definition to protect the regulatory compliance of the organisation and has an 
imminent inspection.  I position these two examples as having the potential to 
shape how the protagonists experience everyday life and influence their 
intentions.   As an example, in the event, the outcome of the audit was positive 
with the organisation receiving a ‘Notable Recommendation’ [‘A’ April 14] for 
very good processes policies, procedures and control systems.  You will see 
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that in the subsequent interview with A they use this outcome, as a power 
mechanism to reinforce their position and requirements of others.  From an 
alternative perspective, you will hear that the added sensitivity around the audit 
has impacted on B’s ability to be successful in their role and how this has been 
used as a reason why the CEO taskforce cannot be successful, suggesting the 
mutual exclusivity of meeting regulatory compliance and commerciality.  
5.3 Protagonist Narratives  
In this next section, I present how the two protagonists experienced and 
made sense of the incident and each other’s actions and responses to it, in their 
own words. In the following pages, I provide extracts from the interviews 
focussed around four questions:  
(a) What happened? 
(b) What’s the problem?  
(c) What’s the case for regulation?  
(d) What are the consequences of regulation?  
5.3.1  ‘What happened?’  
Actor A 
A16.  An email went out to suspended members encouraging them to maybe pick  
A17.  up studying again by using our  e-learning.  The email went out and I wasn't  
A18.  aware of it.  And I can understand why that happens. 
A19.  That's not necessarily an issue.  But it came to my attention because,  
A20.  unfortunately, one of the people it went to was an ex-student of one of the  
A21.  study centres, whose whole business model is based round distance  
A22.  learning, and what she brought to our attention and challenged us, both  
A23.  through data protection, which I think is a red herring on her behalf, but  
A24.  also, and she was right, from a regulation perspective, i.e. Ofqual, that we 
A25.  had privileged information that under different circumstance they would  
A26.  never get hold of.  What I mean by that is that we, as we know, have one  
A27.  central database, whether it's awarding body, whether it's general business  
A28.  use, whether it's what we call our internal study centre.  If we're operating  
A29.  truly independently and transparently and possibly in different buildings,  
A30.  the awarding body would have a database and B, in a business in their  
A31.  own right, would have a database of their customers, … the awarding body  
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A32.  then has the due care and attention of any student that comes via the  
A33.  awarding body, i.e. to take a qualification. So, there'd be a complete  
A34.  segmentation of that.  And there'd possibly be a third database for us and  
A35.  that would be about members.  So, I… hypothetically, once you've qualified  
A36.  as a student, you tip over into the member database because then you're  
A37.  not studying, you are there as a member of the community and therefore, if 
A38.  you like, they're game to any marketing, selling to that member, providing it  
A39.  doesn't  contravene data protection issues.  When I was talking to B about  
A40.  what the issues or concerns were that they struggled with, was sort of  
A41.  drawing that scenario.  The reality is we don't have that.  So, we have  
A42.  everybody in one place.  So therefore B is seeing the students that belong  
A43.  to competitors, i.e. study centres, and therefore they have privileged access  
A44.  to that information to be able to sell them something.  And I guess when  
A45.  this incident came up, whilst it was only one person that complained, and it  
A46.  was very interesting in terms of the logic when I was talking to B they  
A47.  seemed to be more concerned about the number of people that complained  
A48.  and therefore, dismissed it rather than really understanding the logic and the  
A49.  regulatory requirements we have legally; as if to say well it was only person,  
A50.  that doesn't really matter.  So, what is the magic number when it becomes 
A51.  a problem?  The reality, if you've breached something, even if you've done it  
A52.  once, you're in breach. Now, for those particular emails that went out, the 
A53.  first one, I could defend that because they were suspended members and I  
A54.  had no problem defending it. Where I came into a challenging situation was  
A55.  the desire to send another email out, which I stopped going out, was to all  
A56.  active students.  And that's really when I had to put my foot down, 
A57.  which was challenging for B because they perceive that I over-rode their  
A58.  authority and that I should have asked them first. The reality was they were  
A59.  not  in the building.  The email was about to go out.  I had to make a snap  
A60.  decision to stop it so I could then find the time to sit and talk to B, 
A61.  to help them understand why, potentially, that would be a real big problem. 
A62.  One of the things I'd said to B was I have to show that we're fair and  
A63.  transparent and actually what I did…was print off our own code of conduct 
A64.  and highlighted our own code of conduct about how we should operate 
A65.  and I said to them  okay then, so look at this another way,  are you happy for  
A66.  me to get all your students, all your customers and email all the contact 
A67.  details out to every single one of my study centres because then you're 
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A68.  creating an open and fair playing field?  I'm sure you can imagine what they  
A69.  said [said no].   So therefore why is it okay the other way? 
A70.  And one of the things which I found quite amusing, I guess, was B said  
A71.  then well how am I meant to get new business and new customers?   
A72.  And I said well the same way everybody else does.  You go externally, you  
A73.  buy mailing lists, you knock on doors and you have to act and behave as if  
A74.  this was your business and you'd had no sight of anybody else.   
A75.  And he went, oh [A laughs]. 
 
Actor B 
B1  All right.  So this really goes back to a conversation that started late last  
B2  year, around October, November with [A team member], where we  
B3  were getting towards, the back of, the e-learning development project  
B4  and we starting to think about ways that we could leverage the asset 
B5  that we got and sell into more channels than just through the  
B6  [department B] study centre, and to corporates.  So, we believed that 
B7  there was an opportunity for us to sell what I would call unattached 
B8  e-learning to studying students as a study support aid, just like we sell  
B9  our study guides.  So, we knew that we wouldn’t be able to market 
B10  this standalone product as part of the study centre offering, so we didn't  
B11  have any services around it, it was a pure study aid for studying  
B12  students.  And we gained agreement from [A team member] that  
B13  provided we used that kind of language and that we did not attach any 
B14  of the services that we make available to studying students through  
B15  our study centre that marketing to the student population would be  
B16  okay. So, we finished the development process over the winter 
B17  and got into position during February, where we started to put our  
B18  marketing plans together based on the conversation that we'd had with   
B19  [A team member] we engaged with marketing and arranged to go to  
B20  market, making very sure that this did not come across as an offer from  
B21  the study centre, at the same time, we made the study centres aware 
B22  that they had access to this e-learning as well at a discounted rate.   
B23  So, we felt that we were creating a level playing field, selling 
  92 
B24  directly to end users but also making the offer available through to  
B25  study centres.  And we'd agreed with marketing that we would do the 
B26  communication in three tranches.  So, we were going to do I think it was  
B27  international students first and then UK students and then the rest of  
B28  the database over three weeks.  It wasn't until we got a piece of  
B29  feedback from a study centre, a UK study centre, who it turned out had 
B30  a vested interest in us not talking to any studying students because they  
B31  had their own e-learning, and they clearly saw this as a competitive  
B32  threat and I think probably a bit of predatory marketing. And it  
B33  was at that point that we got invited into a conversation with A 
B34  and found out that they had stopped marketing doing any more 
B35  marketing until we had had a chance to regroup and discuss how we  
B36  were going to take this forward. I suppose I was troubled by  
B37  this for two reasons.  One is that nobody had the courtesy to inform 
B38  me that they had asked marketing to stop.  It was marketing that had 
B39  informed me that they had been told by Awarding Body not to do any more  
B40  marketing.  I also felt aggrieved that they chose to put [B team member] 
B41  in the middle of the discussion and gave them a very hard time, they 
B42  and, again, still nobody came to me to get me involved in the  
B43  conversation.  And then clearly, we weren't going to make any progress,  
B44  find any resolution until A and I had an opportunity to get together  
B45  with CEO which we did about two weeks ago and thrashed it through  
B46  and arrived at what we... what I think is a reasonable compromise for   
B47  how we can market and how we segment the database.  So, I'm completely 
B48  on Board with the concept that we can't use our access to the main 
B49  database for students to market our study centre. I can see that's a real  
B50  conflict of interests.  If we were any other third party study centre, 
B51  we wouldn't be able to come to us and say could you please give me the 
B52  list of all studying students because I want to market something to them.  
B53  I get that.  But what I was trying to say to   A is that this is a completely 
B54  standalone product.  We want to market it like an electronic book 
B55  for want of a better description, and we don't want to isolate the study  
B56  centre network from having access to this resource either.   
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B57  So we want to open up all channels and make it fair and equitable 
B58  for everybody. On that basis we agreed with  A that we could 
B59  market the product internationally on the basis that they felt 
B60  there was less risk of somebody from an international study centre having 
B61  either access or the will to complain to Ofqual.  A said she felt that was low  
B62  risk and that she would then work on a segmentation exercise with the study  
B63  centre network of the UK to get a better understanding of who the distance  
B64  learners were and once that exercise was completed, which they anticipate  
B65  to take two to three months, we would then have a database of individuals 
B66  that we could market to in the UK who were students but 
B67  they weren't attached to a particular study centre.  I can't remember what the 
B68  term is on the database, but they're kind of unattached from the study centre  
B69  point of view.  And at the same time, what we've got to do with the  
B70  international marketing is to package this with study guides.  So, what we'll be  
B71  seen to be doing is offering a, if you like, a portfolio of study support materials 
B72  and resources and it's not specifically a promotion around e-learning  
B73  So, we're okay with that. 
Researchers question: I might be wrong but I think I understood that as part of 
this process A got you to directly interface with an ex-Ofqual regulator? 
B74  Yeah we had an hour with him and just kind of talked through the scenario and  
B75  tried to understand what his perspective would have been if he'd been coming  
B76  in and was looking into the conflict of interest question.  He was, I'd say, a  
B77  little bit non-committal.  He said he needed to know much more about the 
B78  scenario and the background before he could really give us any direct  
B79  feedback.  He did also say that we are in very safe hands from a regulatory  
B80  point of view provided A is in charge. 
Researchers question: And how did that make you feel? 
B81  It kind of made me feel that the sort of subservient nature of our activity to  
B82  team A was reinforced.  So, it's like if you've got any questions go and see the  
B83  person that's in charge [lengthy pause] 
B84  And it gave me some comfort that the advice and direction we're  
B85  getting from A is not just her point of view that it comes with, you know,  
B86  practice and experience. 
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5.3.2 ‘What’s the problem?’  
Actor A 
Researcher question: why were you concerned about this incident?  
A76.  My first concern was my allegiance to organisation.  The default mechanism 
A77.  though would be the awarding body would be in breach, we would potentially 
A78.  have reputational damage because any non-compliance that's registered 
A79.  by a regulator is openly available on the Ofqual website.  So, there's 
A80.  reputational damage there.  That sanctions could be implied, which could 
A81.  restrict the way we operate; which could, for example, say that we have to 
A82.  stop people being a member while they're studying because that's what 
A83.  they would call bundling.  We've bundled a product or service with a 
A84.  qualification, which is what we do.  We make someone become a member 
A85.  before they take their qualification, so that's deemed as bundling.  And I 
A86.  keep a low profile on that because there's a tiny bit of the regulation gives 
A87.  me little bit of wriggle room.  And then the third thing for us is a potential 
A88.  fine, and that fine, in terms of business risk, is highly unlikely to ever happen 
A89.  at the highest end but the highest end is 10% of our global revenue, which 
A90.  is what, £2.2 million or something ridiculous.  The chance of never getting it I 
A91.  know is high but there are proportionate fines in-between. 
Research question: Are you saying that your concern is if we get too visible to 
the regulator, for whatever reason they may come in and have an interest in 
some other stuff that we are doing which may not meet the regulatory 
requirements? 
A92.  That's exactly it, which is always the risk and the balance I have about  
A93.  having to adhere to regulation, but equally I think I'm possibly  
A94.  the only senior member who has a role that is both revenue generating 
A95.  and also has to protect public good and standards. So, I have a very  
A96.  interesting role, a dual role that I think most people don't have.   
A97.  They're either very purist out and out revenue generating or they're purist  
A98.  support function and perhaps look at things more objectively. 
A99.  So, it is always a very challenging time in my head when I replay things  
A100.  constantly back that I'm not being so purist in terms of the awarding  
A101.  body, that I'm having to step back, take a deep breath and say okay 
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A102.  then, consider the risk profile of that.  In other words, do you make  
A103.  everything a big drama or do you say you know what, that's a really small  
A104.  risk of that happening?  Not that we would purposely do anything wrong, 
A105.  but with all regulation there's normally a bit of wriggle room there on  
A106.  interpretation.  So, I have been saying to the senior team, as you'll know, I  
A107.  don’t know how many years, there's always a risk of Ofqual telling us to  
A108.  decouple membership and qualifications. Ofqual's gone as far as saying if  
A109.  you want to be an awarding body now you cannot package.   
A110.  So, knowing that and knowing I've got a little bit of wriggle room, I'd 
A111.  certainly try and keep a low profile and what I wouldn't want Ofqual 
A112.  to do is come in heavy on something that actually we probably could have  
A113.  found a more creative way of dealing with it and then they look into 
A114.  everything else. 
 
Actor B 
Researcher question: why do you think A reacted as they did?  
B87  I think they A are conscious of the external perspective that people have. 
B88  I think they are also very sensitive to the regulator, who has quite an appetite 
B89  around conflicts of interest.  In fact, it's one of the six things that I called 
B90  out to be looked at in some depth at the forthcoming [Ofqual] audit. 
B91  So, I think there's a heightened sensitivity around us risking being pulled 
B92  up by Ofqual for something that is kind of within our control to 
B93  manage and mitigate the risk. 
 
5.3.3  ‘What’s the case for regulation?’  
Actor A 
Researchers questions:  Do you ever ask yourselves why are we regulated? 
A115.  Constantly.  I do, all the time and I've weighed that up many times and there  
A116.  will be a tipping point when the benefits of being regulated outweigh the  
A117.  nuisance of being regulated. Interestingly, and this is really rather bizarre, in  
A118.  the UK, aside from any funding that's available for students to take our  
A119.  qualifications, we could overnight not become regulated in the UK.  Our  
A120.  presence here since 1932, our reputation, and the UK being a mature market  
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A121.  understands this, would accept on face value and wouldn't give two hoots  
A122.  about it.  The bizarre thing that's driven all this actually is our international  
A123.  expansion and the fact international markets need to be satisfied that we're  
A124.  not a charlatan.  Because there are so many different institutions. And  
A125.  therefore how can international markets distinguish legitimate  
A126.  institutions that have a public good mandate and that were there to make  
A127.  money to do things and not do things to make money, as opposed to what I  
A128.  would call a cheque book institute, which is there for one thing… behind  this  
A129.  façade of the word institute, there's a limited company with people wanting  
A130.  to make profit. In South Africa, what drives individuals is not getting a grade 
A131.  of membership, it's getting a qualification.  Different markets have different  
A132.  drivers, and in South Africa, in fact the whole sub-Saharan Africa, it's that  
A133.  piece of paper, and that has the currency that that student perceives will give  
A134.  them a better opportunity of being successful in their career.  But in South 
A135.  Africa particularly, in order for, therefore, a corporate to pay out money they  
A136.  want a qualification.  To have a qualification recognised and to get funding in  
A137.  South Africa, our qualification has to sit on SAQA, which is the South Africa  
A138.  Qualifications Framework… or Authority actually, and the one way we can get  
A139.  on there is because we're regulated back in the UK.  So, therefore, SAQA   
A140.  have taken our own application and a part of that process, in terms of due  
A141.  diligence, will be okay, you're Ofqual regulated, therefore we can ignore all  
A142.  that bit, in terms of quality assurance and integrity and all the other processes  
A143.  that we go through for our regulator they’re deemed a given because of the  
A144.  fact that we’re regulated. 
 
Actor B 
Researchers questions:  Do you ever ask yourselves why are we regulated? 
B94  It's important to us.  I've heard that we could survive without Ofqual 
B95  potentially, but for the time being, we've decided that [Ofqual is the regulator  
B96  we want to align ourselves with.  And that if I was to put our compliance at  
B97  risk by creating a conflict of interest, a perceived conflict of interest, I could  
B98  be responsible for [focal org] not passing an audit or having corrective actions  
B99  to do, which could threaten our future. If it was considered to be a serious  
B100  breach and one that we failed to correct, we could have our awarding body 
B101  status removed, which would mean our qualifications wouldn't sit on the  
B102  framework, which would mean that may have some consequences in the  
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B103  market for the attractiveness of our qualification, particularly internationally.   
B104  It feels to me, I get it.  I get the benefits of being regulated. I understand the 
B105  threats of not being compliant from a business point of view.   
5.3.4  ‘What are the consequence of being regulated?’ 
Actor A 
Researcher Question: Do you think the rest of the business sees being regulated 
as a business benefit? 
A145.  Interestingly, I think [CEO] does internationally.  Because he's got so much  
A146.  more exposure now internationally, I think he recognises, because he and I  
A147.  have often had that discussion where I've  said to him, one day I'm going to…  
A148.  I will probably have to come back because we will hit a tipping point to decide  
A149.  what we're going to do.  And he's quite adamant he wants us to remain  
A150.  regulated, as long as it is feasible to do so because he understands the  
A151.  international benefit to the business and the benefit to reputation and brand…  
A152.  In that in almost counteracting the sometimes criticism we get with  
A153.  being too commercial.  And guess what, even if we weren't  
A154.  tomorrow, I would not change one iota of the quality assurance processes we  
A155.  do because they're bloody good, which is why on our recent audit, we've had  
A156.  a notable recommendation verbally.  All that really good stuff  
A157.  we should be doing and if we don't have those processes and policies,  
A158.  procedures and systems in control, the institute can never grow.  We're never  
A159.  going to get to 100,000 or 200,000 exams. If we don't have processes in  
A160.  place, so that's… I'm just talking about the importance of having that quality  
A161.  assurance. What I mean was what those policies and processes made us 
A162.  think about a lot of quality assurance and it means that because of the 
A163.  volume we do we've chosen to use qualifications in a certain way on   
A164.  our database.  We've outsourced the activity to a third party. 
A165.  We've done things in a certain way one, because we recognise the up- 
A166.  risk in terms of volume.  And also, because we recognise it's good practise,  
A167.  there's lot of benefits of having done it that way, rather than trying to manage  
A168.  the risk of having exam papers all over the place.  It could be doctored.  It  
A169.  could be lost.  And so, what… they're the sort of lessons I think we have learnt  
A170.  over the years. 
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Actor B 
Researcher Question: How do you experience being regulated? 
B106  I guess I look at it as a little bit of a hindrance for my part of the activity  
B107  'cause I feel that because we're in-house, we sometimes get… it feels like  
B108  we're getting an unfair level of scrutiny from Awarding Body.  So, through  
B109  an audit process they might tolerate some activities from private study centres,  
B110  colleges, universities, etcetera, etcetera, I think there's an added layer of  
B111  scrutiny on us because we're internal.  There is a nervousness around conflict  
B112  of interests.  There's an interest around mitigation or eliminating a conflict of  
B113  interest from the regulator.  So, I feel like it's a bit of a burden that gets passed  
B114  down to us in the way that we operate.  If we were not regulated the  
B115  difference would be there's no regulatory impact.  So, would we be prepared  
B116  to take more of a risk if we weren't regulated because there's not so much to  
B117  lose from a regulatory point of view?  So perhaps A would swing  
B118  a little bit more in our favour because, you know, the ultimate sanction of  
B119  being unregulated wouldn't exist.   
B120  I don't think it's caused extra work until now.  What I now realise is that if we  
B121  really want to turnaround the study centre and grow it back to where it was  
B122  three years ago, I've got to invest in creating a marketing list that we can  
B123  market and sell to that is going to cost money and it's going to take time to be 
B124  able to develop that database, which is actually sitting there and could be  
B125  used free of charge.  But I get the potential conflict of interest [of that] 
B126  I think that when we're marketing study centre services, I can see very clearly  
B127  that we are one of 70-odd in the UK, at least that's how A perceive us to be,  
B128  and that for us to have access to student data, who are students of other  
B129  study centres for us to market directly to, is using a competitive advantage  
B130  that other study centres don't have and we could therefore be accused of  
B131  having a conflict of interest.  So, I get that.  But then there is a range of 
B132  services that sit outside of our study centre, like course books, like e-learning,  
B133  perhaps like e-books, that we might want to develop in the future 
B134  which are available to our study centre at an internal transfer cost 
B135  and are available to all other study centres at a transfer cost, and should be  
B136  available I think, directly to any studying students as a learning support 
B137  resource.  But if one of those students was to come back to us and said yes, 
B138  I want to buy the e-learning but could you help me with a bit of revision or  
B139  could you help me with registering for my exams those calls would be handled  
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B140  by a customer service team and they would then refer that individual to the  
B141  study centre web page where they're free to decide which study centre they  
B142  want to buy their services from.  So, I thought from the perspective of our  
B143  study centre and from the perspective of having some products that were  
B144  unattached but of potential value to students, we had our bases covered. 
B145  I said to A would it help if we gave marketing of unattached e-learning to 
B146  Bookshop so not attached to our study centre in any way, shape or form and  
B147  that we even realigned the budget for standalone e-learning to somebody   
B148  else’s budget, so I had absolutely no study centre interest, other than wider  
B149  organisation interest to make sure we leverage the asset.  And the feedback  
B150  that I got was it doesn't matter because it's the public's perception that 
B151  matters, not how we're organised internally.   
Researcher question:  You use the word ‘sell’ which isn't something I hear used, 
what's your thoughts on why that might be?  
B152  No, I don't hear it a lot actually.  I hear the word ‘marketing’ quite a lot  
B153  because we do a lot of marketing but I don't hear a lot of people talking  
B154  about selling, which is the… you know, it's the transactional part of what we  
B155  do to earn money.  But to me it's very much part of our reality and something I  
B156  think a lot of people are actually conditioned not to talk about.  Because the  
B157  myth is that our customers don't like to be sold to by us.  But for me  
B158  it should be part of our everyday vocabulary. So, you know, I would  
B159  like to bring somebody on to sell the services of the Study Centre, not passive,  
B160  not in a just do a good marketing campaign sense, but get somebody on  
B161  the phone and we have somebody face to face and we try to sell to them.  But  
B162  I also get that we need to be cautious of not overstepping some of the  
B163  boundaries that we need… that we've created for ourselves for good reason.  
B164  So, I think you have to have checks and balances in place to make sure you  
B165  don't stray into a potential conflict of interest. The risk is that we end up  
B166  portraying a fairly fragmented image of what our total capability is because  
B167  there are bits of it that we can only talk to a certain audience about and there  
B168  are other bits that we clearly can't talk to any part of the student audience  
B169  about it.  So I'm worried that it may appear to be clunky and that, even worse  
B170  than that, we might have to organise ourselves around that clunkiness to  
B171  make sure that we preserve those borders and those barriers that we've got  
Researcher question: You have objectives about growing, revenue and margin. 
Do you think the CEO understands the implications being regulated has on this?  
B172  I don't think he does.  I think the conversation I had with him a couple of  
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B173  weeks ago, helped to put those risks into some perspective. 
B174  And I think the one thing that A does for us all is coach us very clearly on what  
B175  the risks are. I think they have their commercial hat on when they do that.   
B176  So, when we were actually able to sit down and talk about it like adults,   
B177  they were actually quite practical and commercial and giving us some pointers  
B178  about things that we could do, where the risk was minimal and things that we  
B179  ought not to do until we've done a bit more work to mitigate some of the risk.   
B180  And I think those kind of conversations certainly helped me but I think it  
B181  helped CEO to understand the context that we were working within.  What  
B182  I've still got to do with CEO now is to help them understand that with this  
B183  constraint, which is like having at least one hand tied behind your back, we've  
B184  got work to do to define how do we now market the Study Centre as broadly  
B185  as we possibly can, knowing that a part of that offering we kind of have to  
B186  keep secret from some people. 
Researcher question:  You previously used the phrase ‘when A got commercial’ 
are you suggesting that they are not always ‘commercial’?   
B187  I think that when A is dealing with me or my team, I get a more rigid  
B188  application of the regulations.  When we're sitting in front of CEO, it tends to  
B189  get a bit moderated.  And that's when I say it moved to a more commercial  
B190  application of risk.  I think A sees that they have ultimate control of  
B191  authority about how those regulations are applied.  And when she's with CEO  
B192  it's a different kind of relationship. It's more adult to child, whereas with CEO  
B193  it's more… it's parent to parent [laughs]. 
 
5.3.5 Narrative Summary   
Below is a summary pen-picture of the narratives of the two protagonists 
– here is what I hear them say ‘in a nut-shell’. 
 [A] 
The business strategy says that we are going to be increasingly global.  To 
protect our international activity in education we need to be regulated to be 
recognised as a credible and legitimate education provider.   The CEO 
agrees that being regulated is important to protect our brand and the 
international activity.  This matter because my job is quite unique, as I am 
the only one required to protect the public good and be commercial. I need 
you to know that I have the support of the boss behind the work that I do.  
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Staying regulated is a really difficult thing to achieve, just look at B, they 
have just got it wrong and I had to step in to defend pubic good.  The 
regulations are difficult to understand and the regulators are powerful - if 
we do anything wrong we could face big fines and I could go to prison.  
However, you don’t need to worry because my team and I are here and 
have our fingers on the pulse and know what we are doing.  It’s not just 
me saying this, the regulator and other regulatory experts are saying it too. 
My allegiance is to [organisation] and I am willing to risk my freedom for it.  
I can help you to understand what you need to do.  I am willing and able to 
protect our public good activity from the evils of commerciality’   
 [B] 
‘I totally get the importance of being regulated for [the organisation] for 
now but I don’t necessarily think this is a permanent thing. I think that we 
are over sensitive to the regulator and that we could make more practical 
and commercial interpretations of the regulations if we wanted to. I know 
that I have a role to protect our regulatory compliance and I do this for 
the greater good of the organisation, not because I think it helps me in 
my role. In fact, it makes being successful in my job more difficult.  It can 
feel like a burden and it is even counterproductive to achieving my 
objectives because it means I have a complex clunky structure, which 
makes things slower and more expensive than if we were not regulated.    
I am not sure my boss understands how constraining it can be but he 
may have to as I am not sure I am going to deliver what is needed in the 
P&L taskforce and I may lose my job if I don’t make a profit this year. I 
am not sure that A understands how difficult it can be and I wished that 
they would make it a little easier for me sometimes. I feel that we have a 
more rigid application of the rules and a greater level of scrutiny than 
other study centres because we are an internal department.  This doesn’t 
feel fair but I don’t always feel empowered to negotiate with A in an 
adult-to-adult way.  I know that A is knowledgeable and good at trying to 
get us to understand the risks but sometimes it comes across as them 
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telling us what to do which can feel a bit insulting and disrespectful.  This 
time I had to get the boss involved because A wouldn’t hear me and by 
involving the boss they become less rigid in their application of what we 
can and cannot do and we were able to reach a compromise. I tend not 
to get this if I don’t involve the boss.’   
5.4 Interpretation 
The previous section contained extensive passages from interview 
transcripts. In this   section I provide my interpretations of what I heard and 
observed.  In alignment with the central research question, this section 
develops around themes of rhetoric and symbolism, politics and power, and 
structure.  
5.4.1 Use of Rhetoric and Symbolism  
 I experienced much persuasive and emotive rhetoric around this 
incident, yet some of it seemed lacking in sincerity or meaningful content. For 
example, in lines A124-127 A presents being regulated as symbiotic with a 
public good mandate and being judged as a legitimate institution. This is a 
common strapline from A that I have heard many times over the past 10 years I 
have worked with them, normally used to emphasise their commitment to the 
logic of ‘public good’.  However, the lack of articulation of what constitutes 
(good) ‘things’ means that the sentence lacks meaningful content and has 
become an empty vessel, symbolic rather than material in nature, within a 
hybrid positon [see chapter 4, section 4.2.3 for more on this issue]. Moving 
even further towards a commercial logic, in lines A131-136, A149-A153 and 
A162-170, we see A surrender regulation to the purposes of business benefit, 
brand, market demand, growth and as a defence against the charge of being 
too commercial.  A more credible commitment to public good would have 
perhaps been expressed through commitment to removing barriers to learning 
and giving greater access to those in developing countries through reduced 
costs and/or the benefits of cost reduction being passed onto learners.  
Similarly, B signals an acceptance of the importance of being regulated 
‘for the time being’ [B102], signalling a belief that being regulated is not a fixed 
state and exists more for a commercial than moral reason. Meeting the needs 
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of the regulator is nevertheless presented as ‘terrifying’ [E9] and ‘no small task’ 
[E12-13]. This provides powerful discursive resources that have resulted in 
widespread myths among lower-middle job grades regarding the personal risk 
of imprisonment to A, should a regulatory breach occur.  Actors within the 
organisation appear to unquestioningly perpetuate this myth, it has become a 
defining narrative that socialises and sanctions behaviours. Even at senior 
leadership team level, there is a strong sense of personal responsibility for the 
catastrophic consequences of non-compliance:   
‘If I was to put our compliance at risk by creating a conflict of 
interest, a perceived conflict of interest, I could be responsible for 
[focal organisation] not passing an audit or having some corrective 
actions to do, which could threaten our future… I understand the 
threats of not being compliant from a business point of view’ 
[B101-B112] 
B perpetuates an equally powerful myth of personal consequences.  
Using serious humour, they create a discourse among more junior staff that 
they are at personal risk of losing their job if they fail to meet the objectives of 
the ‘keeping me in a job project’. In doing so, they elevate the importance and 
necessity of commercial behaviours and goals. Though the starting points of 
their rhetoric differ insofar as A adopts a public good and B adopts a 
commercial rationale, the core substance of their argumentation is shared in 
that regulatory compliance is ultimately positioned as a symbolic means to 
achieve commercial ends.        
5.4.2  Politics and power  
 Being regulated appears to have utility to A as a political power resource 
in that they use it to ‘police’ behaviour in other departments [lines B106-114] by 
connecting it to public good through protecting standards, codes of conduct and 
providing legitimacy [lines A62-64, A124-130] and commerciality through 
mitigating business risk from fines, reputational damage and ultimately closure 
[lines A78-80, A87-90, B99]. By positioning themselves as an authoritative, 
expert resource who should be consulted [lines A17-A18], A presents their role 
as being to ‘help others to understand’ [line A60-61]. This presentation is 
accepted to some degree when B comments that ‘the one thing that A does for 
us all is coach us very clearly on what the risks are’ [lines B181-B182]. Yet, in 
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contrast to this espoused motive, combatant terms are adopted such as 
‘defending’ [A53]; ‘challenging’ [A54], ‘putting foot down’ [A56] and having an 
‘allegiance’ [A76].  This positions A as ‘at war’ with others and there did not 
appear to be any sense of being apologetic for ‘overriding’ B [line A57] or that 
there is any other way of interpreting the incident. Rather, there is a sense of A 
being aggrieved that B did not take the issue seriously and dismissed the 
severity of the potential regulatory consequences [A46-A49], despite B’s belief 
that they had in fact ‘covered the bases’ around any potential conflict of interest 
[B31-44]. Additionally, a degree of amusement about B’s needs and their 
approach to meeting these needs [lines A70-A75] was expressed.  In turn, B 
speaks of being ‘troubled’ [line B43] and ‘aggrieved’ [line B47] by A’s action to 
stop the marketing without consultation, acknowledging that this is because A 
sees that when dealing with B or their team they have ‘ultimate control of 
authority about how those regulations are applied’ and as such B at times feels 
‘subservient’ to A [line B88].    
Within this power play, both protagonists draw on the CEO to reinforce 
their position.  A, for example, brings the CEO into their narrative to emphasise 
their (CEO) commitment to regulatory status.  Through declaring that the CEO 
is ‘adamant that they want us to remain regulated’ [line A149-A151] they seek 
to persuade others that they (A) are doing an important job. In addition and 
through the use of external experts, A presents themselves as being competent 
to meet this important but difficult task [see lines A171-A173 where A cites the 
regulator as giving them a notable outcome, endorsing their competence; E12-
13 where they use external experts to reaffirm their capability; B86-93 where A 
arranged a direct interface between B and a regulatory expert]. Conversely B 
arranged for a direct interface between him, A and the CEO in order that the 
CEO ‘moderate’ A’s application of the regulations [B194-196]. Whilst B notes 
A’s belief that they ‘have ultimate control of authority on how those regulations 
are applied’ [Line B197-B197] B uses the CEO to mediate and move A into a 
position where they provide a more practical and commercial application of risk 
[B196] than they (B)  was able to achieve independently.    
The notion of ‘wriggle room’ in the regulations presented by A and the 
compromise reached in the meeting involving the CEO suggests a degree of 
agency and awareness about how A interprets, expresses and applies the 
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rules, depending on who they are interacting with. The regulatory compliance 
discourse has been developed as an important power resource or political tool 
because of its utility in transcending commercial and public good logics. 
5.4.3  Structure  
  Actor A presents their role as unique in comparison to the rest of the 
management team, in that they are ‘the only senior member who has a role that 
is both revenue generating and also has to protect public good and standards’ 
[see lines A93 – A104]. Within protagonist A’s narrative, we see them 
appropriate department B’s structural status as an independent business [lines 
A30-A31] as a core reason for the conflict of interest due to gaining competitive 
advantage over external study centres [lines A42-A44, A65-A75]. We equally 
see B show great sensitivity to and awareness of the implications of this status 
and the measures taken to mitigate a conflict of interest [lines B4-B28; B47-
B56; B128-144]. One solution suggested by B to A was that the activity 
perceived by A to be causing a conflict be moved to a department within the 
focal organisation so the internal study centre (and wholly owned trading 
subsidiary) had no ‘interest’ [lines B145-149]. Paradoxically, despite structural 
status initially being used as the source of the conflict by A, they responded to 
B’s proposed structurally based solution by stating that this was a matter of 
public perception and not how the organisation is organised internally [B149-
151]. 
B further suggested that as an internal study centre, they experience a 
higher (and unfair level) of scrutiny from the awarding body (Department A) 
[see lines B106-B114] that the focal organisation’s products and services 
appear fragmented and clunky [lines B157-163], and that they are required to 
keep a part of their offerings ‘hidden’ [line B171-175] and ‘secret’ [B193] to 
avoid conflicts of interest. They describe a sense of ‘working with one hand tied 
behind their back’ [B190]. It is noteworthy that there is no requirement based on 
charity law for the internal study centre to be a separate trading entity from the 
focal organisation, as the activity they undertake is in direct furtherance of the 
parent organisation’s charitable and charter objects. Yet, the complexity caused 
by this structure appears to provide the basis for ambiguous treatment of study 
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centre activity and a reduction in its status given the primacy afforded to the 
awarding body and its regulatory compliance.    
5.5 Chapter Summary  
 This chapter provides an appreciation of how two protagonists with 
conflicting agendas use structure, discourse, politics and other influential actors 
to negotiate and persuade.  For example, we have seen how one protagonist 
uses regulatory compliance and external regulators to create an acceptance of 
their expert position, how both use myths to persuade others and socialise the 
behaviours and priorities they desire and how both use an elite actor to 
negotiate different logics and reach compromise.  Compromising involves 
crafting an acceptable balance between competing logics by conforming to 
minimum standards of what is expected within each (Scott W. R., 1983) and/or 
bargaining with institutional referents so that they alter their demands. Its ability 
to at least placate diverse constituent groups is described as a viable strategy 
for organisations facing institutional complexity (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 
1991; Pache and Santos, 2011).  Compromising is not without limitations, 
however, and may result in ‘antagonistic practices’ (Greenwood et al, 2011) that 
can be challenged on legitimacy, legality and lack of transparency.   
In this incident, the compromise solution has some incongruence to the 
stated benefits or case for being regulated.  In their narrative, A presents being 
regulated as critical to international business, as it provide the organisation with 
legitimacy and credibility [lines A73-A91].  However, the compromise was to 
market the product internationally on the basis that A felt there was less risk of 
somebody from an international study centre having either access or the will to 
complain to Ofqual [lines B54-57].  This signals the symbolic nature of 
regulation and positions it as a way to avoid other international bureaucratic 
processes rather than being values driven as a means to achieve public good 
and perhaps also highlights game playing by elite actors who appropriate 
particular logic values to pursue their own interests.   
This concludes the first incident findings chapter and I now move onto 
the second, which explores the nature of institutional work undertaken to bring 
in a change to the bonus structure 
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Chapter 6 – The Bonus Setting Process 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
I used this critical incident to get a greater understanding of the role of 
logics in shaping bonus schemes and the institutional work of actors in both 
advancing and resisting the case for changes to the scheme. In this chapter, I 
explore the bonus schemes in place over the terms of two CEOs, arguably 
affiliated to the different logics of public good (CEO1) and commercial (CEO 3).  
Through this incident, I explore the institutional work undertaken by CEO 3 to 
bring in a formal bonus structure, aligned to a commercial logic, and the 
challenges they faced from protagonists (namely Trustees) who appear to 
identify with a public good logic. In doing so, the chapter responds to the central 
research question of how organisational actors deal with the presence of 
multiple institutional logics and what implications this has for the nature of 
organisation, with additional emphasis on the sub-question of what happens if 
‘insiders’ do not see the dominant logic as legitimate. Please refer to the 
methodology chapter for detailed information of the fieldwork underpinning this 
incident.  
I confess that prior to analysing this critical incident I had a rather 
simplistic view of bonus schemes, perhaps borne out of my days as a HR 
manager with responsibility for their deployment and management rather than 
creation.  During this DBA research my appreciation of the significance of 
bonus schemes and the complexity of beliefs and assumptions that lead to the 
development, implementation, acceptance and rejection of them deepened.  I 
would now position bonus schemes as a vehicle used to negotiate and embed 
logics within an organisation, but would also suggest that bonus schemes are 
underpinned by an affiliation to a particular logic and therefore present bonus 
schemes as representational of actor’s belief systems. In making this claim, I 
accept the argument of Argryris (1973) and Davis et al. (1997) that 
management systems are reflective and consistent with the assumptions of 
those that have designed them. 
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6.2 Précis of incident 
In this chapter, I explore the institutional work undertaken to bring in (and 
resist) a change to the bonus policy.  Whilst the catalyst for identification of the 
incident was a Trustee meeting in May 2015, I very quickly discovered that this 
tension was not new - a similar challenge had previously resulted in the 
introduction of a new governance committee responsible for approving 
remuneration policies some seven years previous (referred to as Pay 
Committee).   I have therefore extended the timeframe of documentation 
included in the analysis of this incident, which incorporates contextual material 
from 2008 to 2016.  The detailed focus of this critical incident research is 
nevertheless February 2015 - May 2016.   
6.2.1 The incident  
 This incident first came to my attention during an annual pay-setting 
process in 2015. Table 7 below provides a timeline of events. 
 
Table 7:  Incident timeline 
Ref  Date Activity  
1 September 2014 Pay Committee (which was formed in 2008, to monitor and approve 
executive pay) was disbanded and its terms of reference 
transferred to newly formed Finance Committee (responsible for 
overseeing financial governance, of which pay is one element).  
2 19 May 2015 Finance Committee requested a briefing on how pay and 
incentivisation was managed as part of the budget setting process. 
3 1 July 2015 CEO initiated work activity to make a proposal for a change to the 
existing bonus scheme. Initiation occurred by way of meeting with 
CEO, me and Head of HR.  
4 22 July 2015 Email sent by Head of HR to CEO, expressing their concern about 
the proposed change to staff bonus.  
5 24 July 2015 The process of writing the ‘Proposal for Amendment to Pay and 
Reward Policy’ for Finance Committee’s approval begins.  
6 20 August 2015 Meeting of Finance Committee discussed ‘Proposal for Amendment 
to Pay and Reward Policy’. Committee unwilling to approve the 
proposal and asked for it to be tabled at a full trustee meeting. 
6 8 September 2015 Meeting of the Board of Trustees discussed the proposal. Proposal 
was approved after much discussion but only on the condition that 
a full review of all pay and reward was undertaken to ensure 
appropriateness.  No timelines set for the review.  
6a Board of Trustees accepted a recommendation for the re-
instatement of Pay Committee (disbanded September 2014 - see 
ref 1 above) stating that the remit of Finance Committee as too 
large and there was a need to separate out Pay and Reward to a 
separate committee (reformed Pay Committee).  
7 31 October 2015 Head of HR exits the organisation citing ‘cultural differences’. 
8 11 December 2015  Announcement of new bonus scheme to staff. 
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6.2.2  The wider external environment  
The timing of this incident is perhaps significant as it comes shortly after 
the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) Inquiry into Charity 
Sector Executive Pay, a subject which has come under scrutiny in recent years 
following some ‘high profile media articles into charity executive pay’. (NCVO, 
2014, p. 6)   The task of the inquiry was presented as ‘to assist charity Trustees 
in exercising their responsibility for setting the pay of their senior executives’ 
(NCVO, 2014, p. 6).  The regulator (UK Charity Commission) is on record as 
supporting the Inquiry’s findings and report (NCVO, 2014, p. 3).   
The objective of the NCVO inquiry was to explore the relationship 
between salary levels and public trust and confidence in the charity sector, and 
the arguments about what are appropriate levels of pay for charity senior 
executives and how these levels should be arrived at.  The outcomes of this 
report included ‘definitive guidelines for charity trustees, informed by a broad 
debate on the issues involved, to consider when setting salaries’.   In terms of 
the focal organisation there are some noteworthy principles, recommendations 
and statistics published from this inquiry (NCVO, 2014, pp. 4-10): 
1. Charity law binds organisations registered as a charity (and thus the 
focal organisation as it is by legal form a charity) 
2. Charity law is firmly founded on certain values. Central to those is the 
requirement of exclusive public benefit  
3. All charities accordingly share some common characteristics that must 
be observed by trustees when they consider pay. They must be 
completely independent in formulating their policy and decisions, and 
their decisions must be reached solely based on the best interests of the 
charity and its beneficiaries 
4. Trustees exemplify the voluntary nature of the charity and are thus 
themselves unpaid, except in the rare cases where remuneration is 
authorized. (The focal organisation obtain special 
permission/dispensation for the CEO to also hold trustee status).  
5. The inquiry summarized four main viewpoints on high pay in the charity 
sector, ‘all of them strongly held and vigorously expressed’:  
(a) that nobody who works for a charity should ever be paid;  
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(b) that pay for a small, top tier of managers is acceptable provided as 
many other people as possible are volunteers;  
(c) that working for a charity is a special vocation and salaries are 
subject to a ‘charity discount’, making them lower than comparable 
roles in other sectors;  
(d) that charities should be well run on efficient business lines – and if 
that means high pay at the top, then so be it. (CEO3 echoed this 
view on the assumption that to run as an ‘efficient business’ there 
was a need to remunerate highly to attract and retain staff).  
6. The inquiry noted the following profile of the charity sector: 
(a) There are almost 161,000 registered general charities in England 
and Wales, with an annual income of just over £39 billion;  
(b) Almost half this income went to just 533 major charities, each with 
annual revenue of over £10 million. (The focal organisation’s 
revenue is over £22 million);   
(c) Of all registered charities, 91% have no paid employees, the 
remaining 9% provide jobs for around 800,000 people. (The focal 
organisation employs 149 staff);  
(d) Less than 1% of charities employee a member of staff earning 
£60,000 or more. (Almost 11% of staff in the focal organisation earn 
£60,000 or more - see Table 8 below). 
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Table 8:  Emoluments of senior staff in focal organisation (taken from annual report and accounts). 
 
6.2.3 The changing nature of the scheme 
In this section I explore the bonus schemes in place over two CEO’s 
terms. From the analysis in chapter 4 (positions) I present CEO 1 (2001-2008) 
as coming from a public good logic and CEO 3 (2008-2017) from a commercial 
logic. There was a rapid turnover of CEO in 2008 and CEO 2 was in post for a 
short time so made no changes to the bonus scheme. My analysis in this 
section involved a review of the bonus schemes in place since 2007. A 
summary of the changes made to the scheme is provided in Table 14 (see page 
120), which has been developed through documentary evidence in the staff 
handbook, minutes of trustee meetings, general staff communications (staff 
updates, messages on the intranet) and historical HR files.  Through the 
documentary review process, I noted four key changes to the scheme since the 
start of the current CEO (CEO 3).  These can be summarised as: introduction of 
pay scales; move to individualistic performance and reward; move to high 
power distance schemes2 and; change of performance criteria: 
                                            
2 High power distance relates to scale of differences in status and how it is displayed for 
example in terms of job descriptions, decision making levels, salary etc. 
£ Nov 09 –Oct 10 
Nov 10 – 
Oct 11 
Nov 11 – 
Oct 12 
Nov 12 – 
Oct 13 
Nov 13 – 
Oct 14 
Nov 14 – 
Oct 15 
60,001-70,000 4 4 3 2 1 6 
70,001-80,000 0 5 5 1 4 5 
80,001-90,000 3 2 1 2 1 1 
90,001-100,000 0 0 3 3 0 0 
100,00-110,000 0 2 3 2 3 0 
110,001-120,000 1 1 1 2 2 5 
120,001-130,000 0 0 1 0 2 1 
130,001-140,000 0 1 0 0 0  
140,001-150,000 0 1 1 1 1  
170,001-180,000 0 1 0 0 0  
190,001-200,000 0 0 0 0 0  
200,001-210,000 0 1 0 0 0  
220,001-230,000 0 0 1 1 1  
230,001-240,000 0 1 0 0 0  
260,001-270,000 0 0 0 0 o 1 
Total staff £60,000 + 8 19 19 14 16 19 
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(a) Introduction of pay scales and pay bandings. 
A new structure was introduced in 2012 to ‘create a coherent pay and 
benefit policy, which supports the management of pay across the 
organisation’ (Focal Organisation, 2012). This resulted in the creation of 
pay bands and an annual performance and pay review process and was 
a foundation for the introduction of the high distance bonus scheme that 
followed (see b).  
(b) Move from a scheme rewarding team (collective) results to one that 
rewards individual performance and supports high power distance.  
There were two changes that have prioritised individual performance and 
reward over team performance and reward:  
i. Moving from a shared bonus to individual bonus. This change 
first came about in 2010 with the introduction of a separate 
leadership bonus. It was further reinforced in 2015 when bonus 
payments changed from a shared central pot to a percentage of 
base salary for all staff.  See Table 9 below for an example of the 
impact of the 2015 changes.  
Table 9:  Bonus values  
Bonus value - November 2014 - 
October 2015 [shared pot] 
Bonus value - November 20015 – 
October 2016 [individual pot]  
% 
increase  
Entry level job (band E) = £569 Entry level job (band E) = £747 +31.28% 
Middle manager job (band C) = £569 Middle manager job (band C) = £1,399 +245.86% 
Senior manager (band A) = £569 Senior manager (band A) = £2,133 +374.86% 
 
ii. Introduction of individual ‘great rating’.  This initiative 
(November 2010) introduced additional financial and non-financial 
rewards to individuals with ‘great performance’, who overachieved 
on objectives.  Initially the Key Leadership team were excluded 
but in 2015 they became eligible for this bonus.   I thought that it 
would be informative to get an appreciation of what is determined 
as ‘great’ performance within this context and therefore read 
associated policy procedures and the testimonials of individuals 
who achieved ‘greatness’.   The basis of this bonus lies in the 
performance management system, which has three categories of 
performance (see Table 10 on following page).  
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Table 10:  Performance ratings ( (Focal Organisation, 2012) 
Great performer: The Staff Member shows consistent performance against the Personal 
Qualities and Behaviour Framework for their level. This is a mandatory criterion for great 
performance but great performer rating cannot be given for this item alone. The Staff 
Member has achieved and exceeded their agreed objectives, demonstrating, good, sound, 
sustainable performance and positively supports and influences achievement of goals 
outside of and in addition to, their own role 
Good performer: The Staff Member shows consistent performance against the Personal 
Qualities and Behaviour Framework for their level. This is a mandatory criterion for good 
performance but good performer rating cannot be given for this item alone. The Staff 
Member has achieved their agreed objectives, demonstrating, good, sound, sustainable 
performance consistently throughout the appraisal period  
Under performer: The Staff Member fails to show consistent performance against the 
Personal Qualities and Behaviour Framework for their level. Even if a Staff Member’s work 
is of good quality but this descriptor is valid, the Staff Member must be rated as an under 
performer, and / or  
• The Staff Member has failed to achieve their agreed objectives, and / or has failed to 
demonstrate good, sound, sustainable performance. An insufficient amount of critical 
activities are completed in a timely manner and line manager / task supervisor are not 
kept informed of work issues, alterations and status, and / or Staff Member shows: 
• Circumvention of established procedures, resulting in unnecessary expenditure of time, 
money or customer dissatisfaction; 
• Reluctance to accept responsibility;  
• Incomplete understanding of one or more important areas of the field of work.  
 
Individuals who have been rated ‘great’ are subject to a peer group 
‘calibration’ process whereby the line manager making the recommendation has 
to defend and evidence their assessment to their peer group.  The peer group 
will endorse or reject the assessment.  This process occurs at three levels of 
the organisation each one rolling up until the final list reaches the CEO for 
ultimate approval. So just what is recognised as ‘great’?  To answer this 
question, I obtained the testimonials for those staff members who have 
achieved a great rating for the previous 3 years (a total of 17 awards). I present 
these narratives in Table 11 (next page) as an illustration of the dominance of 
commerciality in what is deemed ‘great’. 
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Table 11:  Great Citations  
Revenue 
growth   
 
‘[O] had a fantastic year, delivering above and beyond what is expected in their 
role.  O achievements include: 
• smashing their sales target and bringing in an additional 80% of revenue 
• selling three [product name removed] 
• using [system name removed] effectively to record opportunities and build 
good relationships with the wider sales community 
• supporting the team with a successful telesales campaign to support the 
launch of the [product name removed]’ 
Profit growth  
 
 ‘[S] has excelled in all areas of their role and surpassed all targets and 
objectives set... Their dedication is un-questionable and their contribution is 
well recognized. It is however, their contribution to cost savings and efficiencies 
for cost reduction and scalable delivery that has directly contributed to the 
outstanding achievement of achieving positive NFR for the first time.  S’s 
efforts this year have seen them achieve savings well in excess of 200k which 
exemplifies their deep knowledge of delivery costs along with the innovative 
and dedication to 'make it happen’  
Supporting 
globalisation  
 
 ‘[B1] was rated Great this year for her work on the finance Project which was 
the Group Finance Team’s biggest adventure in the last 20 years I believe, and 
excelled at taking the challenge of integration and implementation forward 
through to a successful Phase 1 Go-Live…At times, B1 has needed to be 
strong in her approach to ensure controls are adhered so that we continue to 
maintain financial stability and transparency globally, which I believe continues 
to work in our favour’. 
Reducing 
dependency 
on suppliers 3 
 
‘[W] led the project to launch a new facility for students which now delivers a 
high quality high-end product where students can self-serve a significant 
amount of support which has reduced the amount of work on support staff. W’s 
creativity has ensured the development of new and better content, in order to 
move away from suppliers and increase own our own IP.’ 
‘Development of our owned IP and taking direct responsibility for tutor 
resourcing and programme quality assurance are game changers for [focal 
organisation]. In pursuit of these objectives A1 has applied their considerable 
knowledge, skills and experience to create a student centered delivery 
capability where cost, quality and agility are driving significantly improved 
levels of performance and will contribute towards eliminating £1.35 million of 
losses from the P&L in FY15.’ 
Developing 
brand  
 
‘This year, Y day job expanded to include Events and leading the embedding of 
a global PR strategy which delivered the highest AVE (Advertising Value 
Equivalent) we have ever seen, at £33million. But on top of all that Y has 
managed and delivered a complex tender, which has resulted in the move to 
[supplier name removed]. It’s pretty difficult to move away from a supplier that 
has been in place for 18 years, and with whom you have built up a strong 
relationship, but Y was unflinching in their commitment to using this opportunity 
to make a step change for [focal organisation]’ 
Campaigns  ‘This year C1 has led on two key projects with Great Results. Project Liberty is 
the work that we have done with the [name of external organisation removed] 
on the anti-slavery agenda.  To support that, C1 led on the delivery of the 
Ethics test, which many of you here have undertaken. Project Eagle is a 
strategic initiative with [name of consultancy house removed] on providing the 
[product name removed] [product supports risk reduction] to our corporate 
contacts.’ 
 
                                            
3 The focal organisation has a legacy of working with suppliers owned intellectual property (IP) (products).  
Where there is a reference to creating focal organisation owned IP this refers to creating products that are 
owned by the focal organisation and not the supplier.  
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(c) Changes of performance criteria.  Again, there were two changes to 
the definition of good performance, both of which positioned financial 
results as the key criteria. 
i. The following table 12 summarises the bonus criteria. I position 
November 2007-October 2008 as being driven from behaviour 
criteria (means) and November 2015-October 2016 as driven by 
financial outcome (end) criteria. 
Table 12:  Bonus Criteria  
Bonus Criteria November 2007 
– October 2008 [all staff]  
Bonus Criteria November 2015 
– October 2016 [all staff] 
1. Work ethics and respect 
2. Working practices 
3. Customer Care & quality 
4. Use of ITC 
5. Financial  
6. Marketing  
1. Net financial return  
 
ii. Introduction of sales commission for those roles deemed to be 
linked to generation of revenue in November 2009 signalled the 
assumed primacy of revenue generation, increasing the total 
reward opportunity for sales roles by 20% more than any other 
role. 
(d) Changes in presentation and communication   
There are notable differences in the way that the bonus schemes were 
constructed and communicated within the organisation by the two CEOs. Here 
we look at the structure and symbolism of the respective bonus schemes, which 
illustrates the different logics underpinning the approach of CEO1 and CEO3. 
The next table (13) provides a summary of the two bonus schemes and their 
communication to staff.   
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Table 13:  Bonus criteria: communication to staff 
2007-2008 2015-2016 
CEO 1 CEO 2 
Communicated by CEO verbal update at bi-monthly 
staff briefing and supported by a printed handout 
Communicated through the Pay and 
reward policy on internal intranet 4 , 
Finance Director update at quarterly 
staff briefings and final bonus payment 
communicated by CEO at December 
end of year staff briefing 
Achievement of the following objectives by all staff will 
trigger a bonus payment of £150 per person.  The 
criteria are based around several areas relating to the 
institutes targets and how we need to operate to 
achieve those goals. 
 
 
These Scheme rules are for guidance & 
are non-contractual.  They replace in 
their entirety the previous rules & 
guidance regarding the payment of 
bonuses as set out in the document 
‘Global Pay & Bonus Policy’  
[Focal organisation] may in its absolute 
discretion pay staff a bonus of such 
amount, at such intervals & subject to 
such conditions as may in its absolute 
discretion determine from time to time.  
Any bonus payment to staff shall be 
purely discretionary & shall not form 
part of the employee's contractual 
remuneration. If [focal organisation] 
makes a bonus payment to staff in 
respect of a particular financial year, it 
shall not be obliged to make 
subsequent bonus payments in respect 
of subsequent financial years. 
Eligibility 
Section not covered   Eligible staff for the FY15-16 non-
contractual bonus must meet the 
following criteria: 
• Employees on permanent or fixed 
term [focal organisations] contracts, 
and;   
• Rated as at least good at the end of 
year appraisal for the qualifying 
period, and;  
• Who were on the payroll during the 
qualifying period, and;  
• Who are on the payroll at the time 
that any bonus payments are made 
even if they are not currently at 
work due to maternity, sick or some 
other approved absence. 
  
                                            
4 The intranet is a private computer network accessible only to an organisation's staff.  
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2007-2008 2015-2016 
CEO 1 CEO 2 
Performance Standards 
Work ethics & respect 
• Respect & understanding for all work colleagues, 
providing support & advice wherever possible, 
without the need for management prompting 
• No-blame method of working with colleagues – no 
rivalry or disrespect between teams  
• Accept responsibility for quality of output & quality 
of relationship with colleagues 
• Language & behaviour to all colleagues to be 
professional & respectful at all times 
• Standard of dress & personal appearance to be 
smart & professional at all times  
• Demonstrable understanding & acceptance of 
different cultures, personalities & beliefs – accept & 
respect petioles differences  
• Understand that whilst entertaining & socializing 
either with customers or work colleagues that you 
still represent as an organisation.  
Working practices 
• Constant interface with colleagues in cross-
functional groups to ensure efficient & best use of 
resources  
• Self-motivated involvement in seeking & sharing 
information  
• Adhere at all times to institute polices & procedures  
• Proactively seek information – don’t wait to be told 
• Abide by the principles of Ethical code in all 
dealings with suppliers  
• Abide by the requirements of the various business 
principles & practices  
• Understand the risk mitigation process & 
procedures & bring risk management to the 
forefront of your minds 
• Customer care & quality (The word customer is 
used as a generic term & refers to everyone for 
whom you provide a service – internal colleagues, 
customers, members, suppliers etc.) 
• Meet the needs of our customers in a high quality & 
professional manner 
• Treat all customers equally  
• Provide a ‘corporate’ image to all our customers 
representing the whole of [Focal organisation] at all 
times, not just one particular part – we must all act 
as Ambassadors cross-functionally 
• Go ‘the extra mile’ to ensure customer satisfaction 
– demonstrate commitment to the ‘customer first’ 
philosophy 
• Recognise that systems & procedures – as they 
are enhanced & designed – are there to assist 
customer care. Do not try to fit customer service 
provision around our systems/processes 
• Be aware of the need to ‘manage’ distressed or 
frustrated customers in a sensitive manner  
• Ensure you understand the variety of engagements 
a ‘customer’ may have across the whole of the 
Institute& keep colleagues informed  
The table below provides the summary 
of standards that must be met to trigger 
bonus payments. 
 
Activity Target 
Revenue £26.638 million 
 
 
End of document   
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(2007-2008m CEO 1 Cont.) 
Use of ICT  
• Effective use of systems – ensuring they are used 
as business tools as well as an operational system  
• Maintain quality data & take ‘ownership’ of the data 
on systems 
• Activity contribute to enhancements & the 
development of systems  
• Consultation about data collection & the use of 
data before making commitments – no 
‘independent’ databases 
• Continued commitment to enhancing & growing our 
IT network & infrastructure  
• Actively follow & support the various IT polices & 
procedures to maximise the efficiency of the 
systems 
• Consult & include the IT team prior to 
developing/enhancing/changing business 
processes in your own area  
• Use of the telephone system as an aid to customer 
service – not as an aid to easier working at 
[location removed] 
• Maintain familiarity with the content & layout of the 
website – understand & maximise the benefits of 
using the website as an internal source of 
information & business information tool  
• Contribution to the website, with strong 
commitment to keep the website at the forefront of 
the brand image  
• Actively utilize & support the development of the 
intranet, ensuring information is relevant & useful. 
Ensure your accept responsibility for keeping the 
intranet up to date & relevant  
Financial  
• Abide by the requirements, policies & procedures 
relating to the Institutes financial transactions  
• Consult with the Finance Team before committing 
to contracts with differing payment terms  
• Actively support the Institutes efforts to reduce 
debtors days by strong client management  
• Maximise savings & proactively think about the cost 
of doing things before going ahead (i.e. do you 
need a colour copy?) 
• Manage wastage – both staff time & materials 
Marketing  
• Commitment to supporting the brand image in the 
market place  
• Commitment to supporting the Corporate image & 
style in all correspondence/printed matter/ 
presentations style. Help colleagues, particularly 
those new to understand & abide by these rules 
• Active consultation with the Marketing Team at the 
initial stages of a project to utilize the expertise 
appropriately  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And, the following table (14) provides a consolidated summary of the changes 
discussed above. 
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Table 14:  Summary of bonus scheme change 
CEO Period Governance CEO Leadership Team Regional Director All staff (excluding 1,2,3) Sales Team 
CEO 
1 
1 Nov 07 – 
31 Oct 08 CEO 
Collective bonus scheme in place 
All staff bonus – linked to share of bonus pot. Pot size dependent on 5 criteria. 1 of which is financial.     Size of pot capped by a 
figure determined as appropriate by the CEO 
CEO 
2 
1 Nov 08 – 
31 Oct 09 
Pay 
Committee   
No change 
 
CEO 
3 
 
1 Nov 09 – 
31 Oct 10 
Pay 
Committee   
New bonus criteria – move from 5 criteria to financial surplus performance and customer satisfaction scores.  All other details 
remain the same 
1 Nov 10– 
31 Oct 11 
Pay 
Committee   
Change to bonus scheme. 
All staff bonus – removal of customer satisfaction scores as performance criteria. 
New Sales team bonus –
linked to revenue. 
Capped to 40% of salary 
– cap determined by 
CEO  
1 Nov 11 – 
31 Oct 12 
 
 
 
Pay 
Committee   
Introduction of high distance schemes, which bring in 4 schemes depending on job role. No change 
Bonus capped at 33% of 
base salary. Linked to 
performance – 2 of 6 
criteria being financial 
Bonus capped at 13% 
of base salary. Linked 
to performance – 2 of 6 
criteria being financial 
25% of base 
salary linked to 
financial 
performance 
Remain on previous 
scheme but addition of 
Individual  ‘great’ 
performance bonus 
linked to appraisal rating 
capped at 5% of base 
salary [cap determined 
by CEO] 
No change 
1 Nov 12 – 
31 Oct 13 
Pay 
Committee   
New salary bands implemented 
 Bonus cap increased to 20% of base salary No change No change No change 
1 Nov 13– 
31 Oct 14 
Pay 
Committee   No change No change No change 
Maximum value 
removed 
Individual commission 
implemented 
CEO 
3 
1 Nov 14 – 
31 Oct 15 
Finance 
Committee   
CEO separate scheme removed and merged with 
leadership, this change] increased the value of the 
CEO base salary commensurate with the reduction 
in his bonus. No change to leadership scheme 
No change No change No change 
1 Nov 15 – 
31 Oct 16 
Pay 
Committee   
New scheme introduced – 3 tiers, meeting budget, exceeding and individual great as before.  Main change is the link to salary 
for all staff and the introduction of the enhanced payment – when financial results exceed targets the overachievement will be 
‘shared’ 30% to staff and 70% to organisation.   30% pot shared based on % of salary bill.  Maximum value not capped. 
The implementation of the of the additional enhanced scheme subject to Trustee challenge 
Meeting budget 10% of base salary linked to 3 financial objectives 
Enhanced budget (see above).  Expansion of individual great to 
Leadership 
Meeting budget 3.5% of 
base salary linked to 
1financial objectives. 
Enhanced budget (see 
above)  
Removal of team bonus. 
Commission remains 
 120 
 
6.2.4 The protagonists 
In this next section I provide an overview of four protagonists generating 
an interplay of intentions where different organising principles, beliefs and 
practices (or logics) compete and contest.  The figure below provides and 
overview of the relationship between the protagonists and their roles.  
Figure 14: Protagonists – Bonus setting process  
 
P1 Board of Trustees – Whilst acknowledging the potential over-simplification 
of presenting a group of individuals as unified in their approach, overall the 
Board appeared to come to this incident from a public good logic founded on 
Board of Trustees 
Principle governing body of organisation 
Legally liable for the registered charity 
 
Trustee Pay Committee  
To ensure fair and appropriate remuneration to 
employees generally, and to manage the 
recruitment of the CEO and thereafter review his 
or her remuneration for appropriateness. 
Trustee Finance Committee  
To support Board in fulfilling its responsibility for 
the control and governance of the focal 
organisation, regulatory compliance and risk 
management.  
CEO [P3] 
The CEO and staff provide support to governance and help to ensure that Trustees can fulfil their 
obligations. Staff are not legally responsible for trustee’s decisions except for the CEO who is a trustee 
with full voting rights and responsibilities. The CEO is responsible and accountable for all operations and 
the successful execution of the strategy set by the trustees. 
Head of HR [P4] 
Responsible for managing the HR function ensuring regulatory compliance, best practice benchmarking, 
high quality policies and procedures and the continuous improvement of [focal organisation’s] skills base 
through recruitment and development activities. 
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their position as legal Trustees of a charity. There are 12 Trustees in addition to 
the CEO who are responsible for:  
• governance and management including strategy setting and decision 
making;  
• prudent financial management, setting of annual budgets and levels 
of financial reserve; 
• implementation of the strategic plan and performance measurement; 
• setting these Regulations for the operation of the organisation and 
mechanisms to ensure compliance. (Governance TORs 2012, pp. 7-
8) 
The incident interfaced with two trustee sub-committees (see Table 15).  
Pay Committee was founded in 2008 with a discrete purpose around executive 
pay.  Pay Committee was dis-banded and merged into the Finance Committee 
in 2015 but after a short period of time the Pay Committee   was re-instated.    
Table 15:  Summary of roles of Trustee sub committees  
Pay Committee   
Initially formed in 2008, disbanded in 
September 2014, re-formed 
September 2015 
Finance Committee 
Formed April 2015, re-positioned in September 2015 
when Pay Committee   was re-instated 
to ensure that the organisation has in 
place appropriate policies and 
procedures to ensure fair & 
appropriate remuneration to its 
employees generally, and to manage 
the recruitment of the CEO, 
thereafter reviewing his or her 
remuneration. 
The Committee is a sub-committee of the Board of 
Trustees, which supports the Board in fulfilling its 
responsibilities for the control & governance of the 
Institute, regulatory compliance & risk management 
• The committee comprises three 
members.  The Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees, who acts as 
chairman & is supported by two 
other Trustees. The purpose is 
to: 
• Review & approve [focal 
organisations] employee 
remuneration policy & package 
for its relevance & 
appropriateness 
• Review & set the remuneration 
package for the [focal 
organisations] CEO, including 
any bonus scheme.  
• Review & approve the CEO’s 
recommendations for the 
remuneration of the Leadership 
Team (Governance Regulations, 2012, 
p. 15) 
The role of Finance 
Committee   is to monitor, 
review & report to the 
Board of Trustees on: 
• The Institute’s policies 
for internal financial 
control & reporting 
• The external audit 
arrangements 
• The Institute’s 
compliance with 
external regulators 
• The Institute’s risk 
management 
procedures 
• The staff 
remuneration & 
pension policy. 
(Governance Regulations, 
2012, p. 15) 
The purpose of this 
committee is to monitor, 
review & report to the 
Global Board of 
Trustees on:  
• The Institute’s 
policies for internal 
financial control & 
reporting, including 
the process for 
setting the annual 
budget parameters  
• The annual audit of 
the group accounts 
• Compliance with 
financial regulation 
key financial risks 
(2015, p. 15; Focal 
Organisation, 2015) 
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The Chair of Finance Committee and one other trustee expressed concerns 
relating to both governance (and decision making) and appropriateness (of a 
decision) within the context of the organisation as a charity:    
 ‘Concern was expressed regarding the bonus proposal, including 
its fairness, transparency, level of increase, and impact on the 
fixed cost base…  A concern was raised regarding how the 
targets had been set, and it was emphasized that the bonus 
should be linked to achieving a series of targets and not solely to 
achieving NFR’ (Focal Organisation, 2015) 
P2 – Chairman of the Trustees.  Structurally, the Chairman should act from a 
public good logic as trustee of a charity but in practice, I suggest, approached 
this incident from a commercial logic in that, within this incident other Trustees 
present P2 as with failing to act collectively with the trustee group, instead 
acting in isolation in approving the new bonus. 
P3 – CEO.  ‘The CEO is responsible and accountable for all operations and the 
 successful execution of the strategy set by the Trustees: 
• The CEO works closely with the Chairman of the Board to ensure that 
the charter and charitable objectives are being pursued, that the 
strategic plan is being progressed and that the financial and other 
targets set by the Board are being met.  
• Is line-managed by the Chairman who will set the CEO’s KPIs and 
conduct regular appraisals.  
• Must identify to the Chairman any potential conflicts of interest between 
his role as an employee and as a trustee and withdraw from any Board 
discussions where this might influence the Board’s decision.  
• Will maintain a staff of qualified Directors capable of delivering the 
strategy and budget set by the Trustees, and is responsible for 
establishing and maintaining an appropriate organisational structure’. 
(Governance Regulations, 2012, p. 20) 
I posit that in a structural sense, acting as both Trustee and CEO of the 
organisation, P3 might normatively be expected to prioritise a public good 
agenda. In practice, P3 approached this incident seeking to position 
maximization of financial rewards to staff as a ‘moral right’. This argument is 
likely driven from assumptions of economic man (Homo Economicus) 
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(Doucouliagos, 1994, p. 877), maximising individualist behaviour, emphasising 
personal goals over group goals and short-term status orientation (Davis, et al. 
(1997, p. 35) and which thus aligns to commercial logic: 
‘Increasing profits although required for [known liabilities] and 
growth investment, should morally go to staff making the growth… 
[focal organisation] is a business as well as a charity and must 
attract the best talent to sustain its strong growth.  Our charitable 
status does not allow equity in the business through share 
options’ (Focal Organisation, 2015) 
P4 – Head of HR.   A relatively minor actor in this incident, nevertheless, their 
perspective and actions are important in responding to the question of what 
happens if insiders do not see the dominant logic as legitimate. P4 sought to 
express concern about the negative impact the bonus scheme proposal may 
have on internal credibility (legitimacy) – given the organisation’s purported 
public good purpose – and unable to resolve the conflict, left the organisation:  
‘As part of my remit I feel that it’s important to make you aware 
that I believe that we have strayed from your original intention for 
the bonus policy and believe that it is important that I bring this to 
your attention now. I fully support what you are trying to achieve 
and believe that ‘sharing success’ is a great message. However, I 
do not believe that the proposed arrangement as it currently 
stands will achieve this objective.  Money is very emotive. Studies 
have clearly shown that staff look primarily at internal equity when 
assessing whether or not they feel they are paid, and treated, 
fairly. If we get this wrong, I am concerned that repercussions for 
the organisation could be both long term and serious and may 
ultimately affect the credibility of senior management’ (Focal 
Organisation, 2015) 
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6.3 Protagonists Narratives 
In this next section, I review organisational documents and records of 
meetings to surface the protagonist’s narratives and construct the incident from 
initial drafting of the proposal through to approval and communication to staff.  
6.3.1 The proposal for change – the drafting process 
 The Finance Committee held its first meeting on 19 May 2015.  As part 
of its review into the previous year’s annual accounts an enquiry was made into 
the value of the salary bill, which had seen an increase from £6.1million to £6.9 
million over a twelve-month period.  A committee member, who works for the 
Public Sector, [Trustee 1] challenged this as being ‘high compared to 
headcount’ (Focal Organisation, 2015, p. 3 (c)) and a request was made for a 
briefing to take place at the next meeting (August 2015) on how pay and 
incentivisation was managed within the focal organisation.    
In preparation for the budget approval process for the period 1 
November 2015 to 31 October 2016 a request was made by the CEO (P3) to 
Head of HR (P4) to prepare a proposal for change under the banner of ‘Sharing 
Success’.  The basis of Sharing Success was that P3, as leader of the 
organisation, felt:   
‘It was fundamentally wrong for the organisation to be making 
significant profits and not distributing some of these back to staff’ 
(HR email to CEO, 22 July 2015). 
During the drafting process P4 challenged the underpinning assumptions of 
P3’s decision making:  
‘[The proposal is] likely to disengage our staff by communicating a 
culture of elitism… as the proposal would see circa £184k of 
profits go to 8 individuals and £132k going to the remaining 150 
staff’ (Focal Organisation, 2015).   
As part of this challenge, P4 presented an alternative proposal which instead of 
exacerbating the power distance by increasing the leadership bonus 
disproportionately to the rest of staff, looked to reduce it by freezing the 
leadership team scheme and implementing an enhanced scheme whereby the 
rest of the staff had the opportunity to achieve a bonus equal to 5% of their 
salary.  This challenge was made in writing (by email) to the CEO (P3) who took 
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exception to this approach, informing me as the line manager of P4 to inform 
her that it was not appropriate to send this type of email to the CEO and that if 
they wanted a discussion they should come and speak directly. When asked 
why they sent the email, P4 responded that they wanted to have their concerns 
formally on record. The CEO did not respond to P4’s email.  Ultimately the 
drafting process of the proposal resulted in a period of sick leave and eventually 
resignation from the organisation for P4 who cited cultural differences. As line-
manner of P4 I was requested to finalise the proposal, which was duly 
presented to the newly formed Finance Committee (Focal Organisation, 2015). 
Effectively in presenting the proposal for change the CEO: 
• provided a response to Finance Committee’s previous request (19 
May 2015) which asked for reassurance that the salary bill was not 
disproportionate to the head count, and;  
• presented a proposal for amendment to the existing policy which 
effectively increased the salary bill by an additional £250,000.   
6.3.2 The approval conversations  
 The approval conversations took place during two formal meetings. The 
first of which was at the meeting of Finance Committee (Aug 2015) and the 
second at the Board meeting (September 2015). It was not the norm for me to 
attend Finance Committee meetings but on this occasion, I did so for two 
reasons - the absence of the Head of HR and to provide additional support to 
the meeting as the Financial Director, who was responsible for the 
administration of the meeting, was not able to attend due to ill health.    
The proposal for changes to the bonus scheme was received with much 
discussion and cumulated in members of Finance Committee stating that they 
were unwilling to approve the proposal and asking for it to be taken to the full 
Trustee meeting in September 2015. The first excerpt below is from the formal 
the record of the meeting and the second is an extract from my research diary 
made on the day of the meeting, which is somewhat longer than the formal 
minutes.  
‘Following discussion it was agreed to endorse the proposal for 
cost of living increases and to note the proposed amendments to 
the staff bonus scheme, further discussions to be at GBT.’ (Focal 
Organisation, 2015, p. 5) 
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Research Journal Entry 1 
Train journey post 20 Aug Committee meeting The FD attended by phone as they 
were on sick leave.  I was asked to attend in person to support the Head of Finance.  I 
experienced the CEO as seeking to manage the Chair of the Committee (Trustee 2) – a 
person who he had found challenging in the past.  
Trustee 2 and another trustee (Trustee 3) were late (Trustee 3 will become 
Chairman of the Board in two months’ time and knows Trustee 2 well as they went to 
university together).  Trustee 2 and 3 were involved in a personal conversation as they 
entered the room and had identically branded cups of coffee in their hands signalling to 
the meeting that they had met up in advance.  There was no apology for their lateness.  
During the meeting, Trustee 2 challenged the numbers and the way that they 
were presented – they made frequent reference to ‘how they do it in their organisation 
(it is a large charity), they mentioned NCVO and charity regulations (SORP) 
frequently; almost I felt to exert their competency and knowledge over the FD. Trustee 
2 opened the agenda item relating to pay / bonus expressing disagreement on the level 
of the proposed pay increase (2.5%) but readily accepted 2% almost as if it didn’t 
matter what the increase was as long as it was not the original proposal.   
The biggest issue was around the level of bonus and whether as a charity, it was 
acceptable even to have one.  The CEO had arranged for the current Chairman of the 
Board (P2) to dial into this part of the meeting. This was unusual as P2 was aBoard 
on holiday. P2 was asked to attend as P2 argued that the bonus scheme ‘was an 
operational issue’ and therefore not one for the Board (or Finance Committee).  P2 
confirmed that he had approved the proposal and was in full support.  What then 
followed was a conversation around the detail of the formulae and what should or 
should not be included.  I interpreted this as the Trustees (1, 2 and 3) trying to make 
the triggers of the bonus scheme un-attainable and of a lower value.  Both the CEO 
[P3] and P2 showed their frustrations by raising their voices, speaking over each other 
and disagreeing with Trustee 2’s comments.  At one point P2 suggested that Trustee 2 
was challenging their integrity and competence.  In response, Trustee 2 stated that 
Finance Committee would not be able to endorse the proposal and that it should go to 
the full Board of Trustees.  
Post meeting and on the train back I called the FD who told me that Trustee 2 
had sent him a private email (before the meeting) asking if he believed in the numbers 
and what he thought about the bonus.  The FD declined to comment but informed P3 
(CEO) of the email and he understands that P3 raised a grievance against Trustee 2 
as it was inappropriate and questioning their competence.   That might explain some of 
the heat of the conversation.  I understand that Trustee 2 apologised to P3 about the 
email to the FD after the meeting. 
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 Following on from 20 August 2015 meeting of the Finance Committee, 
the proposal for pay and bonus was brought to the Board meeting 8 September 
2015.  I attended this meeting to present the proposal.  The following is an 
extract from the minutes: 
‘A debate was held regarding the proposed changes to the bonus 
scheme, the criteria around payment of the bonus and the link to 
margins and GNFR (internal reference for profit). Concern was 
expressed regarding the bonus proposal, including its fairness, 
transparency and impact on the fixed cost base. It was suggested 
that input should be sought from an external lawyer. In addition, 
there should be a six-month checkpoint during FY16 to ensure 
Trustees were comfortable with the bonus position when 
considered against the pension deficit. Trustees requested that 
three-year targets be circulated before the end of September and 
emphasized that the bonus scheme must feedback into the CEO’s 
objectives. Further detail was also requested on the status of 
pension review (it was acknowledged that further work was 
required to address payment of the deficit) including an updated 
action plan/timetable. A comment was raised regarding the 
percentage increase in bonus payment. Concern was expressed 
regarding the level of increase and that this should feed into the 
CEO and leadership objectives.  In addition, a concern was raised 
regarding how the targets had been set, and it was emphasized 
that the bonus should be linked to achieving a series of targets 
and not solely to achieving NFR. 
Following lengthy debate, the Board of Trustee AGREED but 
[trustee name removed] requested it be recorded that they were 
not in agreement with the approach regarding Staff bonus.’  (Focal 
Organisation, 8 September 2015, p. 6.2) 
Below is an extract from my research log written during the meeting, which I 
attended in my job role.  I provide this, as an overview of my record of the 
detailed conversation of the ‘lengthy debate’ referred to in the minutes above. 
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Research Journal Entry 2 
8 Sep 15. My first instinct was that there had been a lot of lobbying prior to the 
meeting and you could see that there was a divide between those that supported the 
proposal and those that did not. It came across as two conflicted teams – those that 
supported the CEO and the proposal and those that supported the Chair of Finance 
Committee (Trustee 2); I felt as if the issue being discussed had become personal and 
that Trustee 2 did not trust P2 or P3.   There was a lively conversation with most 
Trustees giving a view and some raised voices and waved hands as they spoke.  This 
appeared to me an emotive discussion broadly around two questions  
 a) Is it appropriate that we should have a bonus scheme?   
 b) Are the bonus triggers (objectives) suitable?  
The phrase ‘Don’t let the leadership set the homework and mark it themselves’ was 
first mentioned by Trustee 3. This expressed a view that it was the Trustees’ role to test 
assumptions and ensure that the leadership team were not setting an environment up 
where it was easy to be successful – with an inference that it is possible to ‘dumb down’ 
the objectives so that the maximum trigger would be achieved. As a member of the 
leadership team I found this quite insulting and showed a lack of trust in my personal 
integrity.  Both P2 and P3 responded showing their frustration and suggested that the 
Trustees ‘were showing a major lack of trust’.  Trustee 2 responded that ‘this is not 
about a lack of trust but just a facet of good charity governance’. 
Another trustee (Trustee 4) who is a lawyer by profession jumped onto this 
conversation stressing that the Trustees must not take things at face value and that 
they have personal responsibilities and must be led by good practice to mitigate the 
risks. They cited the very recent collapse of ‘Kids Company’ as an example of ‘what 
could go wrong’. 
At the very end of the conversation Trustee 2 referred to the pension paper and 
‘un-sized pension liability’ – it became apparent that this had not been circulated to the 
wider Trustee group and some felt that this had been a deliberate omission.  I am not 
sure if the timing of this point was deliberate – I think it may have been presented in a 
deliberate way almost to suggest a lack of openness and therefore a reason not to trust. 
It was defended by P3 saying ‘it was an operational matter’ and would come to the 
Trustees in due course.  
The conversation ended with P2 (Chair] stating that they had made the decision 
to approve the bonus proposal and did anyone disagree. They said that at the end of 
the day it was down to the Trustees to decide ‘how we feel about the plan’.  They said 
that by all means take guidance from Finance Committee but in doing this we must 
recognise we have a competent set of people running [focal organisation] and that ‘we 
have a duty to question the leadership but also to trust them’.  In the end there was 
some grumbling, some Trustees were overt in their support – only Trustee 4 asked for it 
to be recorded that they were not in agreement.  
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This event continued to occupy thoughts, leading to the following musing a 
month later. 
Musing 7 
September 2015 - Motivation for challenge?  
One question has perturbed me and that was why Trustee 2 after arguing against the 
bonus previously, accepted it at the Board meeting, apparently without explicitly 
recording their disagreement in a similar manner to Trustee 4 who asked for the 
minutes to record they were not in agreement.   In exploration, I returned to an initial 
interview with Trustee 2 where I asked what would make them leave the Board: 
‘If the executive didn’t listen to the feedback that the Trustees give.  If I felt that my 
views weren’t aligned with the other Trustees.  I’m not commenting on who’s right and 
who’s wrong.  For me, if I was seriously concerned about the risk and infrastructure of 
the charity and their ability to honour their charitable status or if it became no longer 
palatable for me to be a trustee because of work or locations or something else. [Trustee 
2 October 2014]’ 
Potentially Trustee 2’s motivation to remain on the Board helped them to accept the 
views of other Board members over her own. Alternatively, Trustee 2 may like to be a 
catalyst for debate and enjoys the interplay and reaction they can illicit from others. 
Finally, maybe they have a longer-term aim and the commitment to reviewing the 
measures and ensuring that the value of the bonus is reflected in the CEO’s objectives 
enabled them to accept a compromise. 
 
The bonus scheme proposal was therefore approved for implementation. 
It is not without consequence, however, as there were requests for additional 
financial modelling to support the HR budget submission and a full review of the 
Pay and Reward Policy (Focal Organisation, 2016).  This was supported by the 
Board of Trustees and a work-activity was set up in May 2016 with the purpose 
of a full review of the rewards strategy to ensure its affordability, governance 
and appropriateness:  
‘The Chairman has agreed to hold a half-day session at a future 
trustee meeting (scheduled from June 2016) to scope out and 
agree the criteria for the bonus with an instruction to have a 
balance of financial and public good objectives.’ (Focal 
Organisation, 8 September 2015) 
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6.3.3  Disrupting power and authority  
Following the August meeting of Finance Committee, P3 voiced 
concerns about the purpose of the Finance Committee   arguing that the remit 
was too wide and they had effectively become the Board but did not have full 
representation of the Board.  A case was made by P2 and P3 to divide the remit 
of the Finance Committee   and to reinstate the Pay Committee.  A proposal 
was written to change the remit of the Finance Committee  to remove all 
elements of pay and reward and reinstate the Pay Committee . The rationale for 
change was presented to the Board 8 September 2015:  
‘The GBT Chairman advised that the Finance Committee   was to 
be re-formatted and its terms of reference redefined. Whilst 
acknowledging the Finance Committee’s input to date, in 
particular with regard to the Draft Budget and Operational Plan, its 
scope was considered too broad. In future it would focus on 
reviewing the annual accounts and considering key financial risks. 
In addition, the Pay Committee would be reinstated.’ (Focal 
Organisation, 8 September 2015, p. 5.2)  
P2 (Chair of the Board) stated to the Meeting:  ‘We formed the 
Finance Committee   and we have made its agenda quite large. 
This has unintentionally created a smaller GBT but they may not 
be fully representative of the full GBT.  We have therefore 
identified a need to reposition the Finance Committee  .’ [Extract 
from my research log 8 September 2015.]     
6.3.4  Narrative summary  
 In this section I summarise the narratives of the four protagonists, the 
tensions and disagreements and the interplay of intentions centred on bonus 
scheme change.  I observed disagreement on three levels: the appropriateness 
of having bonuses in a charity; the value of the scheme and; the governance 
process of setting and approving bonuses.  Furthermore, I suggest that 
divergent logics are at the very heart of the disagreement with protagonists – 
primarily – P2, P3 who advocate commerciality and Trustee 2 who advocates 
public good. Below is a summary pen-picture of my interpretations of 
protagonist narratives – here is what they are saying ‘in a nut shell’: 
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[Trustee 2] 
I am an experienced trustee as I have been a trustee for many (some 
very big) charities.  As a trustee, I am personally responsible for ensuring 
good governance of the charity and I take this responsibility seriously.  
The Trustees should make sure the charity’s doing what it said it was 
going to do when it was given charitable status and to make sure that 
you don’t abuse that status, that you don’t spend money on things you’re 
not supposed to spend money on and that you don’t go bust.  The charity 
does not exist for the staff and they have chosen to work for a charity – 
in the charities that I have worked in we didn’t get a bonus.  
[Chair of the Board] 
As the Head Trustee [culturally if not legally] I am responsible for the 
management of the CEO, I don’t need to consult with the Board on 
matters that I consider operational and my primary role is to support the 
CEO in making operational decisions.   I think that the Trustees should 
stay out of the operational detail and let the CEO run the organisation.   
[CEO] 
I have been employed to run this organisation and I am making it 
successful and the Trustees should leave me to run the business. I have 
built a team of good people who are making the business successful.  
People are motivated to do their best through financial rewards and we 
must therefore pay well to keep the best talent in order to sustain our 
growth.  Morally our increased profits should go to staff who are making 
the growth possible.  If I do not continue to increase their pay they may 
leave.  
[Head of HR] 
It is my job to make sure that our HR practices are morally and legally 
sound.  I am not able to reconcile the expressed values that want to 
reward staff for a good job with the behaviour of making the highest paid 
even better paid. I am worried that if we implement the proposals it will 
look bad on me professionally and also, I cannot sign-up to it personally.  
This is causing me more stress than it is worth so I am going to leave 
and then I do not need to be a part of it or associated with it in any way.  
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Exploring the interplay of divergent logics is the focus of the next section 
where I summarise my interpretations of how the protagonists dealt with 
multiple and conflicting belief systems, assumptions and practices regarding the 
bonus scheme.  
6.4 Interpretation  
In this section I develop three core and interrelated interpretations of how 
protagonists sought to deal with the presence of divergent logics within this 
incident: 
1. through the bonus scheme, the CEO constructs, communicates and 
reinforces the values and behaviours that underpin their preferred 
logic and as such bonus schemes are used as a negotiation tool to 
legitimate and reinforce the preferred logic;  
2. the current scheme has been achieved by an ‘edging strategy’ 
eroding the boundaries of the previous schemes rather than 
attempting an absolute break from previous (2008) to current (2015) 
practices; 
3. the Trustees’ attempt to use organisational structures as a 
mechanism to resist and control elite management actors. 
Paradoxically those very actors are concurrently shaping 
organisational structures to minimise the Trustees’ ability to do so. 
 
6.4.1 Symbolism and Rhetoric   
There are three noteworthy symbolic and rhetorical differences across the 
two schemes. First, the ways in which the scheme is communicated differs.  For 
example, in scheme 1 the communication is primarily a verbal update given by 
the CEO with minimal documentation - a single sheet of documentation was 
handed out at a CEO briefing and only to those who attended. Assessment of 
the performance is made by the CEO and announced also at a CEO briefing. In 
my experience (I attended these briefings) this was done in an understated 
manner, rhetorically de-emphasising the role of monetary motivation.  This 
contrasts with the bonus scheme of CEO 3, which is communicated to all staff 
in a formal Pay and Reward policy – some 22 pages – for which there has been 
legal guidance.  The Finance Director reports progress through management 
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accounts and at ‘town hall meetings’ (the term given to staff briefings) that are 
held four times a year thus giving greater prominence of ‘finance’, ‘performance’ 
and ‘bonus’ rhetoric under CEO3’s scheme.  The end of year bonus value is 
announced by the CEO at a December town hall at the same time as the ‘great’ 
staff members are recognised.  The formal town hall meeting is followed by a 
Christmas party (meal, drink, and entertainment) which is provided free of 
charge to staff as a way of celebrating success.  
Second, such rhetoric has important symbolic and behavioral implications 
insofar as the divergent performance triggers across the two schemes cue and 
reinforce very different messages about what constitutes appropriate values 
and actions.  In scheme 1 there is a strong connection between means and 
ends - how we do things is of equal importance to what we do. Here, work 
becomes a moral project and the bonus scheme is designed to reward ethical 
behavior. In scheme 2, the bonus trigger criteria become a single financial 
measure and there is no consideration for how this is achieved. As per previous 
discussions, this again suggests that money has become the end in itself rather 
than the means to achieve a social purpose.  
Third, I experience both CEOs using the pay and reward structure to 
legitimate their activities to other organisational members and as a mechanism 
to negotiate the adoption of certain logics.  For example, the 07-08 bonus is 
input orientated focusing on behaviours, emphasising working practices of 
accountability, professionalism and respect in a way that suggests that doing 
the right things and things right has greater priority over financial returns.  
This contrasts with the current bonus scheme (CEO 3) which is output 
based. The single performance criterion of financial performance signals that 
the only thing that matters is making money. The financial value of the bonus 
has considerably increased in recent years and constitutes an additional 3.5% 
or 10% of your salary (depending on seniority), arguably seeking to motivate 
individuals into prioritising financial activity with a direct relationship to personal 
gain.     A further example of how the current bonus scheme reinforces the 
preferred logic of CEO3 is in the current scheme’s individual ‘great’ bonus 
which I discussed in detail above. In reviewing the documentation and citations 
I noted that out of the 17 great awards, I interpreted only one as being linked to 
charter objectives of developing the profession and achieving public good (see 
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final row of Table 11, titled ‘Campaigns’ on page 115). However, even within 
C1’s citation there are examples of commercial language like ‘corporates’, 
‘clients’ and the adoption of names like ‘project Eagle’ for the projects, which is 
somewhat of a norm in large organisations.  I interpret the absence of examples 
of great work attributed to ‘public good’ as a possible indication of how little 
activity is now being undertaken in this area and/or a lack of value attributed to 
this type of activity. I posit that a similar scheme within an environment that is 
underpinned by a strong public good as a dominant logic would have an 
alternative profile, likely to prioritise and recognise impact on the public it 
represents as opposed to financial outcomes (as per the criteria of the previous 
bonus scheme).  Not everyone was able to reconcile the change of direction of 
the bonus and its overt connection to rewarding ‘money making’.   See 6.3.1 for 
a detailed discussion on how one protagonist chose to leave the organisation 
because of not being able to reconcile the direction and my musing below (8).  
 
Musing 8 
February 2017  Reflexivity in action: 
I was acutely aware as I progressed through this chapter that the focus could be 
received as critical of the belief system of elite actors and highlights internal conflict, 
which had the potential to be censored.  Nevertheless, I attempted to adhere to the 
tenets of interpretative, reflexive research by sharing the account with those familiar 
with organisational life but not directly involved with the sensitive incident itself.  In 
doing so I still sense-checked my interpretation for sensibility but did not seek feedback 
from those directly involved in the incident due to the political sensitivities and my 
employment role within the focal organisation.  
Within this incident my work role and research role had the potential to overlap.  I am 
aware that on several occasions I disagreed with the direction being taken and adopted 
a position of challenge to the CEO but then agreed to accept the proposal and commit to 
making it happen.  I must confess to a level of admiration for P4 in that they were 
unwilling (or unable) to compromise their views and left the organisation but my life 
requires me to earn a wage and I resolved the issue in my mind in that by making the 
approach transparent and ensuring that it went through the necessary channels, I had 
met the requirements of my role.  The outcome is one that I personally benefit from 
financially but it is not one that would keep me at the focal organisation and to some 
degree has created a level of objective dissatisfaction in the direction we are taking.  
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6.4.3 ‘Edging strategy’ 
A further observation is about the nature of institutional work undertaken 
during the transition from CEO1 to CEO3’s bonus scheme.  The current 
scheme has evolved using what I term an ‘edging strategy’.  In using this 
strategy, the boundaries of the original scheme have been gently eroded over a 
period of seven years (see table 14 on page 120).  Potentially this edging 
strategy could be experienced as a conscious decision not to have a dramatic 
break from the previous ‘successful’ CEO, as if CEO3 was testing 
organisational members’ readiness to adopt a new approach. An alternative 
perspective is that by making small incremental changes the approach is less 
likely to be noticed and thus challenged.  Finally, maybe the CEO is a ‘cultural 
dope’ (Garfinkle, 1967) and past experiences and alignment with economic man 
makes him immune to any suggestion that there are alternatives.  Irrespective 
of the nature of the change – consciously planned or not – it has served CEO 3 
well in that it reinforces the internal adoption of a commercial logic which 
positions and legitimizes profit growth as ‘the end game’.  It is not however 
without its critics and once other actors become aware that the apparently 
benign changes were representative of an ideological change which prioritises 
money making over social impact, internal actors challenged the actions.  We 
have seen previously how they reacted at an individual level (by leaving the 
organisation) and in the following section I discuss how Trustees used structure 
as an attempt to curtail the CEO’s ability to make such changes.  
6.4.4  Structure, power and control  
The Trustees arguably attempted to use organisational structure as a 
mechanism to resist and control elite internal actors. Specifically, the Trustees 
introduced a new governance sub-committee responsible for financial oversight 
of the organisation including approving remuneration. I interpret the introduction 
of this Finance Committee as seeking to reduce the informal powerbase of the 
CEO and Chairman by removing the ability for the Chairman to individually and 
independently approve changes to the pay and bonus policy.    Paradoxically 
the Chariman and the CEO (the very actors who Trustees are seeking to 
control) concurrently shape structure to minimise the Trustees’ ability to do so.  
Specifically, this occurred through a frequent change to the Terms of Reference 
  136 
of the sub-committees which meant that at the precise time of the proposal 
there was no active sub-committee overseeing remuneration in place. As a 
default position, the proposal for change was approved by the Chairman.  
It became apparent to me during the research into this and the next 
incident (see chapter 7) that Trustees are using structure as a control 
mechanism in the arena of pay setting and the approval process. I suggest the 
Trustees’ attempt for control is thwarted by two things. First, the design of the 
focal organisations internal regulations (as defined in the terms of reference to 
committees and roles) is showing a corporate logic privileging the role of the 
Chairman as an independent yet representative voice, which suggests an 
assumption that you can invest power in a single person as permissible in a 
corporate context.   
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees is the head trustee of 
[focal organisation] the charity…  hires (and may dismiss) the 
CEO and acts as [CEO] line manager (Focal Organisation, 2014, 
p. 13) 
Charity law however is based on collective action and decision-making and 
therefore no single trustee (including the chair) should have any more power 
than any other.  An example of how this played out in practice was at the 20 
August 2015 Finance Committee meeting where the proposal for change was 
first made.  In this meeting P2 (Chair of the Board) argued that the bonus 
scheme ‘was an operational issue’ and therefore not one for the Board (or 
Finance Committee) but also confirmed that he had approved the proposal and 
was in full support.  This statement contains inherent contradictions – in 
adjacent sentences P2 says that the bonus scheme is an operational issue and 
not one for the Board and that he (as Chair of the trustee Board) had approved 
it.  Second, the evolving nature of the committees in terms of structure and 
members who serve a relatively short term arguably gives the CEO greater 
permanency at the strategic apex of the organisation, better able to implement 
long-term plans and ‘wait-out’ Trustees who do not see the dominant logic and 
associated practices as legitimate.  In the following chapter (Governance 
setting) I discuss how the CEO resists changes to the tenure of Trusteeship 
despite significant challenge and suggest that such a response indicates that 
the short-term nature of the tenureship is instrumentally valuable to the CEO. 
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6.5  Chapter Summary  
 This chapter uses a critical incident surrounding changes to a bonus 
scheme to get an understanding of the interplay of intentions in relation to a 
shared event. We get a perspective of how four protagonists with conflicting 
agendas and divergent logics use structure, discourse and other influential 
actors to negotiate and persuade.  I illustrated how one protagonist uses their 
identity as an experienced trustee to influence others and how one relatively 
junior member of staff uses personal power to exit a situation where they were 
unable or unwilling to accept the CEO’s preferred logic as legitimate within the 
context of her framing of the organisation.  
 I thus get an appreciation of how alignment to different logics plays out in 
a practical situation and how differing values and assumptions become evident 
symbolically and rhetorically travelling over time and through an edging strategy 
from a frame that values teams over individuals and means over ends to one 
that privileges individuals over teams and positions financial growth as the end 
game. I get a sense through a work activity (great award) of how much a 
specific logic has been adopted and how reward of desired behaviour is used to 
reinforce the dominant logic.  I explored how the interpretations of regulations 
reflect the different values and assumptions (logics) of individuals – the 
example being the role of Chair having an intent of being a co-ordinating role 
but which in practice is utilised as a tactic to reduce the degree of consultation 
with the wider Board of Trustees.  In addition, I get an appreciation of how the 
different actors attempt to use structure to control and thwart others’ efforts for 
control. Finally, I saw how a compromising strategy is adopted by a vocal 
trustee who has championed the discourse against the proposed bonus ‘as a 
matter of good governance’.  An alternative interpretation is that the discursive 
practice of said trustee and the CEO could indicate game playing or 
organisational mischief by two elite actors who appropriate logics to pursue 
their own interests.  
This concludes the second incident chapter but I return to the themes of 
structure, rhetoric and edging in the next chapter which consists of the third and 
final incident exploring an evolving governance structure. 
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Chapter 7 -  The Governance Setting 
7.1 Chapter Introduction  
The purpose of this final findings chapter is to consider the role of logics 
and institutional work in evolving governance structures to both advance and 
resist control. I examine the institutional work undertaken to bring in changes to 
the governance structure from 2012 and the interplay of challenges that took 
place. In doing so I respond to the central research question of how 
organisational actors deal with the presence of multiple institutional logics and 
what implications this has for the nature of organisation, with emphasis on 
governance structure and processes. 
This incident was identified through my attendance at several trustee 
meetings.  The catalyst for identification of the incident was a trustee meeting in 
June 2016 at which a challenge to the role of a governance committee was 
made, I quickly discovered that this tension was not new and that a narrative of 
challenge had been present at several meetings.  I also became aware of a 
growing awareness of frustrations between the CEO and a group of Trustees 
which resulted in an internal rhetoric around ‘that woman’ and the need for 
conversations and documents to pass ‘the (name of person) test’. At the heart 
of this incident, was a female trustee – ‘that woman’ – challenging unilateral 
decision making by the CEO and Chariman of Trustees; over-attention to 
commercial performance and lack of attention given to ‘good governance’.   
Due to the political sensitivities surrounding the incident and my 
employment role within the organisation, specifically the fact that I am line 
managed by the CEO a central actor in this incident, I did not provide drafts of 
this chapter to the review group. Recognizing that this may limit my sense-
checking ability (resonance, creditability) I paid attention to ensuring that at the 
end of each meeting, I recorded my reflections, thoughts and feelings in my 
research journal. These entries were used in discussion with my supervisor to 
develop my interpretations and as part of the reflexive process to identify 
assumptions I may be bringing to interpretations.   
In the same format as pervious incident chapters, this chapter consists of 
three sections; the first provides a précis of the incident; the second the 
narratives of the protagonists, primarily the Trustees, supplemented by internal 
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actors involved in governance activities; finally, I conclude with a summary of 
my interpretations.   
7.2 Précis of incident 
 This incident is situated within the context of evolving governance 
structures and processes in the period 2012-2016 (see section below on 
regulatory changes).  Specifically, the incident relates to a challenge to 
committees, authority and processes.  See diagram below for a pictorial 
representation of the groups.  
Figure 15: Pictorial representation of group (based on diagram in Regulations (Focal Organisation, 
2014, p. 5) 
  
 
 
 This incident is considered central to shedding light on the research 
questions guiding this thesis insofar as it appears to be driven, at least in part, 
by the interplay of competing (commercial and public good) logics.  Specifically, 
the current CEO’s desire to have delegated authority to make autonomous 
decisions, on occasions with backing from the Chairman, is somewhat at odds 
with charity law (and public good logic) which situates ultimate legal 
responsibility for organisational decision-making and action with the Trustees, 
who must act collectively.  This level of accountability is arguably designed to 
compel Trustees to want to feel in control of what decisions are made and how 
they are made as stewards of the charity’s assets.  
Nominations committee 
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 So just where does accountability (or perhaps power) sit in the focal 
organisation?   The regulations outline the roles and accountabilities of the 
numerous groups as:  
(a) Nominations Committee is responsible for the selection and 
removal of the Trustees and the overall performance of the Board.   
(b) Group Y is responsible for holding Board accountable against 
charter and charitable objectives, values and ethos. Group Y can 
request an extraordinary general meeting at which they can hold a 
vote of no confidence against the Board of Trustees or individual 
Trustees  
(c) The Board of Trustees (Board) is accountable to both 
Nominations Committee   and Group Y  
(d) The Chairman of the Board acts as the CEO’s line manager and 
is responsible for CEO hiring, firing and performance 
management  
(e) The CEO is accountable to Nominations Committee (as they are a 
trustee) but also to the Chairman as they are the CEO.  
(f) Finance Committee, a sub-set of Board - responsible for financial 
and audit oversight  
(g) Pay Committee (sub-set of Board) – responsible for setting CEO 
remuneration and approving the remuneration policy for all staff. 
Figure 16:  Accountability Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Y 
• Elect 50% of Board through a voting 
mechanism – only qualified members can 
be voted into Group Y (there is a 
representational quota linked to 
geographical spread of membership 
• Can call an Extra-Ordinary General 
Meeting (EGM)   
Nominations Committee 
• Approve Group Y elections 
• Recruit Trustees  
• Selects Officers (President/ Chariman of Board) 
• Set performance standards of Board 
• Recommends remedial action to the Chairman of 
the Board of Trustees in respect of individual 
Trustees  
Board of Trustees  
(Including Chariman of Board and CEO when acting as a Trustee) 
Group Y 
Can call a vote of no confidence in 
Board through EGM  
Nominations Committee    
Can request the dismissal of individual 
trustees where they have breached 
standards   
CEO 
Accountable to Chariman of Board who acts as line manager 
Trustee Sub- 
Committees. 
Finance and Pay  
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Through reading and analysis of regulations, phase one interview 
transcripts and participant observation at Board meetings, I identified a complex 
and often contractionary accountability structure.   This structure highlights the 
hybrid nature of the organisation and the challenges emerging from divergent 
public good and corporate logics.  I posit that it also   allows for a degree of 
vagueness of accountability and delegated responsibly which I suggest creates 
an environment where it is difficult for individuals to be held accountable.  
(a) The Trustee Board (including CEO) is accountable to the charity 
commission under charity law5  
(b) The Trustee Board (including CEO) is accountable to Group Y 
‘[Group Y] is the Institute’s representative and advisory 
body, elected from the global membership…. [it is] …the 
‘conscience’ of the Institute…holds the Board of Trustees 
accountable6 against our charter and charitable objectives, 
values and ethos (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 6) 
(c) The Trustee Board is accountable to the Chariman of the Board 
as ‘Head Trustee’. (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 13)  Whilst this 
structure may be how a typical ‘corporate’ works, this is divergent 
to charity law which places the Chair as a coordinating role who 
has no more power/authority than any other trustee.  
(d) the CEO is accountable to the Board of Trustees  
‘As leader of the staff the CEO is responsible and 
accountable for all operations and the successful execution 
of the strategy set by the Trustees’ (Focal Organisation, 
2014, p. 24) 
(e) the CEO is accountable to the Chariman of the Trustees  
‘The CEO works closely with the Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees to ensure that [focal organisations] charter and 
charitable objectives are being pursued, that the strategic 
plan is being progressed and that the financial and other 
targets set by the Board are being met. The CEO is line-
managed by the Chairman who will set the CEO’s KPIs and 
conduct regular appraisals.’ (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 
24) 
                                            
5 see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-essential-trustee-what-you-need-to-know-cc3/the-essential-trustee-what-
you-need-to-know-what-you-need-to-do ) 
6 the mechanism of holding Trustees accountable is through an EGM at which a vote of no-confidence of the Trustees may be 
tabled 
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7.2.1 The incident  
The incident relates to a Board challenge of Nominations Committee’s 
legality, authority, process and recommendations:   
‘The Board agreed: 
(i)  To request that external legal advice be obtained to confirm 
the role of the Nominations Committee in appointing Trustees and 
whether Board had the power to block the recommendation from 
the committee and if so, on what grounds;  
 (ii)  To request an Extraordinary Board meeting be convened at 
the earliest opportunity, to which the Chairman of Nominations 
Committee   would be requested to present an update detailing: 
(a) the process and procedure undertaken, and (b) the rationale 
behind the committee's decision to appoint each of the named 
individuals’ (2016) 
This challenge was made alongside a challenge to the CEO’s voting authority:  
‘[Board requested] the implementation of clear rules relating to the 
authority and voting rights of the CEO (in his/her capacity as a 
trustee) to avoid potential conflict of interest.’ (Focal Organisation, 
2016) 
7.2.2 The protagonists  
 I experienced two protagonists within this incident.   One perspective is 
that they are peer to peer trustee roles.  If, however, you accept that not all 
Trustees treat the CEO as a trustee: ‘I don’t receive him [CEO] as a trustee’ 
[Interview H; October 2014 – phase 1 research] there is another perspective in 
that one is a trustee and one is the CEO. See below for a  summary of roles. 
Table 16:  Protagonists’ roles 
Trustee 
2 
A member of the Board which is the principal governing body of [focal organisation], 
legally liable for the organisation as a registered charity. As such they are (jointly with 
the other Trustees): 
• legally responsible for ensuring [focal organisation] acts in fulfilment of Royal 
charter and charity obligations 
• responsible for the governance and management of [focal organisation], including 
strategy setting and decision making  
• responsible for prudent financial management and setting of annual budgets and 
levels of financial reserves 
• responsible for strategy development, implementation and annual review  
• responsible for regular risk assessments and management  
• responsible for the operation of [focal organisation] and mechanisms to ensure 
compliance against regulations (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 9) 
 
Trustee 2 is also the Chair of a Board sub-committee for finance which is responsible 
for monitoring, reviewing and reporting to the Board on: financial control and reporting; 
external audit arrangements; compliance with external regulators and risk 
management procedures (Focal Organisation; Focal Organisation , 2008) 
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7.2.3  The environment –The changing nature of governance  
 In keeping with the spirit of ethnography and to consider the incident in 
situ, it Is important to contextualise it against a series of small, seemingly 
benign changes in the governance structure over recent years, since CEO 3 
(current CEO) joined the organisation. My analysis in this section firstly 
consisted of a review of the Regulations which identified a significant change in 
the governance structure in 2012, followed by apparently minor changes in 
2014 and proposed changes in 2016 (see Table 17, p.145 for a summary of the 
changes). Notably, there were no amendments to the regulations and structures 
between the period 1992-2008 followed by two amendments and a proposed 
amendment within a four-year period under the current CEO. Seeking to 
understand how internal actors made sense of the changes and acted to 
influence these changes I conducted semi-structured interviews with four 
actors:  
Actor 1 Member of the Senior Leadership Team.  Employed in the organisation 
some 17 years prior to the incident. 
Actor 2 Senior manager and member of the governance change team. Employed 
in the organisation some 16 years prior to the incident.  
Actor 3 Works in the CEO office. Employed by CEO 3 and joined at the time of the 
Board structure change 
Actor 4 Previous Chairman of Trustees.  
In the remainder of this chapter I sequence my data and interpretation 
narratives around the governance structure changes outlined in Table 
17(below) to explore how identification with different – and at times opposing – 
logics shaped the evolution of governance structures and the utilization of these 
structures to both advance and resist control or accountability mechanisms. In 
doing so, I draw attention to the nature of institutional work undertaken to 
(de)legitimate structures and processes, by whom and the associated political, 
symbolic and rhetorical dynamics that ensued.   
 
CEO  
 
The CEO is responsible and accountable for all operations and the successful 
execution of the strategy set by the Trustees. The CEO: 
• works closely with the Chairman to ensure that charter and charitable objectives 
are being pursued, the strategic plan is being progressed and that financial and 
other targets set by the Board are being met. 
• is line-managed by the Chairman who sets KPIs and conducts appraisals. 
• must identify to the Chairman any potential conflicts of interest between his role as 
an employee and as a Trustee and withdraw from any Board discussions where 
this might influence the Board’s decision. (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 24) 
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Table 17:  Changes to Governance Structure 
Role / 
Time  
Recruiting Trustees Trustee Group Representation of 
profession  
CEO Financial 
Oversight  
CEO 
Remuneration 
Oversight  
1992-
2007  
(CEO 1)  
Nomination Committee 
exists to identify key 
officers for posts of the 
focal organisation: 
• President, Vice-
President, Chairman 
& Deputy Chairman 
• Members of the Board 
of Management  
• Membership of the 
committee (Y1) itself  
• 47 Trustees, 13 of these 
recruited by Committee Y1 & 
remaining elected by the 
membership  
• Principal governing body legally 
liable for the focal organisation 
as a registered charity 
• Sub-group of Trustees (Board) 
elected to provide operational 
oversight.  Board made up of 10 
people recruited by Committee Y 
& 3 elected from the trustee 
group  
Membership branches Employee, 
line-managed 
by the 
Chairman of 
trustee Board 
 
Board Board  
2008 
(CEO 2) 
     New Board sub-
group to oversee 
remuneration  
2012 
(CEO 3) 
Nomination Committee.   • Smaller executive Board of 
Trustees  
• Trustee Board chaired by the 
Chairman of the Institute 
• Performance of each trustee will 
be evaluated & managed by the 
Trustees as a group 
• Principal governing body legally 
liable for the focal organisation 
as a registered charity 
• Total of 13 Trustees, 6 elected 
by Group Y, 6 recruited by 
Nominations Committee & CEO  
• Previous trustee 
group became 
representative group 
(Group Y) 
• Membership of 62 
• Responsible for 
holding Board to 
account through EGM 
mechanism & by 
electing 50% of the 
Trustees from Group 
Y     
CEO becomes 
an ex officio 
trustee 
  
2014 
(CEO 3)  
    New Board sub-
group to oversee 
Financial 
governance  
Removed to 
finance committee 
then reinstated  
2016 
draft  
(CEO 3)  
  Proposal to remove ability 
to call an EGM being 
considered 
   
 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trustees 
7.2.3.1 Changes to the Board of Trustees 
Figures 17 and 18 below provide an overview of the structure before and 
after the 2012 changes, which saw:  
(a) the Board of Trustees (n=47) become the membership for a newly 
formed representational group (Group Y, n=62).  Whilst this group of 
previous Trustees lost trustee status they were given powers to ‘hold the 
Board of Trustees accountable against charter and charitable objectives, 
values and ethos’ (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 6 (3.1.1));  
(b)  the formation of a new, smaller Board of Trustees (n=13) and;  
(c) the CEO gaining trustee status and ability to attend nomination 
committee meetings  
 
Figure 17:  Pre-2012 structure 
 
 
Nominations 
Commitee
(1) Overseas the election 
process for the trustees who 
are elected by and from the 
membership (election 
process managed by 
employed staff)
(2) Manages the trustee 
selection process from those 
who are not elected by the 
members
(a) Identification of 
potential trustees to 
add to the ‘long list’ (a 
list of potential 
trustees)
(b) Carries out the 
interview and 
selection of the 
trustees from the 
‘long list’
(3) Manages the election of 
Board of Management from 
the trustee group 
Board of 
Trustees (47)
(Selected and 
elected)
Board of 
Management 
(13)
CEO
Wider membership 
elect 50% of trustees 
Election	
process
Monitors	process
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Election process 
 
Figure 18: Post 2012 structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of note in the 2012 structure is the reduction in the number of Trustees (from 
47 to 13) and the removal of a sub-group of Trustees responsible for 
‘operational management.  I posit that the reduction of the number of Trustees 
and the removal of the ‘operational oversight’ trustee sub-group enabled the 
CEO to reduce trustee scope to influence daily activity and thus increased their 
(CEO) ability to make autonomous decisions.  
When asked what had driven changes in governance there was a 
consistent representation that it was a result of the ‘new CEO’ with a ‘new 
ideology’, as illustrated in the excerpt below:  
 ‘Suddenly the pace quickened… Mainly [due to] getting into the 
corporate market [because of] the new CEO having a completely 
different ideology.  And that was… the market that he understood... And 
I think as the business grew, you know, there was...there was greater 
need for more formality in how we did things around here and a whole 
lot more professional.   …CEO 1 (The previous CEO) didn't find the 
need to change, but of course the organisation was a lot smaller then.  
Everything was running centrally anyway.  I think mostly to do with the 
fact that [the current CEO3] wanted... cover's the wrong word but it's the 
only word I can think of…. [that] he had a body a people to go to and 
turn to. I think [he] certainly wanted a higher calibre of people on the 
Nominations Committee 
 
(1) Overseas the election 
process for the 
trustees who are 
elected by and from 
the membership 
through Group Y 
(election process 
managed by employed 
staff) 
 
(2) Manages the trustee 
selection process from 
those who are not elected 
by the member  
(a) Identification of 
potential trustees to 
add to the ‘long list’ (a 
list of potential 
trustees) 
(b) Carries out the 
interview and selection 
of the trustees from 
the ‘long list’ 
 
Wider membership 
elects Group Y 
Elected membership 
representational 
group  
[Group Y] 
Board of Trustees (13) 
 
Including CEO trustee  
Election process 
(50% of trustees) 
Manages selection process (50% of 
trustees) 
Monitors process 
CEO attends Nominations 
Committee meetings   
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Board. I mean, don’t forget Carole, we went from a trustee of 40-odd 
people, and the majority of these were voted on by the members from 
their branches.  We kind of inherited them as they were voted on by 
members who we represent. So, from that perspective you are only 
getting [reference to profession removed] type of people. Whereas 
[current CEO’s] approach was to select people who are more rounded 
and are more business people I think. You know, so you’ve got Big 
business people.’    [G] 
 
In this narrative, the previous Trustees are positioned as being more 
representative of the profession (of the focal organisation) and by association of 
‘lower calibre’ than ‘big business people’. Another interview makes similar 
points around the agency of the CEO and the drive to make the organisation 
appear like a ‘conventional business’,  
‘That [2012 change] was instigated by an incoming new CEO 
who's first look at everything was that there is some dysfunction 
here. And there was a perception of a complete lack of trust 
between the [committee name removed] which was the large 
trustee body and the Board which was the smaller executive 
body…. there was a perception of mistrust on both sides of the 
secretariat so it was a very unholy triangle of conflicting powers; 
conflicts which were perceived to be leading to a kind of paralysis. 
So that was the drive behind the change to the new system.  So that 
you have something that looks much more like a conventional 
business and you've got a small Board comparatively speaking.’ 
[interviewee L] 
Meanwhile, another actor highlights the CEO’s desire for autonomy and 
preventing ‘intrusion’ as the driving force for the changes: 
‘I had just joined at that point [2012] so I am not sure on all the 
background but I have always assumed it came from [CEO] when he 
arrived, thinking that the decision-making structure wasn’t autonomous 
enough [for him] …I remember thinking it was very odd when I first 
came here there was no audit committee.  But maybe that was just 
because of what I'd been used to.  And I know he was very anti it those 
days, because I remember mentioning it.  My view is that he is more of 
a commercial kind of person who wouldn't perhaps embrace audit and 
all these, what... he sees as red tape and things to stop him doing the 
things he wants to do. He resents the intrusion. [D1] 
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When asked about the reason for forming Group Y (member representation) out 
of the previous trustee group, an actor presented this as a deliberate act to 
remove the power of the group:  
‘There was a further dimension in that [these changes mean] your 
member element is transferred to being an advisory body. So, it has no 
powers whatsoever.  It's purely advisory. So, it's the sounding 
Board…that's where we look if we want member's views.  They have no 
ability, directly, through any sort of voting or other mechanism to 
influence what happens at the Board.  So, the… current scenario…in 
what happened in 2012…the direction to me was get rid of this huge 
body of Trustees, get me a small Board and a small Board made up of 
people who know what they're doing in business terms.  ‘Business 
people’ was the phrase used ‘business people’.  [L] 
 
This is a noteworthy representation as during the 2012 changes the Terms of 
reference for Group Y presents them as being the ‘conscience of the institute’ 
with the ability to influence and guide the Trustees and to hold the Board of 
Trustees accountable. The primary formal mechanism through which Group Y 
can hold the Board of Trustees accountable is through the instigation of an 
Extra-Ordinary General Meeting (EGM) at which the Trustees can be held to 
account and/or a vote of no-confidence can be raised.  Notably, there is a 
current (2016) proposal being driven by CEO3 to remove the ability of Group Y 
to request an EGM and thus vote of no confidence which I interpret as a further 
attempt to reduce the number of stakeholders to which they (CEO) are 
accountable and further increase the CEOs ability to make autonomous 
decisions.  
 In terms of the nature of work undertaken to implement structure change, an 
internal actor who was responsible for managing the process described the use 
an external party and  ‘independent voice’ to validate the view that change was 
needed: 
 ‘Although it was never publicly stated here as the dichotomy 
between the internal and external messaging, the internal 
messaging was ‘we know what the problems are, but if we as the 
staff tell the Board and the Trustees, they're going to not accept 
any of it…’   I think at that time we weren't bold enough to say we 
know what the problems are and here they are.  We wanted a 
third party to come along and say…here is what the problem is 
and here are some of the solutions that you might consider’. If you 
get a well-respected, independent expert to come and say yes, 
these are your problems, that transfers that role to somebody else 
in a safe way.  So, you then haven't got an argument between the 
  149 
staff, the Board and the Trustees.  That is your fault, no it's your 
fault.  You've got an independent person coming in and saying 
‘this is how it looks to us’ and it's more acceptable getting that 
message from a stranger who was looking at it cold.  And that was 
quite interesting, but we already knew what the key result was 
going to be before we saw it…. [the output report] didn't say how 
are you going to get from here to there?  [L] 
Furthermore, the interviewee described careful management of perceptions 
regarding selection of the review group and a conscious decision to employ 
‘enthusiastic volunteers’ from the previous trustee group to ensure that there 
was no challenge of manipulation:  
So that's when we put together the review group…. We chose 
people from the Board, particularly, who had already shown an 
interest and engagement in the whole process.  So, they would 
have contributions to make and talk about governance.  You could 
tell who on the Board was interested in governance and who 
wasn't. … And we asked for volunteers from the [previous Board], 
which was interesting because you had a diverse group.  And the 
thinking was, don't try and engineer that group so that the 
[previous board] feel that they have been manipulated or that we 
cherry picked the ones we thought would agree with us.  So, you 
had some members of that group that were very vocal and critical 
of the Board and staff.  Others who simply didn't grasp some of 
the principles and had to be coached quite a lot to understand the 
issues, but that's how we put together that first group… The 
majority were enthusiastic volunteers as opposed to people who 
could actually contribute much to it’. [interviewee L]  
7.2.3.2  CEO as Trustee   
 The second key change in 2012 was the CEO taking a dual role as CEO 
and Trustee.  This is not the norm for charities and requires additional 
permission through Byelaws and Regulations within the organisation and 
permission from the Charity Commission as regulator due to the potential for 
conflicts of interest. It became apparent during a phase 1 interview that the 
volunteer Trustees may not be explicitly aware of or in agreement with the 
CEO’s trustee status: 
‘Researcher:  … the CEO has a dual role, acting both as a 
Chief Executive and a Trustee.   
Interviewee:  I’ve never seen that before. 
Researcher: Do you see any tensions or challenges from that 
[dual role]? 
Interviewee: Yeah, I don’t know.  I mean, I’ve never seen it before 
so it’s genuinely not something… I don’t know how you’re allowed 
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to do that in best practice governance.  I don’t know… They 
(CEO) are approving their own recommendations so, to me, you 
can’t do that. 
Researcher: When you have [CEO] at the Board, in what role 
do you see them?  
Interviewee: They should be at the Board but I thought they were 
there as a Chief Exec.  I didn’t know they were a Trustee. I don’t 
receive them as a Trustee’ [Interviewee H]  
This dual CEO-trustee status is central to this incident and something I return to 
throughout the chapter. 
7.2.3.3  A new oversight committee 
 Following the substantive changes of 2012, a smaller scale change 
occurred in 2014 with the formation of a trustee sub-committee responsible for 
financial oversight.  As an internal actor not directly involved in financial activity 
I was aware that the formation of such a committee had been mooted by 
various Trustees for several years but nothing had materialised. Keen to 
understand what had happened to finally bring about this new committee, I 
began to explore.   
 All four interviewees presented a picture of the CEO resisting but then 
submitting to the formation of a new financial oversight committee.  On reading 
the interview narratives, formation of the new committee was presented as both 
a symbolic gesture, enabling the CEO to signal ‘good [governance] practice’, 
and a tactical action, enabling him to remove conversations and attention to 
financial governance from Board to a smaller group to stop Board ‘wasting’ their 
time:   
 ‘We'd had a few problems with... one of our subsidiary businesses, 
particularly in [country removed], where we had an horrendous year 
end. We were pulled over the coals by our audiences, local audiences 
as well as our group auditors.  At that time, there was also a partner 
change at [Auditors name removed].  The incumbent partner retired and 
the new guy came in and he was very surprised that an organisation of 
our size and status, particularly being a charity, did not operate an audit 
committee... It was good practice to have an audit committee. We had... 
fought...well, not fought, but we hadn't encouraged it for a number of 
years.  It had been mooted several times.  A lot of organisations have 
various committees, one of which is the audit committee.  And we tried 
to shy away from that, principally because of the way the business was 
structured in as much that there would have to be counsel and 
representatives on those committees.  We didn't have any qualified 
accountants or anything like that or anybody that had any accounting 
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background to actually serve on those committees.  Now, of course that 
changed when we moved to a smaller Board and we got a higher 
calibre of people on the Board.  And we then had the likes of qualified 
accountants. The problems in [country removed], the recommendations 
from the auditors and the introduction of people like [Trustee 2] onto the 
Board… I think at the end of the day he [current CEO] bowed down to 
pressure, but he could see the logic of having those people in... 
because it... they could deal with matters as a subset of the Board.  We 
weren't then wasting the Board's time, Carole, in discussing audit 
issues, appraisal and all that sort of stuff.’ [G] 
 
 [The committee] Came about as a result of further concerns about 
finance. They [CEO] was resistant to the idea of an audit committee for 
a very long time.  Their [CEO] view was if we're a competent group of 
managers here, we shouldn’t need one. Their [CEO] main fear was that 
they would deep dive into detailed financial stuff from the position of 
lack of knowledge, lack of understanding of how the business 
operated… And he didn't want them to be getting that deep into detail. 
They [CEO] believes it's their job, their decisions, their responsibility to 
make sure that the business continues to operate. Where they [the 
trustee] were very successful in their approach was in frightening the 
other Trustees into doubting themselves, doubting whether or not they 
were equipped to have the oversight role that they're supposed to have, 
not really knowing where the boundaries were of that and also picking 
up on this undermining of [internal] staff ability to know what they were 
doing. So, by saying constantly ‘I'm a finance expert’ and ‘I'm looking at 
this and I'm telling you it's not being done properly’, that's quite a 
powerful statement to make. We wanted someone who was an expert in 
those areas who would take a critical look and advise us what we 
needed to do to get our act together. And that happened big time. 
[Laughs].’   [L]  
I think that [the introduction of the committee] was pressure from 
[Trustee 2] to a point.   They [trustee 2] was challenging them [CEO] at 
all the meetings – challenging them [CEO] at every turn regarding the 
financial stuff. And I think they [Board of Trustees] were getting that 
bogged down with the annual accounts at the meeting, and it was taking 
so long it was getting very convoluted, they [Board of Trustees] were 
getting very tied up with it.  And I think that was the catalyst for, well, 
shouldn't we have like a sub-committee that would just deal with it. [D1] 
In a similar but slightly different presentation of events leading up to the creation 
of a new sub-committee, a previous Trustee [Trustee 5] positioned the creation 
of the committee as a way of managing ‘the conflict’:  
I think the pressure from the Board...Well, let's put it another way. 
I think [CEO] was brow beaten by [Trustee 2]] Because I think it 
got to a point where there was so much pressure about the need 
to understand the accounts by people like [Trustee 2], that they 
scare mongered the Board, who were previously quite content 
with the ratification of the accounts... But were suitably concerned 
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by the comments of [Trustee 2], to the point where it became…  
[Trustee 2] now became our authority on the accounts.  No.  the 
FD’s the authority on the accounts, with CEO.  Trustee (2) has a 
slightly more focused view of what it actually means, and can 
maybe raise one or two questions.  When it got to the point where 
we had half a day on ratifying the accounts, at that point it was, 
well hang on.. this point is getting nowhere fast.  Where's the 
strategy of the discussion.  We've got half a day gone with the 
fiscal discussion.  We're getting challenge after challenge of the 
FD.  We needed to formalize something outside of this Board 
meeting to give us that confidence that we're right.  Hence, the 
[Finance] committee [when we came to a head with [Trustee 2] It 
came to a head with (Pause) the conflict…. I observed [Trustee 2 
using their advanced knowledge of charity law, compared to the 
other Trustees, to create a burning platform and a position of fear’ 
[Trustee 5] 
 In this narrative, whilst Trustee 2 is presented as having the ability to 
influence other Trustees   this agency is depicted as negatively motivated.  
When asked why Trustee 2 would wish to create fear to achieve influence, the 
response from Trustee 5 attributed the behaviour to a desire for personal gain, 
disruption and sensationalisation over ensuring that their trustee obligations 
were met:  
‘I think it comes back to people's agenda on the Board.  And I'm 
going to be quite blunt here. There are people who put their 
names forward to be on the Board to enhance their CV.  There 
are people who put their names forward to partially enhance their 
CV and have this desire.  They want to do something and be 
involved and make a difference.  I've got people who put their 
names forward because they want to make a difference.  And it 
might not be a surprise for you to learn that I feel I'm in that latter 
category.  We want to work with the organisation and find ways to 
overcome obstacles or issues that present themselves. But there 
are people...and it never ceases to amaze me, and it will never 
ever change.  There are some people who just love conflict… 
And, as I said before, who like to make a mountain out of a 
molehill, and like to sensationalise.  And actually, this is really 
awful to say, but it's true, I'm afraid.  There are some people that 
don't want to actually have the ultimate objective achieved.  
There's got to be an obstacle in the way.  They've got to be the 
person that finds the reason why we cannot achieve it, why we 
cannot do.  And that is [Trustee 2].’ 
I found this an interesting presentation, on an emotional level I felt as if Trustee 
5 was seeking to demonise Trustee 2’s motivation and therefore the legitimacy 
of the challenge.  I suggest that a person from a public good logic might receive 
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Trustee 2’s challenge as a legitimate challenge to governance practices.  
Remembering I had interviewed Trustee 2 during my phase 1 research (‘pre-
conflict’), I revisited this transcript and experienced them as being driven from a 
charity governance perspective – see the except from their interview transcript 
below:   
Researcher:  What do you see as the role of the Trustees? 
I think the Board are actually a governance trustee group.  I mean, 
the Charity Commission requires you to have an independent 
Board of Trustees to make sure the charity’s doing what it said it 
was going to do when it was given charitable status and to make 
sure that you don’t abuse that status, that you don’t spend money 
on things you’re not supposed to spend money on and that you 
don’t go bust.  So that is our corporate governance role.  For a 
charity, the advantage of having a team of individuals as Trustees 
from a variety of backgrounds is that they bring in expertise and, 
frankly, a contact book as well that will enable you to get free 
consultancy advice to help inform and develop the strategy and to 
seek their advice on how to execute’  
Researcher:  What if anything would make you leave the 
Board?  
 ‘If the executive didn’t listen to the feedback that the Trustees 
give.  If I felt that my views weren’t aligned with the other 
Trustees.  I’m not commenting on who’s right and who’s wrong.  
For me, if I was seriously concerned about the risk and 
infrastructure of the charity and their ability to honour their 
charitable status or if it became no longer palatable for me to be a 
trustee because of work or locations or something else.’ [H] 
This pubic good logic was re-iterated during a Board sub-committee meeting 
when Trustee 2, in their role as chair of the sub-committee, and one other 
Trustee expressed concerns of both governance (and decision making) and 
appropriateness of the decision within the context of the organisation as a 
charity:    
‘Concern was expressed regarding the bonus proposal, including 
its fairness, transparency, level of increase, and impact on the 
fixed cost base…  A concern was raised regarding how the 
targets had been set, and it was emphasized that the bonus 
should be linked to achieving a series of targets and not solely to 
achieving NFR’ (Focal Organisation, 2015). 
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And again, during a subsequent Board meeting where they stated: 
 ‘This is not about a lack of trust but just a facet of good charity 
governance.’ [See extract 2 from Research Journal September 
2015 page 129] 
7.1.4 Section summary  
In the section above, I have outlined the incident and the environmental 
context at the time of the incident.  I have made use of documentary analysis 
and interviews to get an understanding of how different actors make sense of 
the changes. Collectively these narratives imply that internal actors associate 
the changes with the CEO’s ‘corporate ideology’ and associated desire for 
‘autonomy’ in decision making and drive for professionalization by introducing 
‘big business people’ almost as if this on its own would make the organisation 
more successful.  Furthermore, the actors present the introduction of a new 
committee [Finance Committee] as being in response to one particular trustee 
who was able to use their personal power to frustrate, frighten and undermine 
confidence in internal operations.  It is suggested that despite ‘fighting and 
resisting’ this structure for a period, the CEO ultimately ‘bowed down to 
pressure’.  Interestingly, the rhetoric of the CEO downplayed the significance of 
the new committee, presenting it as a way to stop the Board ‘wasting time’ on 
such [trivial] matters.  
Against this organisational context, I now move to the incident which 
challenged the status of the Nominations Committee and the CEO in respect of 
process, accountability and conflicts of interest.  In the following section, we 
look at the protagonist’s perspectives on the role of Nominations Committee 
and Group Y and the power of the CEO.  
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7.3 Protagonists perspective  
 In section 7.2.2 above I provided an overview of the two protagonists, 
namely the Trustees (and specifically Trustee 2) and the CEO.  I have 
previously presented them as coming from opposing commercial and public 
good logics respectively (see chapter 4 for commentary on the CEO’s logic 
identification and 7.2.3.3 above in respect of Trustee 2).   
 To get a greater appreciation of the interplay of these logics as it relates 
to the challenge to the Nominations Committee and the CEO’s trustee status, I 
used minutes of meetings (namely Board and senior executive meetings) and 
my research journal, where I attended meetings as a participant observer, as 
the key information sources. By reviewing the minutes of trustee meeting that 
took place between December 2014 and September 2016 I identified that, in 
the eight meetings which took place, a concern about trustee selection or term 
of office was raised at all but one (see summary table 18 below).  I noted that 
whilst the concerns were presented in general terms, in September 2016 the 
narrative became more focused in that it directly challenged the legitimacy of 
the Nominations Committee, raised for the first time the potential for conflicts of 
interest in respect of the CEO and suggested that there was a deliberate delay 
to the governance review process. I found this interesting and wondered if the 
Trustees had been setting the scene for some time using an arguably benign 
and un-emotive structural discourse as a vehicle to introduce much broader 
issues of situated power within existing structures and processes in respect of 
their own grouping vis-à-vis Nominations Committee and CEO. Furthermore, I 
noted that the challenge was made at what would be the final meeting for 
Trustee 2 (who had been vocal on the matter of good governance and trustee 
tenureship) as their tenureship came to an end after the September meeting.   I 
could not help but think that they had set the stage for a challenge that would 
last beyond their time as a trustee. 
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Table 18:  Narrative at Board meetings 
 
Narrative   
Raised at meeting 
Dec-
2014 
Mar-
2015 
Jun-
2015 
Sep-
2015 
Dec-
2015 
Mar-
2016 
Jun-
2016 
Sep-
2016 
Need for greater transparency of trustee 
selection (Nomination Committees 
process, criteria and decision making) 
        
Clarity of process for electing chair of 
Nominations Committee  
        
Challenge to the legality of Nominations 
Committee          
Rejection of proposal for a trustee          
Challenge to the trustee selection process          
Request for extension of term of office for 
Board Chairman from 2 to 3 years 
        
Ability for Trustees to serve two terms of 
office 
        
Concern of a disconnect between the 
Board and Committee Y 
        
Challenging the time, it has taken to 
conduct a governance review         
The appropriateness of the CEO being a 
trustee as he had the potential to misuse 
his voting rights 
        
 
This documentary review set the scene to enable me to get an appreciation of 
the activity undertaken by the different protagonists to make and defend against 
challenges.  In the next section I further consider and break down the two key 
areas of challenge namely Nominations Committee and CEO trustee status. 
7.3.1  On Nominations Committee   
I begin this section by providing relevant extracts of the regulations as 
they relate to the Nominations committee.  First, the committee is position as an 
independent body responsible for the integrity and efficiency of the process for 
electing and selecting Trustees 
‘The Nominations Committee is an independent body responsible 
for the integrity and efficiency of the process for electing and 
selecting Trustees’ (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 15 3.4) 
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Second, trustee selection decisions will be made against agreed and published 
criteria. 
 ‘[The committee] sets and publishes the recruitment criteria for 
Trustees... validates candidates for election or appointment to the 
Board of Trustees against those criteria to ensure that Trustees 
have the commitment and competence to discharge their 
responsibilities’ ( (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 15 3.4.1) 
Third, detailed records of meetings and decisions will be kept and made 
available to the Board of Trustees:  
‘accurate records will be kept which will be available for scrutiny to 
the Trustees’. (Focal Organisation, 2014, p. 17 3.4.4 vii) 
And finally, the CEO is positioned as having little role in trustee selection:  
‘[the CEO] will attend meetings of the Committee by invitation to 
identify any specific expertise that would be of benefit to the 
Trustees.  The CEO shall not participate in shortlisting or voting, 
or recommending a preferred candidate, either for Trustees or for 
the Nominations Committee itself’ (Focal Organisation, 2014, pp. 
16 3.4.2 v-vi) 
The four statements above are pertinent to this incident from two perspectives.  
Firstly, the Board raised concerns about the lack of proficiency of the 
Nominations Committee (Focal Organisation, 2016, p. 7 (e)); a ‘disconnect and 
lack of visibility’ (Focal Organisation, 2016, p. 7 (a)) and; the ‘lack of transparent 
processes and criteria for compiling the list of candidates for appointment to 
Board and fairness and transparency of such appointments’ (Focal 
Organisation, 2016, p. 7 (d)).   
Additionally, whilst the regulations position the CEO as having no ability 
to influence trustee selection, in practice this does not appear to be the case. 
Instead, the CEO is presented as having an ‘extremely powerful input to the 
selection process’.  See for example the extracts from interviews where trustee 
selection is presented as an incestuous process without many [governance] 
safeguards and involving power plays and politics.  
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‘Oh yeah, that's [recruiting Trustees] a black art (laughs) … through 
the long list, the short list, the secret list...  So, some people have 
said it's a very incestuous... ...old boys network... that’s okay, as 
long as it's not abused. How could it be abused? Well, quite simply.  
You know, the CEO could be awarded a rather substantial salary, 
which is out of kilter with normal practice benchmarked against 
other similar organisations.’ [G] 
‘It's a curious one because it can be quite incestuous and there 
aren't many safeguards in there… So, the chief executive has an 
extremely powerful input to the selection process for the next chair.  
The next chair is the line manager of the CEO and will set his KPIs 
and his remuneration and any bonuses that result.  That, therefore, 
gives both parties a very strong vested interest in managing that 
relationship to both of their benefits.  So, there's always a concern 
there.  There really is always a concern… So, if you're a chair of the 
Board and your role up to now has been pretty inward looking, you 
actually want to make an external name for yourself and you 
wanted to do the next spread in a magazine, it's in your interest to 
give a favourable report to your CEO and approve his remuneration 
and approve any bonuses and give him a glowing testimonial.  Quid 
pro quo.  There are no checks and balances in that process.’ 
[Interviewee L] 
‘The transparency's not there, is it… if I'm honest, it's all a bit, if 
you're in my pocket, kind of thing… You wouldn't get in that position 
without knowing the people that you know, would you... I can see a 
flaw in... the whole system… whereby the chairman of the Board is 
also …the chief executive's boss, who sets his salary… The whole 
thing is this circle of this old boys' network again. In my view, it's 
improving now, but it isn't and hasn't been fair and transparent.  
I think that our regulations leave a bit to be desired, to be honest.  
Because if it were in the regulations what their remit was, in a...in a 
more structured definite way...our regulations are very woolly in my 
opinion.  I come from a background where we had a constitution, 
and there was a committee's terms of reference and it was very 
clear what that committee was allowed to do... The benefits of 
having...having that was that there was transparency.  Everyone 
could see.  You've got something to back you up if you said, no. 
Why do you think we haven't got it then? I don't know.  I mean 
it's...it's...it's very democratic, isn't it?  And I suppose where I came 
from it had to be very democratic, whereas here we don't have to 
be that democratic.  Should a charity be democratic?  In my 
opinion, yes.  Yes, it should.  But again, we're a charity when we 
want to be and we forget that we are when we don't want to be...’ 
[Interviewee D1]  
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The CEO… he’s got a lot of influence [in the selection of the long 
list], is my perception, I know he has…well, he tells me he sits at 
the back [of the selection interviews] and says nothing...  But he 
coerces…. On the selection of the Chariman of the Board… so, it’s 
a nice cosy arrangement isn’t it.  Yeah. Who’s going to allow me 
[CEO] to prosper … well, it’s you scratch my back and I’ll scratch 
yours, isn’t it?’ [Trustee 5 September 16]  
Arguably this presentation shows how agentic actors (namely the CEO) 
use informal power and relationships to circumvent formal regulations and 
decision making  structures that were intended to prevent abuse and ensure 
good governance.   I specifically note the reference to the CEO’s ability to 
influence the Chariman of the Trustees who in turn had the ability to influence 
the CEOs remuneration package - a ‘cosy’, ‘quid pro quo’, ‘you scratch my back 
I’ll scratch yours’ situation open to ‘abuse’:  
7.3. 4  On the CEO being a Trustee 
 As part of the 2012 governance structure change the CEO was given a 
dual role of CEO and Trustee, such a role did not exist prior to 2012. The 
presentation of a potential for conflicts of interest is the argument that has been 
made, apparently for the first time, at the September 2016 Board meeting, 
where the Trustees asked for:   
‘The implementation of clear rules relating to the authority and 
voting rights of the CEO (in his/her capacity as a trustee) to avoid 
potential conflict of interest, specifically in the event of a split vote’ 
(Focal Organisation, 2016) 
Whilst this point was muted by Trustee 2, arguably an adversary of the CEO  
‘their [trustee 2] whole persona was the antithesis of [current 
CEO].  And that was the problem.  It was a clash’ [Trustee 5]  
they were not alone in having this view.   Interviewing a previous trustee who, 
based on my observations over several years I position as an advocate of the 
current CEO they also shared the view that there was potential for a conflict of 
interest: 
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 [On whether the CEO should be a trustee] ‘I’m not sure about 
how important that really is.  What would I prefer?  Probably for 
him to be impartial and objective.  I'm not saying he shouldn't be a 
trustee…  I don't see why they have to be a trustee.  I don't see 
the benefit of them being a trustee.  There's possibly a conflict.  
There's certainly a perceived conflict.  I don't see the need for 
them to be a trustee.  I don't see they brings any value as a 
trustee.  I think, if anything, he’s possibly too conflicted.	 [Trustee 
5] 
Being able to coerce other Trustees through their trustee role does appear to be 
a factor in the CEO seeking trustee status and with it voting rights.  One internal 
actor presented the motivator as the CEO wanting the ability to use the formal 
structure to informal influence other Trustees.  
 ‘The number one…the internal logic, which wasn’t the external 
logic…was so that that trustee could have a vote and could…if 
things were delicately balanced would have a vote and that some 
Trustees would be highly influenced by the way in which that 
person voted.  So, sheep Trustees or the jackal Trustees and the 
sheep Trustees are going to wait and see how the chair of the 
Board votes and wait and see how the CEO votes and we'll vote 
according to that because they want to be seen to be good, 
sporting Trustees.  I'm over simplifying this.  They are not that 
passive by any means, but I think that's the sort of essential thought 
process.  I think…I don't really know what I think about this, I want 
to see what [Chairman of Board] and [CEO] are saying, they're 
argument sounds sensible to me, I'm going to agree with them.  I 
think that's how it works.  Then you've got the ones on the other 
side who I'm going to argue with this no matter what because I feel 
like arguing today.  Some of them may genuinely believe what 
they're saying, some of them I think just like to argue.  And so, the 
sort of…the slightly more subversive Trustees are going to go in 
that camp, but the majority are going to want to be seen to be good 
Trustees.’ [L]  
Not all actors however see having Trusteeship as a conflict, one actor 
expresses the benefits of CEO Trustees as being directly accountable for their 
actions: 
‘I don’t see any tension in it… you know, I can't see how you can 
have someone running an organisation, a CEO, who... there's a 
term they haven't got any skin in the game, yeah?  And basically, 
he could have done what he wanted really, to a degree and there'd 
be no consequence to him personally.  Whereas if he's a trustee 
then he has to be mindful of the fact that any decision could come 
back to haunt him, bite him, all the rest of it, 'cos he could end up 
being sued or accused of misrepresentation or malpractice or 
whatever.’ [G]   
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Musing 9 
 
April 2017 Sadly, earlier this year and during the final drafting of this thesis the 
current CEO died after a short and unexpected illness.   We will therefore never be able 
to see how the challenge to the CEO’s Trustee status played out. I note that the person 
specification for the new CEO makes it clear that they will not be a trustee as this is 
perceived to be a conflict of interest.  An inference can perhaps be drawn from that 
position in that whilst they did not challenge it with the one individual the Trustees 
did not see the CEO having trustee status as generally acceptable. 
 
7.3 Interpretation  
At the heart of this incident, I suggest, is a ‘battle’ between the CEO’s 
desire to have autonomy which they see as efficient and driving business 
growth and the Trustees’ defence against such autonomy which they   
considered poor practice [lacking checks and balances] and self-serving [you 
scratch my back I’ll scratch yours] unfitting of a charity.  
In this section, I discuss my core interpretations of how protagonists 
sought to deal with the presence of divergent logics within this incident.  These 
interpretations are interrelated and consist of the use of structure, informal 
power and rhetoric. Specifically, through this incident we see how Trustees’ 
attempt to use organisational structures as a mechanism to resist and control 
the elite management actors. Paradoxically those very actors are concurrently 
shaping organisational structures to minimise the Trustees’ ability to do so.  
7.3.1 Structure, power and control 
A result of the battle between divergent logics is the governance 
structure (see figure 15 page 140). From an external, un-informed perspective 
this diagram presents a picture of a governance system with several ‘checks 
and balances’ yet the internal narrative is that this presentation is of ‘very 
symbolic relationships’ [Interviewee D] to enable the focal organisation to 
display conformance to the accepted norms and legal requirements of a charity.  
Its existence is to legitimate status and to ‘say to the outside world, we have a 
committee that does this’ but what it does not show is the	 ‘extremely powerful 
influence of the CEO’ [Interviewee D] positioned at the apex of all 
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conversations; influencing the selection of Trustees, committee members and 
ultimately the Chariman of the Board.   
Through this incident, I identified what I consider a dysfunctional 
relationship between CEO and several Trustees.   This dysfunctionality driven 
from divergent logics and beliefs of what it legitimate behaviour, has resulted in 
a stalemate with the Board of Trustees challenging the legitimacy of the current 
structure and the appropriateness of CEO / Trustee duality.  In response, to 
such challenges the CEO accepts ‘trivial’ changes to the Board (such as the 
Finance Committee), almost as if seeking to appease some Trustees.  But at 
the same time as shown by the minutes (see table 18 on page 147) and 
interview transcripts the CEO stalls firstly the introduction of the finance sub-
committee and secondary a full review of the governance structure, arguably, 
waiting out some Trustees until the end of their tenure and therefore, potentially 
the end of the discussion.  
Additionally, through this incident, I observe how informal power could be 
used to circumvent formal decision making structures and enable the CEO to 
have an ‘extremely powerful input’ into decision making.    Specifically, I remind 
you of the perceived ability of the CEO to influence trustee selection despite the 
formal structure explicitly stating that the CEO ‘shall not participate’. Another 
example is how the CEO can influence ‘sheep Trustees’ through voting 
behaviors thus ensuring they (CEO) get the outcomes that they required.  I 
suggest that the CEO values the symbolic nature of the governance structure 
for its very ability to support informal power and enable him to remain at the 
apex of all conversations whist giving the perception of ‘good governance’ and 
democratic trustee decision making.  
7.3.2 Rhetoric  
 I noted differences in the way that the need for governance was 
constructed and communicated.  This reminds me of Lok’s (2010) study which 
reported how ‘everyday talk’ reinforced identity cues enabling actors to translate 
logics in particular ways.   Look how the protagonists use language to push 
forward their claim for change and simultaneously defend against change.  For 
example, in 2012, the CEO created a narrative around the need for greater 
formality and restructuring to be more like ‘a conventional business’.   In this 
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narrative, the CEO promotes a need for a smaller group of Trustees ‘who know 
what they are doing in business terms’, and a structure  would enable the CEO 
to be subject to less scrutiny and to have greater autonomy.  
In parallel and in resistance to the identity cues of a commercial logic, 
see how Trustee 2 puts the case for ‘good governance’ using their previous 
experience to give themselves a sense of coherence and distinctiveness by 
positioning themselves as an expert in governance.   They make use of 
objective examples and references from the Charities Regulations to underpin 
the consequences of bad governance practices in such a way to encourage 
other Trustees to form and adopt behaviors and identities of charity Trustees 
with (‘making sure that the charity’s doing what it said it was going to do and it 
not abusing its status, and that it doesn’t spend on things it should not spend it 
on’). Note also how, in a counter-attack to Trustee 2 other Trustees who are 
arguably aligned to the CEO form a narrative that seeks to undermine Trustee 
2’s.  This narrative seeks to delegitimize Trustee 2’s by demonizing them and   
position them as ‘sensationalists’, the ‘antithesis’ of the current CEO, and 
motivated by a love conflict and look to put obstacles in the way.  
‘Trustee 2 is the antithesis of [current CEO], and that’s the real 
problem… there is a clash…  There are some people who just 
love conflict… And, as I said before, who like to make a mountain 
out of a molehill, and like to sensationalise.  And this is awful to 
say, but it's true, I'm afraid.  There are some people that don't 
want to have the ultimate objective achieved.  There's got to be an 
obstacle in the way.  They've got to be the person that finds the 
reason why we cannot achieve it, why we cannot do.  And that is 
[trustee 2]’ [except from Trustee 5 transcript] 
7.5  Chapter Summary  
 This findings chapter uses an incident to get an understanding of the 
interplay of intentions in relation to the governance structure. We get introduced 
to an apparent ‘perfect’ theoretical structure before we understand the 
imperfections and flaws brought about through individual actors which result in 
a distortion of practical reality against the espoused reality.  In getting this 
understanding we again get an appreciation of the power of intentions and how 
the interplay of different actors can support or thwart.  
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What the incident shows is that the elite are vying for control and power 
through different strategies. Actors on the Board are attempting to gain and 
assert authority through formal structure (because that is their available 
resource) - they thus prioritised structures and systems - while the CEO (and 
those in the ‘in group’ such as the chair) are doing it through informal 
relationships and conversations which circumvent the structures – prioritizing 
inter-relationships and actor agency. Rhetorical strategy of formal structure is 
used as vehicle to introduce real issue of trust in CEO and collective decision 
making (as per charity law). 
(a) We get a picture of how the Board seeks to resist a role of a 
governance committee and how individuals use tactics to assert their 
position of knowledge, discrete legitimacy and narratives that subtly 
suggest conflicts of interest resulting in poor recommendations being 
made.   
(b) As time goes by without resolution we experience the ‘temperature’ 
go up and challenges become more personalised until at the very last 
moment a departing trustee questions the personal integrity of the 
CEO.   
(c) We see how the CEO uses tactics of personal relationships, role 
definition, timetabling of work and simply not responding as strategies 
to resist or defend against such challenges.   Is something as simple 
as their ability to ‘wait-out’ the Trustees their biggest power-resource 
after all?  
(d) Finally, through the evolving state of the governance structure we get 
an appreciation of how alignment to different logics plays out in a 
structural conversation and how nuances of the governance structure 
can be used to facilitate activities that align to one logic over another.  
As an example, we see the activity being planned to reduce a power 
resource of Group Y thus making them less able to hold the Board 
accountable to delivering to the social agenda and therefore I posit 
give more freedom to embrace commercial logic without censor.  
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Musing 10 
Musing (Nov 16) As I was finalizing the draft of this chapter I came 
across a news broadcast. Whilst I am not suggesting that the focal 
organisation has the potential to cause a war on the size of the Iraq war I 
was drawn to Chilcots reference to the power of advocacy:  
 ‘the former Labour Prime Minister’s ‘sheer psychological dominance’ 
of his Cabinet meant that few ministers challenged him …Chilcot was 
asked if trust in politics had been corroded …He replied: ‘I think when 
a government or the leader of a government presents a case with all 
the powers of advocacy that he or she can command, and in doing 
so goes beyond what the facts of the case and the basic analysis of 
that can support, then it does damage politics, yes.’ Chilcot added 
that he ‘can only imagine’ it would take a long time to repair trust. 
(Huffpost UK, 2016) 
The acknowledgement of the power of advocacy of an elite actor resonated 
with me and I returned to the interview of L who described why the CEO 
sought trustee status which was I suggest as a vehicle through which to 
advocate a particular course of action. ‘The number one…the internal 
logic, which wasn’t the external logic…was so that that trustee [CEO] 
could have a vote and could…if things were delicately balanced would have 
a vote and that some Trustees would be highly influenced by the way in 
which that person voted.  So, sheep Trustees … are going to wait and see 
how the chair of the Board votes and wait and see how the CEO votes and 
we'll vote according to that because they want to be seen to be good, 
sporting Trustees’ [L]  
The parallel between the Chilcot and the interviewee accounts is that by 
definition of their role, elite actors can advocate particular outcomes.  
(1) A sub group of the Trustees is implying that the CEO is using his 
voting rights as a way of advocating outcomes, additionally they [CEO] is 
using informal relationships (with committee members) to sponsor and 
promote  
(2) Interview L is confirming that the CEO values having trustee status 
and therefore voting rights for its utility in backing, sponsoring, 
promoting or opposing outcomes 
Does this suggest an inherent conflict of interest in the CEO having voting 
rights – possibly.  Does the materialisation of said conflict require the 
interplay of intentions -  almost definitely in my view.  
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
8.1 Introduction  
The research question guiding this study asked how organisational 
actors deal with the presence of organisational hybridity (multiple institutional 
logics) and what implications this has for the nature of the organisation - 
structurally, politically, symbolically and rhetorically. Through the research, I 
found a complex, inter-related, diachronic, often messy picture of institutional 
work than that typically presented in institutional literature, which paints a rather 
binary, linear, rational and conscious picture of both actors and change 
(Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001; Suddaby & Hinings, 
2002Thorton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012; Gawer & Phillips, 2013)  
 Grounded in the analysis and interpretation of the data presented in 
chapters 4-7, I suggest here that two categories of internally focussed work are 
central to institutional work in the focal hybrid organisation. First, work 
undertaken by senior managers to encourage other actors to identify with a 
preferred logic (commercial/public good) but within the existing organisation 
mission, which I term Identification Work. Second, work undertaken by 
organisational actors to promote adoption of practices that are congruent with 
their preferred logic by other actors, which I term Practice Work.   I found that 
such work is undertaken over time, is mutually reinforcing and often 
overlapping.  The forms of work and their inter-relationships are illustrated in the 
diagram presented in Figure 19 on the next page   and then unpacked 
throughout this chapter. Throughout, I will emphasise how these findings 
challenge and extend current theorisations of institutional work in hybrid 
organisations.   
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Figure 19:  Categories of internally focussed institutional work within the focal hybrid organisation 
 
Perspective
Internal
Category
Identification4work
Work%undertaken%by%senior%
managers%to%get%other%actors%to%
identify%with%a%preferred%logic%
(Commercial%/%social)%%but%within%
the%existing%mission%
Rhetoric4work
[Euphemistic4Discourse]
Structural4work
[Politics%and%power]
Ideational4work
[Legitimising]
Use4of4Nestling
Use4of4decoupling
Use4of4informal4power
Use4of4bridging4narrative
Use4of4external4referents4as4
a4legitimising4resource
Use4of4power4distance Building4a4collective4identity4
Activities4of4work Desired4outcome
Practice4work4
Work%undertaken%by%organisational%
actors%to%encourage%adoption%of%
practices%that%are%congruent%with%
their%preferred%logic%by%other%
actors
Rhetoric4work4
Structural4work
Use4of4corporate4planning4
Use4of4Myths
Use4of4hiring4strategies
Use4of4external4referents4as4
a4power4resource4
Diffusing4the4collective4identity4
Use4of4incentivisation
Use4of4terms4of4reference4
and4job4descriptions
Use4of4symbolic4order4
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8.2 Identification work  
 Identification work refers to institutional work undertaken by senior 
managers of the focal organisation to encourage individual actors to identify 
with a given logic (namely commercial or public good). Such work takes place 
at an ideological level and aims to ensure widespread acceptance of a system 
of ideas and ideals within the prevailing mission of the organisation, which 
might normatively appear contradictory or illegitimate. The intent of identification 
work differs from Gawer and Phillips’s (2013) ‘identity work’ in that their 
emphasis is on activities carried out to change actor’s perceptions of the 
organisation’s identity from one ‘type’ of organisation to another. Indeed, 
accounts of institutional work which attempt to shift organisations or 
organisational actors from one prevailing logic, identity or purpose to another 
are relatively commonplace within the literature (Coburn, 2004; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Battilana & Dorado, 2010;  Turco, 
2012; Gawer & Phillips, 2013). Scant attention, however, has been given to the 
types of work concerned with influencing actors’ acceptance of a new frame of 
ideas and ideals (or logic) within an existing and prevailing organisational 
mission. In addressing this neglect, this study offers a rare longitudinal account 
of the processes used to encourage actors to gain ideological allegiance to an 
alternative (commercial) logic, and subsequently think and behave in ways that 
are congruent with that logic, through legitimating its appropriateness within the 
prevailing public good mission of the organisation. Specifically, as elite actors in 
the focal organisation aimed to increase its commercial success, they 
attempted to convince other organisational actors to accept a commercial logic 
as legitimate within the prevailing context of being a public good organisation 
governed by charter status and charity law.  
 I developed three sub-categories of identification work from my analysis: 
(1) rhetorical; (2) structural work and; (3) ideational work, which are now 
discussed in turn. 
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8.2.1 Rhetorical work  
 Rhetorical work involved the elite actors within the focal organisation 
developing a euphemistic discourse (Turco, 2012) to persuade actors to identify 
with their proffered logic. Euphemistic discourses are those which are used to 
make messages inoffensive to their audience. At the ideological level, I interpret 
elite actors as consciously using euphemistic rhetoric as an identification 
resource. Specifically, the rhetoric ‘we make money to do more things/ 
further the institute…’ features as a process through which staff are 
encouraged to accept (and identify with) the creation of profit as a legitimate 
goal for the organisation.   I make three core observations regarding the use of 
euphemistic rhetoric at the identification level: (1) elite actors gave protection to 
an existing symbolic order to provide an underlying structure of meaning (2) the 
use of a nestling strategy enabled new ideas to be fitted to prevailing normative 
scripts thus giving them moral legitimacy; (3) the evolution of an existing 
discourse was used to create a bridging narrative. 
(a) Protecting the existing symbolic order.  Like many of those I interviewed 
(see chapter 4), when I first joined the organisation, I was inducted into a 
symbolic order that prioritised public good (under leadership of CEO 1) with 
an accompanying ‘we make money to do more public good’ rhetoric. 
Within this narrative, making money was purposeful but only as ‘oxygen’ for 
the organisation’s survival and not as an end in and of itself (refer to p.57-
58). The conditions of public good were explicit (helping individuals and 
organisations in the profession, representing the profession and delivering 
improved methods).  A notably abbreviated version of this phrase is still 
prevalent today ‘we make money to do more stuff/for the further benefit 
of the institute’ (see pages 59-60).  Critically, the statement has retained 
the opening ‘we make money to do…’ which has a high degree of 
acceptance with long standing internal actors inducted under the narrative of 
CEO 1 in that money is positioned as a purposeful resource.  However, the 
narrative has reduced the major premise (Green, Yuan, & Nohria, 2009, p. 
25) that defines the use the money is put to, namely to achieve public good 
as defined by the charter objectives. Today, the end of the strap line either 
provides an opaque, unspecified account of what represents ‘good use’ or 
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‘more stuff’ or moves the focus to being in the service of the instituteitself 
rather than the profession it serves. Furthermore, by removing the link to the 
charter, the purpose for which funds are generated becomes eroded, 
enabling space for a new ‘purpose’ narrative (of making money) to be 
developed. See, for example, the interviewee accounts in chapter 4 p.61 
which suggest that the maximisation of net financial return has become the 
main end game in the organisation. 
(b) Use of a nestling strategy. Elite actors then capitalised on the space they 
had created by the absence of specified ‘public good’ through nestling new 
ideas, such as profit sharing, (see chapter 6) which would likely be received 
as offensive by individuals connected to a public good logic.  In other words, 
if the commerciality of the ‘stuff’/’good uses’ was explicit, those 
organizatonal actors who identify with a public good logic may find the 
message offensive, self-serving and thus illegitimate within the context of a 
charity/chartered organisation. However, in a context where ‘the further 
benefit of the institute’ has become a legitimized end goal, profit sharing 
becomes naturalized and uncontroversial. Arguably it is more likely to be 
accepted as (morally) legitimate:  
‘it is fundamentally wrong for the organisation to be making 
significant profits and not distributing some of this back to 
staff’ (email, 22 July 2015 – see page 115)  
(c) Evolution of an existing discourse. Potentially a benefit of introducing 
vagueness into exactly what constitutes ‘more stuff’, ‘good use’ or ‘further 
the institute’ is that it allows for development of a bridging narrative. 
Battilana and Dorado (2010, p. 1420) promote a logics combination 
approach whereby a common belief e.g. ‘we make money to further 
the institute’ is developed.  The purpose of the bridging narrative is to strike 
a balance with the intent of preventing subgroups and schisms coalescing 
around the competing logics within the organisation.  In this way, institutional 
action is enabled (Green, Yuan, & Nohria, 2009) as actors from the 
divergent public good and commercial perspectives can imbue the message 
with cognitive meaning for themselves:   
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 ‘money is our oxygen, that we have to make money to 
survive and create a surplus to do more things in order to 
be able to deliver public good. [CEO1] 
‘I see it as a charity that needs to generate income to 
deliver its core purpose’’ [H] 
 ‘We are a not for profit organisation…. the benefit of being 
not-for-profit is we don't have shareholders.  We don't have 
partners in a consultancy.  We don't have an individual 
owner, who is trying bankroll his villa in wherever.  So, we 
don't have those individuals as such, so therefore what 
we're doing is we are providing, you know, the money we 
make, we can put to good use….’ [D] 
 ‘As long as that money is used for the further benefit of the 
Instituteand the resources we can offer then that's great’ [I] 
‘We're a not-for-profit organisation…. Now that doesn't 
mean we don't need to make the money to do things with 
that money.  So, are we commercial?  Of course, we're 
commercial, and I don't think there's anything wrong with 
being commercial’ [D] 
‘Increasing profits although required for pension liabilities 
and growth investment, should morally go to staff making 
the growth….’ [extract from proposal for amendment of pay 
and reward policy – July 17]  
‘as long as we make sure we’re selling, we’ll be doing the 
charity work; that’ll happen….’ [C] 
In addition to using euphemistic discourse, arguable to make the commercial 
message palatable to some stakeholders, rhetoric also involved catastrophizing 
– creating a causal relationship and sense of danger to encourage acceptance 
of the need to become more commercial. For example, elite actors 
communicated a sense of urgency and danger, with the organisation facing 
‘significant challenges with the continuing effect of global economic downturn’. 
(Focal Organisation, 2013), the answer to meeting these challenges being 
presented as being ‘more professional, big business-like, and money-making 
activity’ which linked to the ideology work (see chapter 7 pages 146-148 for 
detail).  
In summary, rhetorical work undertaken by the focal organisation’s elite 
used an approach that looked to build on an existing narrative ‘we make money 
to further the institute’ and through euphemistic discourse (Turco, 2012) 
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introduced softened innocuous and transferable phrases whilst at the same 
time, creating a sense of urgency of the need to adopt new practices to ensure 
reduce the imminent threat to the organisation. In making this observation, this 
study contributes to the understanding of how rhetorical work is used within a 
hybrid organisation.  Specifically, it: 
(a) Identifies the elements of rhetorical processes that took place over 
time in the focal organisation, as depicted in the following figure (20).  
 
Figure 20:  Process of rhetoric transformation at the identification level  
 
 
(b) Builds on Turco’s (2012)  study by providing an example of how 
euphemistic discourse was used by elite actors to reduce discomfort 
(of the money-making agenda) and aid adoption of a new logic as 
opposed to the case in Turco’s ethnographic study of Motherhood, 
Inc. where internal discourse was used by employees to defend 
against a change of logic 
Protect 
• Protecting enduring symboloic rhetoric. 
• 'we make money to do more things to achive public good 
as defined by the Charter'
Reduce 
• Create a discourse gap
• Remove critical discriptors
• 'we make money to do more things'
Introduce
• Introduce ambuigity 
• Reduce discomfort through euthamistic discource
• 'We make money to further the institute'
Redefine
• Redifine/introduce new criteria which is deemed to further  the 
institute
• 'it is fundamentally wrong for the organisation to be 
making significant profits and not distributing some of 
this back to staff'
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(c) Builds on Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) study by showing how an 
established hybrid (as opposed to a newly created hybrid in Battilana 
and Dorado’s study), could create a bridging narrative accessible to 
constituents of both the public good and the commercial logic.  
Notably it was the absence of clear descriptors of the use of the 
money made that became the bridging narrative.  In this way, 
individual actors could legitimise the reason for making money 
against their specific logic.  
8.2.2  Structual work  
Structural work is the second form of identification work. It refers to work 
undertaken by elite actors to change the structure of the organisation 
(committees, governance and entity structures) to privilege those structures that 
align to a specific logic. Such structural work is contained at the ideological level 
with the purpose of gaining widespread acceptance of a system of ideas and 
ideals, which might normatively appear contradictory or illegitimate within the 
prevailing mission of the organisation. I elaborated two sub-categories of 
structural work taking place within the context of this study namely: decoupling 
‘charity’ from ‘everyday business’ and; power work (formal and informal) which I 
discuss in further detail below.  
(a) Decoupling ‘charity’ from ‘everyday business’. Decoupling is a structural 
process through which an organisation takes on several distinct forms and in 
doing so projects legitimacy to stakeholders (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 972).  
In the context of this study, the focal organisation (which is a charity by legal 
form) created a sub-charity (Foundation).  Additionally, it was agreed that 
the focal organisation would donate a percentage of its annual profits to the 
foundation annually. Through the creation of the sub-charity (Foundation), 
which has branding, financial systems, charity reference, staff and 
governance structure separate to the main focal organisation actors sought 
to separate out, or decouple, ‘charity’ from core business; positioning it as 
an activity rather than the core being of the organisation. I note two 
outcomes of this structure within the organisation.   
i. Charity is narrated as being ‘a small part of what we do’ and not 
something we are.  Arguably therefore, only those staff who are 
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directly involved/employed with the Foundation should behave in a 
way that aligns with a public good logic and others are expected to 
behave differently (or corporately)  
ii. Through the funding mechanism elite actors are using the annual 
donation of money to the Foundation as a mechanism to legitimate 
commercial activity and refute claims from internal constituents of 
being ‘too commercial’.  I suggest that this supports the bridging 
narrative previously discussed as an example of the ‘good stuff’ that 
we can do because of being commercial.  
Furthermore, I observed that the structure of parent organisation and 
philanthropic Foundation is one that aligns with commercial organisations 
and not one typically seen within a charity. Arguably, there is no need for a 
charity to own and operate another charity serving the same profession.   
That is not to say that ‘charity’ is not valued by the ‘business’, but that 
it seems to be valued and utilised for certain commercially focused reasons. 
For example, the ‘tax exemption benefits’ are readily acknowledged as a 
benefit, as is the ability to differentiate the organisation from ‘charlatans’ and 
other ‘check-book’ (money orientated) institutions (see page 96). Within this 
context, I experience ‘charity’ as being used as a Trojan Horse (Pache & 
Santos, 2013) selectively coupled with other activity to give it higher moral 
status as the organisation competes with other ‘commercial’ organisations 
(see chapter 4, page 71-73). This creates something of a paradox in that 
whilst elite actors aligned to the commercial logic use structure to side-line 
and reduce the level of influence and presence of ‘charity’ [Foundation], they 
simultaneously recognise its value to differentiate the organisation in 
commercial conversations. This suggests that it is something that is valued 
for its moral legitimacy to specific audiences, but for the purposes of 
competitive advantage.  
(b) Structure as a power resource.  Through this study, I got an 
understanding of the power work carried out by elite actors to maintain their 
dominance.  Drawing on the three critical incidents I identified four activities 
of power work undertaken, which I now discuss in turn. 
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i. First, the CEO responded through a change of governance structure 
to diminish the threat of substitution.  For example, this was achieved 
though the reduction of the number of other actors who could hold the 
CEO accountable for their performance and who could control the 
CEO’s use of resources.  See chapter 7 – Governance Setting and 
specifically table 17 (page 145)  and figures 17 and 18 (pp 146-147) 
for an overview of the nature of the structure changes.  
ii. Second, the Board of Trustees responded to the CEO’s desire to 
diminish their control by asserting their control.  For example, this 
was achieved through the introduction of a new sub-committee 
responsible for financial and audit oversight. 
iii. Third, the CEO sought to develop and utilise informal power 
relationships when under threat. For example, I discussed in the 
incident relating to bonus setting (see chapter 6) how the Chairman of 
the Board unilaterally approved the CEO’s proposal.  At an 
ideological and governance level this action was challengeable as it 
was outside the scope of the role in that the Chair was acting as an 
independent privileged voice rather than as part of the collective 
trustee group. I posit that this approval was sought as the CEO knew 
that the proposal would face challenge if it went to the full Board.  
iv. And finally, the CEO sought to use informal power to assert his 
influence.   For example, I turn to the interview notes of an 
organisational actor involved in the application for the CEO to 
become a trustee:  
‘So, sheep Trustees or the jackal Trustees… the 
sheep Trustees are going to wait and see how the 
chair of the Board votes and wait and see how the 
CEO votes and will vote accordingly to that because 
they want to be seen to be good supporting 
Trustees…’ [see page 150] 
The meaning I took from their narrative was that their desire for the 
CEO to become a trustee was in part based on an intended outcome 
of managing the trustee group through informal power, specifically 
through the CEO using the action of voting to indicate to the Trustees 
how they should respond. 
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In summary, I propose that elite actors instrumentally used structure and 
power to transform and defend their logic position.  This study therefore 
contributes to a better understanding of the nature of structural work at a micro 
level within a hybrid organisation. Specifically, it:  
i. Identifies how decoupled structures were used to signal 
desirable behaviours within different areas of the focal 
organisation.  I posit that this study builds on Skelcher and Rathgeb 
Smith’s (2014) suggestion that strategies are used by non-profit 
hybrids to enable them to manage the relationship between two 
logics.  In their paper ‘Theorizng hybridity’ they  categorised logics in 
segmented hybrids as being comparmentalised by units but 
remaining within one organisation.  This differers from segregated 
hybrid organisation where the different logics were more  isolated 
from each other by virtute of being located within distinct  but 
interconnected organisations.  In the context of the focal organisation 
I observed a formal segregated structure with isolated brand, staff 
and governance.  However, through selective coupling (see next 
point) it was also used to reinforce organisational rhetoric.     
ii. Identifies the nature of selective coupling.  I experienced the focal 
organisation as selectively coupling the public good logic with the 
commercial logics in two ways.  The first is to reinforce the 
organisational rhetoric – ‘we make money to do stuff’.  I propose that 
by using the Foundation as an example of the ‘stuff’ for which money 
is made, elite actors sought to reassure those aligned to the public 
good logic and legitimate money making. The second is by selectively 
coupling charity activity with other activity to give it higher moral 
status as the organisation competes with other ‘commercial’ 
organisations (see chapter 4).  In this context, I perceive ‘charity’ as 
being used as a Trojan Horse in a similar manner as that identified by 
Pache and Santos (2013, p. 2).  In their study, Pache and Santos 
propose that when lacking legitimacy in each field, hybrids use a 
Trojan horse strategy.   Through this strategy organisations 
selectively couple various templates in which they are embedded in 
order to gain acceptance in a field where they have low legitimacy. In 
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doing so Pache and Santos report organisations can combine logics 
to create a competitive advantage  
iii. Identifies how structure is used as a power resource.  Through 
this study I provide explicit examples of micro-processes that were 
used with political effect to influence others and or exert control. For 
example, I discussed how elite actors sought to maintain and 
transform   governance structures, committee purposes, voting rights, 
and informal relationships in ways that enhanced their status.  This 
resonates with Currie et al.’s in depth case-study (2012), which 
discussed the work carried out by elite medical professionals to 
maintain professional dominance in the face of external threats to 
their privileged position. Examples in their study included activities 
such as delegating routine tasks and maintaining existing resources 
and control arrangements which I equate with the delegation of 
representational activities to a membership representational group 
which reduced the power of a previously elite group (see chapter 7 
page 168) and, the establishment of a financial oversight committee 
as the Trustees sought to maintain control and the CEO becoming a 
trustee which was arguable was a strategy by the  CEO’s to maintain 
control.     
8.2.3  Ideational work 
Ideational work is the third and final form of identification work. It refers to 
institutional work aimed at the creation of alternative ways of thinking through 
the specification of abstract categories and elaboration of chains of cause and 
effect (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Currie , Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 
2012).  Creating alternative ideals that reflect a logic change is not enough 
(Gawer & Phillips, 2013), organisational members must be convinced that the 
new ideal is appropriate and this is the role of ideational work.   Ideational work 
therefore is undertaken to encourage other actors to accept as legitimate the 
ideas and beliefs of a specific logic.   I now summarise the two sub-categories 
of ideational work within the context of this study, namely recruitment and use 
of external independent experts, in turn.   
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(a) Recruitment.  In chapter 7 I discussed how much change was attributed to 
a new CEO who had a ‘completely different ideology’; one that needed more 
formality and ‘a whole lot more professionalism’:  
‘suddenly the pace quickened… Mainly [due to] getting into the 
corporate market [because of] the new CEO having a 
completely different ideology.  And that was… the market that 
he understood... And I think as the business grew, you know, 
there was...there was greater need for more formality in how 
we did things around here and a whole lot more professional.   
…CEO 1 (The previous CEO) didn't find the need to change, 
but of course the organisation was a lot smaller then.  
Everything was running centrally anyway.  I think mostly to do 
with the fact that [the current CEO3] wanted... cover's the 
wrong word but it's the only word I can think of…. [that] he had 
a body a people to go to and turn to. I think [he] certainly 
wanted a higher calibre of people on the Board. I mean, don’t 
forget Carole, we went from a trustee of 40-odd people, and the 
majority of these were voted on by the members from their 
branches.  We kind of inherited them as they were voted on by 
members who we represent. So, from that perspective you are 
only getting [reference to profession removed] type of people. 
Whereas [current CEO’s] approach was to select people who 
are more rounded and are more business people I think. You 
know, so you’ve got Big business people.’    [G] 
 
Contained within this narrative is a theorisation that ‘big business people’ 
represent a ‘better’ type of person (more rounded, more business-like, more 
professional) and that big business people would make the organisation grow 
and be less ‘dysfunctional’.  From this theorisation, the CEO was able to 
influence the future governance and organisational structure making it 
become ‘more like a conventional business’.  
I suggest that underpinning the CEO’s theorisation was an assumption of 
logics as being rationally bound (Friedland & Alford, 1991),  and  actors as 
being cultural dopes (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) and logic carriers (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996; Zilber, 2002), able to represent and import into an 
organisation the meaning and norms of logics to which they have been 
primarily exposed -  in this case ‘big business’  (Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih , Micellotta E, & Lounsby, 2011). By surrounding themselves with 
individuals who brought to the decision-making process similar 
interpretations the CEO looked to reduce challenges, reduce the likelihood of 
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disparate ideological coalitions emerging and signal to other actors that this 
world view (commercial logic) was legitimate.    
(b) Use of external experts.  In the critical incident ‘The Governance Setting’ 
(see chapter 7) I described how the organisation made active use of other 
professionals outside of the organisation who were relatively powerful within 
their governance consultancy and best practice sphere.  Within this incident, 
I reported how the focal organisation co-opted these external experts to 
engage in institutional work aimed as transformation of the governance 
structure.  For example, see page 149 for an interview excerpt where an 
institutional actor descried how they used a ‘well-respected, independent 
expert’ to further legitimate the need to change prevailing institutionalised 
models and structures.  This was achieved through the provision of technical 
validation and justification to the CEO’s theorisation that the current 
structure was ‘dysfunctional’ which gave a pragmatic legitimacy (Suddaby & 
Hinings, 2002) to the new CEO’s abstract concept of ‘big business’.   
In summary through the incidents I provide tacit examples of how elite 
actors sought to firstly de-institutionalise existing ideologies and promote 
commercial logics through the abstract concept of ‘big business’, theorised 
as legitimate and pragmatic thorough ‘external experts’ and endorsed 
through new elite actors.  Rather than a single linear process shifting from 
one steady state (logic) to another, I observed several similar events 
occurring in tandem and creating arenas of contradiction in the underpinning 
ideals of the organisation.   
I posit that it is the interplay of these events that has significant 
implications for the focal organisation and for our theorisation of change within 
hybrid organisations.  For example, Trustee 2 presenting the ideals of Charity 
as the organisation’s reason for being and the CEO presenting the benefits that 
being a charity brings to financial/commercial endeavours. As such, the two 
logics were often contradictory and contested. The interplay often resulted in 
interruptions to discourse around organising principles and control of work 
which made decision-making inefficient and often warlike (Kerr, 1963) as 
opposing coalitions aligned to commercial and public good logics formed. See 
figure 21 below for a depiction of the interplay of intentions  
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Figure 21: Interpretation of the stages of ideational change at the focal organisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This above theorisation is problematic for and extends current 
understandings of the nature of change in hybrids, undermining the 
presentation of institutions as being organised around a shared practical 
understanding, sets of material practices and symbolic systems (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001; Greenwood, 
Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Lok, 2010; Thorton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).  
Whilst the findings of this research offer support to the idea of agentic actors, 
able to activley mediate and manipulte lgoics (Coburn, 2004), it undermines the 
linear shift from one logic/steady state to another depicted by current 
theorisations (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990; Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1996; Gawer & Phillips, 2013.  Also see chapter 2, pages 16 -17 for 
further discussion on this issue).  
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8.3 Practice work 
In this section I discuss how organisational actors used institutional work 
to promote adoption of practices and behaviours that are congruent with 
specific logics among other actors. Such work takes place at the level of 
policies, procedures, processes and systems and aims to diffuse the system of 
collective ideas and ideals through rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning.  To 
put it another way, it is the work undertaken to develop, implement and 
encourage adoption of practices that reinforce the dominant logic as useful, 
meaningful and legitimate (Gawer & Phillips, 2013, p. 1054).  Specifically, within 
the context of this study it relates to the work undertaken to align practices to 
the new emerging commercial logic and to defend and retain practices aligned 
to the institutionalised public good logic. I developed two sub-categories of 
practice work from my analysis: rhetoric and structural work which are now 
discussed in turn.  
8.3.1  Rhetorical practice work  
  Much time and effort was spent internally by senior managers through 
spoken and written word to influence the adoption of new commercial practices.  
I interpret these activities as seeking to influence the level of intensity of actors’ 
connectedness to new practices (through frequent exposure to messaging that 
reinforces particular logics) and, the degree of pervasiveness of new practices 
(through the degree to which actors were connected to sets of messages in 
multiple, interlocking and overlapping ways) (Coburn, 2004).  
 Specifically, I experienced practices relating to the commercial logic were 
messaged and reinforced in the following ways: 
(a) Corporate planning: Activity was undertaken to clarify how new practices 
fit with the overall objectives and a new plan and set of objectives were 
published every year as an outcome of the strategy setting process.  Key 
performance indicators included commercial logic, globalisation, creating 
critical mass and a ‘financial war-chest’ but failed to define what public good 
might look like and was absent of any public good measures.  Such was the 
presence of commercial measures of success that the strategy was 
experienced as being about ‘maximising net financial return and make that 
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as much as we can’ as this was the only measure ‘recognised by the boss’. 
[G – page 66].  
(b) Town hall meetings: Quarterly ‘town-hall’ meetings were implemented to 
report on progress against objectives and these supplemented the 
circulation of monthly financial reports to all staff.   
(c) Bonus scheme:  A rhetoric around the ‘moral right’ of staff to share in the 
success of the organisation underpinned the new bonus scheme’ (see 
chapter 6 – the bonus setting pages 123 and 189) 
(d) CEO sponsored ‘corrective’ activities: High profile CEO task-forces were 
set up in areas where performance was not as expected. These were 
sponsored by the CEO to give them an ‘elite status’ and often resulted in 
resources being redirected to the task-force and away from other activity. 
 That is not to say however that the commercial rhetoric was uncontested. 
A notable example was the interplay between two elite actors where one 
actor positioned themselves as the ‘protector’ of the public good, ‘defending’ 
against commerciality and conflict of interest (see chapter 5 Public Good vs 
Commercial for in-depth summary). The ‘defender made use of:  
i. Moral authority: Within this incident, the ‘defender’ of the public 
good positioned themselves as the moral authority, unique to all other 
elite actors as they were the ‘only one with a public good mandate 
and as such the only one with such a ‘terrifying’ and difficult role.  
ii. Expert authority: they made use of external referents (consultants, 
audit outcomes and independent regulatory experts) to reinforce and 
legitimate their authority, expertise and significance. Training was 
implemented to reinforce the complexity of their role and a regulatory 
audit was given high profile in a way that draw attention to the 
importance of the activity and to the technical competency of the 
team responsible for the activity.  
iii. Catastrophizing:  Furthermore, an internal myth ‘I will go to prison in 
the event of a regulatory breach’ was created and perpetuated across 
the organisation.  This myth acted as a powerful discursive resource 
used to signal a higher moral purpose for the individual, their team 
and activity than the commercial activity. With this expert authority 
and morally superior position asserted it was used as a power 
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resource to counterbalance, disrupt, dismiss and ridicule commercial 
activity as inappropriate, lacking in integrity and damaging to the 
public good logic.    
In response, however, the way that the ‘defenders’ messages were 
received by other internal actors was interesting.  For example, I experienced 
the strategy and associated documents (budgets, project plans, performance 
indicators) acting as normative pressure (Scott W. , 2001), putting forward ideas 
about what internal actors should do specifically about business growth and 
making money. In contrast, I experienced the messages given by ‘the defender’ 
as using rule setting, monitoring and threat of sanctions as pressures to behave 
in certain ways, specifically around standards, integrity and professionalism.  As 
such the messages felt regulatory in nature and thus less voluntary and more 
mandated.  In making this observation I am reminded of Coburn’s study (2004) 
of teachers and the classroom which reported that actors (teachers) were: ‘far 
more likely’ to connect to normative than regulative pressures; less likely to 
adopt regulatory pressures and, less likely to make consequential changes to 
existing practices because of regulatory pressures.  Additionally, when faced 
with regulatory pressures, actors were more likely to respond by de-coupling 
new practices from existing ones to give a perception that they are conforming 
but without seriously attempting to implement new practices (Scott, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1997; Coburn, 2004; Cooney, 2006).   
I suggest that Coburn’s presentation of lack of connectedness and 
adoption of new practices driven through regulatory pressures resonates with 
the actions of the other actor in this incident.  For example, they reflected public 
good as a hindrance to ‘money-making’ but suggested that the public good 
drivers were temporal and only for ‘the time being’ as it met current need (see 
chapter 5 – data sharing pages 97 -103).  Additionally, they alluded to a 
strategy of segregation to enable them to continue to ‘do business’.  
‘The risk is that we end up portraying a fairly fragmented 
image of what our total capability is because there are bits 
of it that we can only talk to a certain audience about and 
there are other bits that we clearly can't talk to any part of 
the student audience about it’ [lines B172-B178] 
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Another example of how discourse was used to resist new practices is 
located in the critical incident around bonus setting (see chapter 6).  In this 
incident, the CEO was driving a proposal for a change to the bonus structure 
which had an underpinning discourse around creating an ‘ethos of sharing 
success’.  Concerned that the proposal being developed was not true to the 
given message of ‘sharing success’ but would instead create ‘a culture of 
elitism’ (in that the executives would receive a considerably bigger bonus than 
other staff) a staff member challenge the CEO using the CEO’s stated 
discourse of ‘sharing success’ to resist the proposed practice.   
‘When we first spoke about this, you clearly advised me that you 
wanted to introduce a scheme in which all staff get to share in the 
financial success of the Organisation. …. You felt that the current 
staff bonus scheme does not drive this ethos of sharing 
success… As part of my remit I feel that it’s important to make you 
aware that, under this proposed new arrangement, c£164k of 
profits go to 8 individuals in this Organisation and the remainder of 
the workforce would not really see any tangible benefit from this 
new scheme... I believe that we have strayed from your original 
intention …. I believe that ‘sharing success’ is a great message. 
However, I do not believe that the proposed arrangement as it 
currently stands will achieve this objective… I am concerned that 
repercussions for the Organisation could be both long term and 
serious and may ultimately affect the credibility of senior 
management.’ (Focal Organisation, 2015).   
The ability for rhetoric to be turned against logic change was the subject 
of a paper by Turco (Difficult decoupling: employee resistence to the 
commercialization of personal settings, 2012) which discussed the ability for 
actors to resist and undermine commercialization strategies.  Specifically, in the 
context of the case study organisation (Motherhood Inc.) Turco reported how, 
actors can ‘turn-around’ and use espoused messages to resist new practices 
when they experienced a lack of congruence between espoused message and 
enacted actions of a commercialisation strategy. This is how I experienced this 
response from the internal actor in the focal organisation 
 In summary, through the incidents, I provided examples of the nature of 
rhetorical practice work within the focal organisation. I experienced an intensity 
of rhetoric reinforcing the desired behaviours and asserting the causal links 
between activity and money-making in a way that related to and reinforced the 
identification ‘we make money to further the institute’ message.   A strategy of 
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catastrophizing and creating a sense of danger was used to promote pragmatic 
adoption of practices – with the CEO creating a need to meet the ‘significant 
economic challenges ahead’ and moral adoption of practices through a myth of 
personal risk.  As with identification work at the ideological level, independent 
experts were used at this practice level.  However, at the practice level they 
were used to legitimate practices (as opposed to ideas and ideals) and validate 
the technical competence of individuals and teams asserting the need for others 
to do as they say (as communicated in rule setting and threat of sanctions) to 
keep the organisation ‘safe’.  
 Challenges were made to rhetoric that did not appear congruent and I 
summarised an incident where a stated rhetoric was used to resist new 
practices that were perceived to lack congruence.  In making this observation I 
am aligning with Turco’s (2012) observation of how, actors can ‘use espoused 
messages to resist new practices when they experienced a lack of congruence 
between espoused message and enacted actions thus highlighting both the 
agentic nature of a relatively junior internal actor and the need to ensure 
congruence between messages and practices.    
 I noted with interest how messages that appeared to be regulatory (and 
thus involuntary) in nature were received at an almost superficial and temporary 
level and did not necessarily result in serious adoption of practices, indeed on 
occasion teams acknowledged how they worked to give a perception of 
conforming without seriously attempting to implement new practices (Scott, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1997; Coburn, 2004; Cooney, 2006).   
8.3.2  Structural practice work  
The second form of practice work refers to work undertaken by actors to 
align the structure of their sphere of influence (teams, jobs, committees) to a 
specific logic.  Examples of structural work during this study included: (1) uses 
of terms of reference and job descriptions; (2) hiring strategies and; (3) 
incentivisation strategies.  As previously, I will consider each one in turn.  
(a) Terms of reference (TORs): The focal organisation used terms of 
reference to define the purpose and structure of committees (e.g. 
governance), the task it is responsible for and the basis for making 
decisions.  I posit that the TORs were used to ensure adoption of practices 
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that were aligned to a logic.  For example, in 8.1.4 I discussed how the CEO 
looked to surround themselves with individuals who brought to the decision-
making process similar interpretations of priorities and outcomes. 
(b) Job descriptions.  At the individual job level, but in a similar way to TORs, 
the focal organisation used job descriptions to define the purpose and 
structure of a specific job role, its task responsibility and the basis for 
making decisions.  However, unlike the content of the governance terms of 
reference, which was facilitated by the organisation, whilst a central 
template was provided by the central HR team, the content authoring 
process of the job descriptions was decentralised.  For elite roles in that the 
job descriptions were written by individual role holders.   I suggest that an 
outcome of this authoring process was that job descriptions became an 
external expression of the individual author’s sense-making (logic) rather 
than a guiding frame for the role’s purpose. For example, I discussed in 
chapter 5 (Public Good vs Commercial) how two specific job descriptions 
(one aligned to a public good logic and one aligned to a commercial logic) 
approached the activity of product development with a different logic of 
developing standards and maximising profit and increasingly market 
penetration respectively.  Furthermore, these job descriptions were then 
used as if they were an independent guiding frameworks to legitimate and 
validate the behaviour of actors.   
(c) Recruitment.  Recruitment work within the focal organisation was 
influenced by the CEO’s abstract theorisation of ‘businesses people’ and the 
belief that by recruiting actors who previously worked in ‘big business’ it was 
possible to develop a collective commercial identity by surrounding 
themselves with individuals steeped in the commercial logic. For example, 
there was an instruction to develop a Board of ‘business people who knew 
what they were doing’ and this resulted in the trustee selection process 
being modified to prioritise individuals with a ‘business’ background as 
opposed to the previous process that prioritised individuals from the 
professional and / or with a not-for-profit background or with trustee 
experience.    
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In a similar fashion the recruitment practices of internal actors was 
orientated to attract business people.  New senior roles were created that 
were focused on sales activity and recruitment advertising practices were 
changed to move away from self-recruitment on the organisation website 
(and therefore likely to attract people who were searching this type of 
organisation) and use of not-for-profit recruitment agencies (such as TPP 
https://www.tpp.co.uk), to new recruitment agencies that had more of a 
commercial focus (such as Hays www.hays.co.uk and Odgers 
www.odgersberndtson.com/en-gb).  In the event this assumption did not 
prevent divergent coalitions and challenges to decision making occurring 
and there were notable examples of challenge from both elite Trustees 
(chapter 7) and relatively junior actors (chapter 6).    
I posit that using recruitment practices to build and maintain a collective 
identity has its limitations and recruiting for capability/expertise does not 
always have the desired impact of ensuring a similar decision making 
process and removing challenges.  My interpretation resonates with that of 
Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) study which found that using recruitment 
processes in isolation to build a collective identity is not enough.  In their 
study which explored how two hybrid micro-finance organisations developed 
and maintained their hybrid nature they reported that the ‘evidence suggests 
that crucial early levers for developing a collective identity amongst 
organisational members were hiring and socialisation polices.’  However, 
they also highlighted limitations in this approach.    In this comparative 
study, Battilana and Dorado reported on one organisation (BancoSol) using 
the approach of recruiting individuals from the different logics (finance and 
social) to represent the nature of both logics.  This approach appeared to fail 
in that despite the intention to blend the different perspectives (on 
organisational position), significant internal tensions emerged with those 
aligned to the social goal (accessibility to funding for disadvantaged) was 
prevented by the rules and procedures enforced by the technical team 
driven by the financial logic. The other organisation (Los Ande) instead 
recruited individuals without work experience and thus not steeped in either 
logic and thereafter used socialisation practices to teach and reinforce 
desired values of both logics.  Los Ande reported that acclimatising new 
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recruits into the organisation was easier than trying to frame the 
organisation’s work within existing logics.  This resulted in a recruitment 
practice that prioritised candidates socialise-ability and not capability citing 
the organisation’s ability to hire ‘people it can manage’ (p. 1429) as a key 
success factor. This study also highlighted the need for other socialisation 
practices to teach and reinforce the desired values and behaviours in hires.  
One such socialisation practice was that of incentivisation and this is the 
subject of the section below.  
(d) Incentivisation work. I position incentivisation work as work through which 
organisational actors seek to encourage desired outcomes and enable the 
diffusion of a collective identity.  I discussed in detail (see chapter 6) how 
CEO 3 implemented changes to move from a previous shared ‘thank you’ 
bonus to one that introduced several incentive plans which strengthened a 
power distance between the lowest and highest paid actors thus creating a 
‘culture of elitism’ which is typical within a commercial logic.  I posit that new 
incentive practices were implemented to persuade actors to engage in new 
money-making practices and imprint teach and reinforce desired values of 
money-making.   Such a belief I suggest aligns to a commercial logic of 
economic man (Doucouliagos, 1994, p. 877) and is an example of how the 
commercial ideology encompassing the ‘moral right’ to distribute profits to 
staff, is translated to a concrete practice of increased salaries, personal 
bonus, commission schemes and individual financial rewards for exceptional 
(commercial) activity.  
(e) Stimulating the need for change.  As previously discussed (see chapter & 
- the Governance setting) the focal organisation made use of independent 
external experts as message carriers.  Specifically, they carried out a review 
process which required the Trustees to complete quantitative surveys and 
the outcome of the review was fed back to the group in a way that said ‘what 
the problem is’’.   Through this process, the existing Trustees were managed 
into self-declaring a need for change in a manner that made the internal 
actors appear as passive facilitators of a process.  
(f) Innovating new governance practices:    In conjunction with presenting 
the outcomes of the self-assessment the independent experts gave some 
‘suggestions’ of ‘the solutions that might be considered’.  A review group 
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was set up to take the suggestions forward and develop the new practices 
and structure.   This group was made up of ‘enthusiastic volunteers as 
opposed to people who could actually contribute much to it’.   In putting the 
group together, internal actors were cognisant of the need to ensure a 
suggestion of impartiality and reduce the potential for challenges of 
manipulation and as such ‘didn’t try and engineer that group’.  
(g) Enrolling members to engage: Following the process above of ‘self-
diagnosing (the problem) and self-prescribing (the solution), the review 
group then started to build momentum of acceptance.  This occurred 
through the development of new terms of reference which were promoted 
and endorsed by the review group though a few activities such as meetings 
and targeted communication, and which culminated in an acceptance ‘vote’ 
for regulation changes.   What is interesting here is how by using external 
actors and ‘enthusiastic volunteers’, the internal actors were able to obtain 
the changes they desired in a benign and safe manner. 
(h) Contested structure.  Whilst initially the new structure and terms of 
reference appeared to be accepted by all, it was not long (approx. 10 
meetings) until the new governance structure began to contest elements of 
the new practices as they were not considered to be ‘good governance’.  I 
identified a specific challenge (see chapter 7 – Governance setting) where a  
new trustee (who became a trustee after the new practices were 
implemented) suggested that the current structure and terms of reference 
were designed to limit the powers of the Trustees (and thus increase powers 
of the CEO)  through the short tenureship of Trustees which enabled 
organisational actors to ‘wait out’ Trustees who did align to the same 
decision making process or hold similar interpretations of priorities and 
outcomes as the CEO. The process of contesting involved: 
i. Challenge to technical validity:  Citing personal experience and 
expertise in public good regulations and logic’s challenges were 
made to the structure in that it was not a ‘facet of good charity 
governance’ as such undermining the legitimacy of the structure.  
This challenge went so far as to insist that ‘external legal advice be 
obtained’ to confirm the legal remit of a governance group and the 
validity of its decision-making process.   
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ii. Challenge to moral legitimacy: alongside the technical challenge, 
a personal challenge was made to the CEO’s trustee status and 
ability to manage conflict of interests, amendments to the terms of 
reference for the CEO’s voting rights were requested and as such 
the ability for the CEO to influence other elite actors was limited by 
the very means that they had used to increase their influencing 
ability.    
iii. Catastrophizing: The case for ‘good charity governance’ was 
presented by several Trustees as necessary to meet their ‘personal 
responsibilities’.  A recent collapse of a charity (Kids Company) and 
the personal liability of the Trustees was cited as an example of 
‘what could go wrong’ if Trustees ‘took things at face value’ and 
ignored ‘good practice’.  I suggest that this statement coming after 
the challenge of poor practice was effective at building momentum 
for challenge by other Trustees.   
iv. Use of formal meeting records as message carriers:  Again as 
discussed in chapter 7, against a back-drop of end of trustee 
tenureship, Trustees mobilize the formal records of meeting and 
requests for actions.  In making statements and requesting actions 
(such as the implementation of clear roles for CEO voting, and 
obtaining legal validity of a structure) they were ensuring that the 
challenge continued in their absence. 
v. Counter-contest of challenge. The responses to the challenge to 
the structure were dismissed by elite actors who attempted to 
undermine the credibility of the change by discrediting the 
motivations of the individual (who had made the initial challenge) as 
being self-motivated by a desire to disrupt and sensationalise rather 
than to support and ensure that their trustee obligations were met.  
In summary, and through the incidents, I provide explicit examples of 
how organisational actors sought to bring in and resist new practices in their 
attempt to diffuse a new collective commercial identity.  I provided examples of 
how similar strategies (theorizing causal relationships, use of external referents 
to endorse technical legitimacy, use of rhetoric to reinforce ideas and ideals 
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(including catastrophizing and myths) and structure) were used at both the 
practice and identification levels.  Whilst at times boundaries between the two 
levels blurred, the intent behind practice work was not to create a collective 
identity, rather it was to use processes, incentivisation, sanctions and 
socialisation practices to reinforce a particular logic and through the intensity 
and persuasiveness of the multiple and interlocking messages contained within 
the practices sought to promote adoption of new practices and the desired 
collective identity.  
These findings echo findings on socialisation and practice adoption 
findings of  Battilana and Dorado  (2010), and studies into the relationship 
between changing ideas and changes to practices  (Turco, 2012, p. 231) and 
institutional work undertaken as logics shift (Gawer & Phillips, 2013).  I have a 
difficulty however accepting the representation of actors as entirely rational and 
conscious of activities and intents.  This is not how I always experienced the 
interplay. At times, I suspect that actors chose to disrupt or resit new practices 
from an individual perspective, motivated for example by a desire to maintain 
personal power, or just to enjoy a debate and conflict.  Whilst the interplay 
between rational actions and personal motivations provides for a rich research 
environment at an organisational level it created a war-like feel (Kerr, 1963), 
with areas of contraction, overt tension, challenge and power-plays with only 
symbolic adoption of practices.  Arguably this state reduces technical efficiency 
and ultimately prevents a collective identity from forming, leaving the 
organisation in a constant state of flux and internal conflict.  
8.3 Chapter summary 
 My research question asked how organisational actors dealt with the 
presence of multiple institutional logics, what implication it had for the nature of 
the organisation and the nature of institutional work undertaken.  I found that 
the focal organisation was a hybrid, attempting to combine a public good logic 
which places delivering to the charter objectives as the ‘end game’ and ‘money-
making’ as the ‘oxygen’ to fund public good aims with, a commercial logic  
placing money-making as legitimate in its own right positioning the public good 
agenda as the means to a money-making end.  I found two kinds of internal 
work were central to understanding how actors dealt with the presence of 
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multiple logics, namely Identification work – work undertaken by senior 
managers to encourage other actors to identify with a preferred logic within the 
existing organisation mission and; Practice Work - work undertaken by 
organisational actors to promote adoption of practices that are congruent with 
their preferred logic by other actors.  These forms of work interplayed in a way 
that was complex, inter-related, diachronic, often messy and inefficient with its 
competing and contradictory aims.  These forms of work and their relationship 
is illustrated in figure 22 below.  
 In making this depiction I seek to show the level of interplay at the levels 
of identification and practice work but also within the types of institutional work.   
Whilst I have drawn identification work at the top of this picture and practice 
work at the both I am not suggesting a sequential order, rather I interpreted 
them happening sometimes chaotically and at the same time, interdependently 
and overtime.  
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Figure 22: Forms of institutional work, their interplay and their interdependent relationships 
Rhetorical	work
Spoken	and	written	word	used	to	
persuade	actors	to	identify	with	their	
proffered	logic
Structural	work
Work	undertaken	by	elite	actors	to	
change	the	structure	of	the	
organisation	to	privilege	those	
structures	that	align	to	a	specific	logic
Ideational	work
Work	aimed	at	the	creation	of	
alternative	ways	of	thinking
Identification	work:	Work	undertaken	by	senior	managers	to	get	other	actors	to	identify	with	a	preferred	logic	(Commercial	/	social)		
but	within	the	existing	mission	
Practice	work	:		work	undertaken	to	influence	and	reinforce	actor’s	commitment	and	adoption	of	specific	logics.	Such	work	takes	place	at	
the	level	of	policies,	procedures,	processes	and	systems	and	aims	to	diffuse	the	system	of	collective	ideas	and	ideals	through	rule	setting,	
monitoring	and	sanctioning.	
Rhetorical	work:
Spoken	and	written	word	used	to	influence	
the	level	of	intensity	of	actors’	
connectedness	to	new	practices
Structural	work
Work	undertaken	by	actors	to	align	the	
structure	of	their	sphere	of	influence	(teams,	
jobs,	committees)	to	a	specific	logic.
Edging	strategy:	an	approach	to	logic	change	that	uses	subtle	and	apparently	benign	changes	that	eventually	break	down	previous	
boundaries	and	create	new	schematics	of	meaning	and	sense	making	at	the	ideological	and	practice	level.	
Interplay	&	
interruption		
Interplay	&	
interruption		
Interplay	&	
interruption		
Interplay	&	
interruption		
Interplay	&	
interruption		
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Chapter 9 Conclusion  
9.1  Introduction  
This concluding chapter builds on the preceding chapter (which 
encapsulated the main findings of the study) by defining its contributions to 
theory, methodology and practice.  Additionally, it outlines the strengths and 
limitations of this study and presents suggestions for further research into 
hybridity.  This chapter, and specifically the practice contribution, is supported 
by appendix 5 which is an executive report, providing an executive summary of 
the research and recommendations for the focal organisation. 
The research question guiding this study asked how organisational 
actors deal with the presence of organisational hybridity (multiple institutional 
logics) and explores the nature of institutional work undertaken to navigate and 
manipulate institutional logics and, who undertakes (and interrupts) such work. 
Through long-term participation in, direct observation of and purposeful 
conversations about the processes of institutional work this study contributes to 
the emerging micro perspective of institutional theory whereby individual 
agentic actors can shape organisations; an area which has had little attention or 
focused research (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, p. 8).   
By providing explicit real life examples (see chapters 5-7), this study 
gives a nuanced account of life in an enacted organisation where actors can 
‘actively mediate logics’ (Coburn, 2004, p. 212) and offers greater 
understanding and appreciation of the complexity, interconnectedness and 
temporal nature of the different forms of work undertaken to maintain, change 
and resist logics within a hybrid organisation.  Additionally, the study reveals the 
chaotic multidimensional and often highly contested context in which 
institutional work takes place which is somewhat different to the deterministic 
linearity favoured by the extant literature.  Finally, I show how agentic actors 
can promote and resist activity through everyday talk (Lok, 2010) and question 
the presentation of actors as either heroic change agents or cultural dopes 
(Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, p. 1) and unwitting victims of coercing 
pressure and symbolic violence (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998).   
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9.2  Contribution to knowledge  
This study makes four key contributions to theory which builds on 
understanding of: forms of institutional work; processes of change, the role of 
actors and finally methods of research. I now discuss each one in turn.  
9.2.1  Forms of institutional work  
First I develop a map showing the forms of institutional work, their 
interplay and their interdependent relationships (see figure 22 in the preceding 
chapter) that could be generalizable to other similar hybrids (e.g. professional 
associations). By providing explicit real life examples (see chapters 5-7), this 
study gives a nuanced account of life in an enacted organisation where actors 
can ‘actively mediate logics’ (Coburn, 2004, p. 212).  It offers greater 
understanding and appreciation of the complexity, interconnectedness and 
temporal nature of the different forms of work undertaken to maintain, change 
and resist logics within a hybrid organisation thus responding to the need for 
‘tougher’ conceptual frameworks to move away from the value, normative 
polemic conversations, to those that increase theoretical understanding of 
hybrid organisations and the implications for policy and practice    (Billis, 2010) 
Through this study, I identify two forms of institutional work in the context 
of hybridity. The first, which I term identification work, is undertaken by senior 
managers to encourage other actors to identify with a proffered (commercial) 
logic but within an existing (social) mission. Such work takes place at an 
ideological level and aims to ensure widespread acceptance of a system of 
ideas and ideals within the prevailing mission of the organisation, which would 
normatively appear contradictory or illegitimate. The second, referred to as 
practice work, is the work undertaken by organisational actors to promote 
adoption of practices that are congruent with the proffered logic by other actors. 
Such work takes place at the level of policies, procedures, processes and 
systems and aims to diffuse the system of collective ideas and ideals developed 
through identification work.  Importantly, whilst I present identification and 
practice work as independent constructs I found that such work is inter-related, 
mutually reinforcing, often overlapping, inefficient and messy, often undertaken 
in a contested and conflicted, war-like environment (see figure 19 on page 168 
for an illustration of the inter-relationship, also see chapter 5 – data sharing, for 
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a detailed discussion about one part of the organisation ‘protecting’ itself from 
another).  
I observed actors using identification and practice work to influence how 
actors make sense of ideas and ideals and to nudge others into adopting 
practices (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 17). For example, in the incident 
surrounding the bonus setting (see chapter 6) I described how elite actors 
aligned to a commercial logic had a pervasive belief in ‘economic man’, and in 
accordance with this belief sought to build a bonus scheme to maximise ‘man’s’ 
financial gain using a rhetoric around employees’ moral right to share in the 
financial success of the organisation to persuade others to adopt this idea and 
implement practices that support the ideology. In response actors, aligned to 
the competing public good logic, sought to mediate the pressures and their 
responses (Coburn, 2004, p. 234) to challenge the appropriateness of the ‘self-
serving’ proposal within a public good logic. Those unable to align to the 
proposed ideology and practices sought to modify, disrupt and ultimately reject 
the proposal using tactics such as delaying decisions, escalation of the 
approval process, individual formal recording of non-acceptance at a 
governance meeting and one staff member who was unable to reconcile the 
proposal with the espoused values of public good, ultimately chose to leave the 
organisation.  
9.2.2  The processes of change    
Second, this study reveals the chaotic, multidimensional, often highly 
contested context in which institutional work takes place, which is somewhat 
different to the deterministic linearity favoured by the extant literature (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1996; Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Pache & Santos, 2010;  
(Greenwood et al., 2011).  Rather this study found that there is no big bold act 
but rather there is an edging process over time.  In previous chapters (4–7) I 
refer to a tactic that I term ‘edging strategy’ to ‘edge in changes’.    I 
conceptualise edging strategy as an approach to change that uses subtle and 
apparently benign changes that eventually break down previous boundaries 
and create new frameworks of meaning and sense making.  This process 
happens incrementally over time in a way that mitigates the risks of insiders 
seeing the changes as illegitimate and allows the instigator to test and respond 
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to the reactions of stakeholders. See section 6.4.3 on page 138 and the 
discussion in section 6.5 on page 140 for further details on how the edging 
strategy is used by making small incremental changes and uses rhetoric to 
theorise a need for change, often catastrophises the impacts of not adopting 
proffered ideas and practices and involves some form of external validation, to 
increase the persuasiveness and intensity of connectedness (Coburn, 2004) 
and therefore adoption of the proffered logic.   
The presentation of change that I make problematises current 
understandings of institutional work in hybrid organisations in several ways. 
First, it highlights the ‘messiness’ of institutional work in hybrid contexts in ways 
that challenge the appropriateness of both the linear binary presentation of logic 
change (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990; Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996; Gawer & Phillips, 2013.  Also see chapter 2, pages 16 -17 for 
further discussion on this issue) and the presenation of cleanly delineated forms 
of institutional work that dominate the literature (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 
2002; Lok, 2010; Thorton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).   
9.2.3  The agents of change    
Furthermore, this study shows the important and powerful role of agentic 
actors.  Placing the interest of individual and groups of organisational actors at 
the heart of institutional logics this study highlights the ability of everyday actors 
to envision, enact or resist change.  As such I reject the account of the heroic 
institutional entrepreneur (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) and posit that 
there is no big bold act (Suddaby & Hinings, 2002) but rather there is an edging 
process over time.  By making this statement I  contribute to the growing 
critique (Glynn, 2000; Zilber 2002; Coburn, 2004; Lok, 2010; Turco, 2012; 
Coule & Patmore, 2013; Coule and Bennett, 2016) that challenges the view that 
only resource rich, elite institutional actors are agentic (Lawrence, Suddaby, & 
Leca, 2009, p. 1) and non-elite actors as cultural dopes  and/or unwitting victims 
of coercing pressure and symbolic violence (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998). 
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9.2.4  Understanding the complexity of institutional work within a hybrid 
organisation     
Finally, and relatedly, understanding the complexity of institutional work 
within a hybrid organisation is a long-term endeavour, involving significant time 
in the ‘waiting room’ (Mannay & Morgan, 2015) and requiring observation of the 
actual processes of institutional work over time. I present embedded 
ethnography as particularly valuable in its ability to allow for deep 
understanding of the topic.  Through my 'innovative use of ‘incidents’ (Dick, 
2017) I look to contribute to research methodology and posit that the prevalent 
retrospective accounts of institutional work collected at a single point in time are 
likely inadequate for developing rich understandings of the role of ‘everyday 
talk’ (Lok, 2010) and sense making in a hybrid organisation or the practicalities 
of change efforts.  Specifically, I offer my use of incidents as an alternative to 
the commonly adopted thematic presentation of data; certainly it served as a 
useful mechanism to guide the focus of data collection and writing up the 
findings.  Furthermore, it was invaluable in providing multiple perspectives and 
opportunities to examine micro processes (Fine, Morrill, & Surianarain, 2009) 
and actor-context relations (Yanow, Ybema, & van Hulst, 2012).  
9.3 Contribution to practice  
 As part of my research contract I committed to providing a 
‘findings report’ to the focal organisation.  An anoymised copy of this is provided 
at appendix 6.  The central finding relates to threats to the organisation’s 
survivability, primarily through the presence of two sets of logics (namely public 
good and commercial) which are underpinned by different and often opposing 
assumptions, values and beliefs. I suggest that whilst the recommendation are 
centered around the focal organisation, they are likely relevant to other 
professional associations that hold charitable / charter status that have begun to 
pursue highly commercial strategies and practices.  
Significantly, this study found that rather than individuals constructing a 
single framing of the organisation they simultaneously constituted the 
organisation in multiple ways.  Arguably this makes it, more difficult to have sets 
of organising principles, material practices and symbolic systems that meet 
individual’s assumptions, values and beliefs.   In the absence of a single 
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internal identity the organisation continually faces divergent sub-groups and 
reforming (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) and are susceptible to a depleting 
capability to solve complex problems (Jay, 2013).  As such having to negotiate 
the rules of the game in multiple contradictory games has become a daily 
reality, complexity and dysfunctionality has become normalised. I posit such 
tensions present a serious challenge for the survivability of the organisation 
over time (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 2001; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Turco, 
2012; Skelcher & Rathgeb smith, 2014).  For example:    
(a) In chapter 5 (data sharing) I described how one director used a 
structural argument to ‘defend’ and ‘protect’ the integrity of the 
organisation, preventing a fellow director accessing areas of activity 
and resources necessary for their role.  In this instance, the 
organisation was presented as fragmented and clunky (inefficient) 
and subject to additional and un-necessary complexity and costs. 
(b)  In chapter 6 I discussed the challenge to a CEO proposal for a new 
bonus scheme.   In this instance, Trustees questioned the 
appropriateness of the proposal within the context of being a charity 
(public good) organisation. Ultimately the trustee sub-committee 
refused to endorse the proposal requiring it to be escalated to a full 
trustee meeting, in doing so undermined the legitimacy of the 
commercial logic and importantly the appropriateness of the CEOs 
beliefs and assumptions and from elite actor’s perspective, extended 
and complicated the approval process more than necessary.  
(c) A further example pertains to the Governance setting where the 
Board challenged the legality and authority of a sub-group resulting 
in significant tensions between divergent sub-groups over a period of 
at least 22 months (it was not resolved by the time my research was 
concluded). It resulted in: (a) changes being made to the format and 
purpose of trustee sub-committees which caused confusion and 
additional activity (linked to drafting, approval and publishing) and 
delays in approving proposals (e.g. bonus scheme, new Trustees); 
(b) a challenge being made to the CEO integrity and ability  to 
manage complexity and; (c) undermining an established trustee 
recruitment process.   
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It is for that reason the key recommendation was that: 
 ‘the organisation finds ways to represent itself structurally, 
practically and rhetorically that are attractive to all staff 
irrespective of their proffered (public good and/or commercial) 
logic. It is critical that this representation is congruent with the 
organisational activities or discerning staff will reject any practices 
and behaviours that are not deemed to be authentic or legitimate’. 
(Bain C. A., 2017, p. 10) 
 
Contained within this report were two practical recommendations which I 
discuss below.  It is noteworthy that, after the submission of the report, a review 
of the ‘foundation’ and its relationship to the main charity was commissioned by 
the interim CEO and a draft proposal to further enhance the bonus scheme was 
abandoned because it was felt to be inappropriate for a chartered organisation 
by the Chariman of the Board.  
9.3.1 Creation of a bridging identity.  
Firstly, I recommended the creation of an internal (bridging) identity 
that does not present public good and commercial activity as rivals. In making 
this recommendation I am building on the work of Battilana & Dorado (2010, p. 
1420) whose work on micro-finance organisations argued for the need for ‘logic 
combinations’ to reduce potential for conflicting coalitions and acknowledging 
the work of Jay (2013) who promoted logic combination as enabling hybrid 
organisations to innovate and cope with change. Specifically, I suggested that 
the organisation sought to:  
a. position money making as a powerful and purposeful resource to 
enable public good rather than an end game in its own right 
b. consolidate the formal structure to bring together all mission related 
activity thus reducing the ability for political gaming. 
c. refine hiring practices to include a consideration of individual’s ability 
to cope with hybridity (complexity) in addition to technical capability 
and experience (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) 
d. review the purpose and content of job-descriptions (role profiles) with 
a view to reinforcing interdependencies and inter-relationships of 
money making and public good activity and removing the sense of 
rivalry and exclusivity of each activity.  
  201 
9.3.1  Governance and operational congruence 
Secondly, I suggest that performance measurements be realigned to 
recognise and reward the purposeful use of money-making in such a way that 
reduces the view that making money is all that matters.  In making this 
recommendation I am acknowledging that a key problem of hybridity is that it 
suffers from ‘fundamental and distinctly different governance and operating 
principles’ (Billis, 2010; Cornforth & Spear, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, 2013) and 
the ablity of diserning actors to reject organisational practices that are not 
congruent with the given identity (Turco, 2012).  Specifically:  
a. I suggested that: the bonus programme is reviewed to ensure 
alignment with the organisations hybrid nature e.g. to include value / 
behaviour standards in addition to financial performance 
b. I recommended against any further increase to the financial value of 
individual bonus in recognition of the not-for-profit and charity nature 
of the organisation  
9.4  Personal development  
In terms of my own professional practice this study has significantly 
changed my worldview (see appendix 1) and my technical appreciation of 
several practices for example purpose and impact of bonus schemes 
(chaptex6), hiring polices (chapter 7); job descriptions (chapter 5) and 
organisational structures (chapter 4).  As events evolved during the write up of 
this thesis I became increasingly aware of practices that I considered to be 
motivated for individual gain (e.g. access to power relationship, amplified 
control of resources and decision making process) and the volume of these 
activities resulted in an intensified inability to resolve tensions.  This situation 
was exacerbated by the unexpected death of the CEO. Unwilling to work within 
such an environment and be associated with such dysfunctional working I 
chose to leave the organisation in June 2017. Whilst the process itself was 
quite horrendous I feel that the skills, knowledge and personal insight that I 
have gained through this research journey puts me in good stead for the next 
stage – whatever that may be.  
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9.5 Limitations and strengths of this study  
Ethnography is not without its limitations and perhaps the biggest 
limitations are the susceptibility to researcher basis and its lack of enumerative 
generalizability.  However, I counter these limitations by arguing that this study 
has enabled long-term participation in direct observation of and purposeful 
conversations about the processes of institutional work. Understanding the 
complexity of institutional work within a hybrid organisation has been a long-
term endeavour, requiring observation of processes unfolding in real time and 
over time.  This approach has enabled a rich understanding of the role of 
‘everyday talk’ and sense making in hybrid organisations or the practicalities of 
change efforts not normally achieved through a retrospective and/or snapshot 
study.  I also suggest that the findings and issues discussed in this thesis (and 
the organisational recommendations in 9.3 above) are likely relevant to other 
professional associations that hold charitable/charter status that have begun to 
pursue highly commercial strategies and practices. 
9.6  Suggestions for further research  
 This study included an innovative use of incidents and protagonists as a 
means to both guide fieldwork and write-up the research account.  Specifically, 
through this approach I could draw a picture, not only of the main characters, 
but also of the setting in which they worked and the structures, systems and 
rhetoric that impinged and influenced their sense making and action.  This was 
valuable as it allowed me to get an appreciation of the complexity and inter-
relatedness of the different organisational framings that were used 
simultaneously and interdependently. It would be interesting to undertake 
further research into the applicability of using incidents as a means of 
identifying areas of interest within an ethnographic study and secondly to further 
understand how a protagonists approach could be used to get a rich and 
holistic view of the main characters involved in critical incidents (Perry, 1997; 
Webster & Mertora, 2007).  
 Additionally, a future study might usefully consider the role of human 
resources (HR) activity in the maintenance, disruption and or transformation of 
logics.  This study highlighted several internal HR processes that were used to 
communicate and to encourage the adoption of particular logics.  Specifically, 
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job descriptions (chapter 5); bonus schemes (chapter 6) and recruitment 
strategies (chapter 7) were presented as examples of institutional work 
intended to encourage adoption of practices and behaviours aligned to 
particular logics.  Such a study might consider the role of HR within an 
organisation and may question how HR practices and processes might navigate 
multiple logics and support the survivability of a hybrid organisation.  Such 
research would contribute to the theorisation of socialisation practices within a 
hybrid context and enable the focal organisation to frame their HR practices and 
processes in a way that appeals to internal actors in diverse ways to support 
organisational sustainability.   
 Finally, this study has concentrated on understanding how internal actors 
deal with the presence of, navigate and manipulate multiple institutional logics.  
A further study might approach the question from an external actor perspective.  
For example, the focal organisation is a membership organisation, existing in 
terms of charter to develop and represent the profession it serves. I previously 
discussed (see chapter 4 page 75) how during a budget setting process 
‘members’ were presented as consumers.  I suggest that this perspective aligns 
to the commercial logic, positioning membership as a transactional process 
through which members can access certain resources and events free of 
charge or at a discounted rate.   An alternative perspective may be where 
members consider themselves to be part of a community of practice (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991;Hoadley, 2012), sharing a passion for the profession and 
assuming responsibility for its continual development.  Within this perspective, 
members may consider their fees to be a donation to support the development 
of the community of practice. A fruitful line of further research would be to 
explore how members make sense of their membership against the hybrid 
nature of the focal organisation.  Such research would contribute to the 
theorisation of hybridity and to practice work, enabling the focal organisation to 
position ‘membership’ in a way that appeals to external actors who may frame 
their membership in diverse ways to encourage growth in membership and 
therefore advance charter objectives.  
 
End of thesis.  Word count before  appendix and references:  70,180 
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Appendix Section  
Appendix 1 – Focal Organisation Overview  
How it all began: In the 1920s 15 companies set up a management 
research group with a stated purpose to ‘discuss topics of mutual concern’.  By 
the late 1920s several sections were created one of which focused on the 
function (profession) represented by the focal organisation today.  In the early 
1930s, seven individuals decided to evolve the research group section into a 
British Association.  A constitution was drafted, membership fees set and the 
first general meeting took place.  Membership stood at 100 and this association 
was to become the foundation of the focal organisation.   
1940 – 1970: Keen to be recognised as a professional association work 
was undertaken to introduce elements of an education scheme (run jointly with 
another association), a journal was published and an annual dinner and 
national conference was held all of which felt to be the central elements of an 
association. During the, 1950’s and 1960’s, topics of conversation became 
more international in scope and steps were taken to evolve the education 
programmes into specialist programmes (run independently); membership 
reached 5,000 and membership branches and specialist interest groups had 
increased to 43 both in the UK and overseas.  
1970 – 1990’s: In the 1970s discussions began about how to increase 
both the profile of the institute and of the profession it represented and it was 
decided that it was necessary to achieve Chartered status.   Achieving this took 
20 years (it was finally awarded in 1992 at the institutes golden jubilee) and 
required the institute to evolve its education programmes to degree level 
programmes, introduce member’s grades (linked to education and professional 
achievement) and develop and promulgate a code of ethics against which all 
members were bound.  A new market index was launched (which is today used 
by the Bank of England in setting inflation rates) and active membership 
recruitment programmes were launched.  This saw membership rise to 17,500, 
primarily caused by ‘a hugh growth’ in overseas members as global companies 
sought to get its staff qualified.  The stated objects of the Charter were: 
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 (a) to promote and develop for the public benefit the art and science of 
[profession name removed] and likewise to encourage the promotion and 
development of improved methods of [profession name removed] in all 
organisations;  
(b) to promote and maintain for the benefit of the public high standards of 
professional skill, ability and integrity among persons engaged in 
[profession name removed];  
(c) to educate persons engaged in the practice of [profession name 
removed] and by means of examination and other methods of 
assessment to test the skill and knowledge of persons desiring to enter 
the Institute.  
 
Following the achievement of Charter status, the focal organisation 
become a registered education charity. Whilst the internal narrative was that the 
reason for becoming a charity was for tax benefits, the external stated aims 
were: 
• Educating individuals engaged in the profession 
• Promoting and maintaining high standards of professional skill, 
ability and integrity amongst its professionals  
• Promote and develop techniques and encourage their adoption  
 
In 1995, the first three-year business plan was approved with measures to 
judge how effectively the organisation was achieving its charter objects and 
included aims of    membership growth, knowledge development, and 
qualification volumes. Progress was monitored by a Board of Trustees of 47.  
2000’s:  In the mid 2000s a new CEO took over.  Recorded as the first 
CEO to come from a business background (all the others had come from a 
professional institute, charity or not-for-profit background), arguably this CEO 
introduced a professionalisation agenda seeking to shape the institute to 
become ‘more like a business’ (e.g. less like a charity/not for profit).  For 
example, one of the first activities undertaken was to introduce a linked charity 
to separate out charity activity from commercial activity.   This was received by 
some as a defence mechanism against the challenges that the organisation had 
‘become too commercial’ and by others as a segregation mechanism to ensure 
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that the ‘charity aspects’ did not influence the business activity. Additionally, a 
governance restructures took place to reduce the number of trustees to make it 
‘more business-like, trustee recruitment was revamped to source trustees from 
‘big business’ and aware from its previous voltmeter membership source.  
Along with this came a change in performance criteria - some would say the 
changes moved the conversations away from how effectively the organisation 
was achieving its charter objectives to how efficient it was as a business 
(revenue growth, profit maximisation, market penetration, globalisation) and 
heralded the first commercialisation of the organisation.  
Current day: At the time of writing this thesis (2014) there are several 
‘offerings’ (products / services) offered: 
Membership (networking, conferences, branches). Membership is 
published at ‘65,000 in 150 countries’.  Membership branches and special 
interest groups remain but have become more virtual in format.  See chapter 4 
(4.3.2) where membership was positioned as an important revenue stream 
somewhat different from the original position where the organisation was 
positioned as giving people opportunity to discuss matters of mutual concern. 
The ethics code remains and has been complemented by an ethics test and 
ethical organisational kite mark, the annual dinners have expanded to include 
annual awards and the national conference includes several regional 
conferences (Africa, Australasia, Middle East, Singapore and UK) as does the 
graduation ceremony 
Education The education programmes had continued to evolve with 
over 70,000 assessments undertaken each year.   The education function is 
considered by some organisation actors as ‘the most important function and at 
the heart of the institute’ but by others as just another activity.   There is tension 
around the priority and influence of the internal education team and this is 
discussed in detail in chapter 5.   
 Knowledge Following from its inception from a research group, it is my 
understanding that there has always been a ‘knowledge team’.   When I first 
joined the organisation, this team was positioned at the centre of conversations, 
setting the agenda of many conversations and included many special interest 
groups and sponsorship of four academic chairs.  In 2010, this agenda changed 
and the knowledge team was positioned as a revenue centre, its direction was 
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changed from knowledge development to ‘knowledge harvesting’ a term which 
resulted in the outsourcing of the knowledge function to ‘knowledge associates ‘ 
typically consultancy house who are giving access to publish on the 
organisations website.  Examples include how to guides, books, and 
subscription access to other information. Funding for academic chairs was 
removed as it was deemed to be a luxury and non-profitable.  
 Benchmarking. Developed since 2000, there are several ‘tools’ 
provided to benchmark organisational functions as they rate to this profession in 
a similar way to Investors in People.  Organisation that buy this provision are 
audited, have a development plan (where needed) and receive a status award 
depending on the outcome of the audit (bronze, silver, gold etc.).   Additionally, 
they may also enter an annual awards ceremony where they could be further 
recognised.  This type of provision is attractive to the Middle East market where 
most of the activity takes place.  
 Training There is a small prevision of face to face and on-line short 
training courses.  These do not result in a qualification but obtain an attendance 
type of ‘badge’.  
Commercial sales (selling to corporate customers).  The corporate 
strategy was first introduced in 2002 and was a small team responsible for 
selling the organisations services in a way that enabled organisations to have a 
co-ordinated bundle of different services.  For example, at its inception there 
were two sales people and a team of eight responsible for managing 
programme delivery.  In their 2013 strategy the CEO stated that this area was 
the future of the organisation and it was expected to double its revenue year by 
year for over five years.  As a response, a new directorate was set up, sales 
teams in the UK and overseas were established and development of the 
corporate market became the focus of conversations (as shown by 
presentations, key performance indicators, staff bonus and projects).  
Furthermore, it was stated to be the primary reason why the focal organisations 
turnover has grown from, £10million (2005) to £25 million (2015) and staff had 
grown from 78 (2005) to 158 (2015).  The reported sources of revenue show a 
movement from what was broadly 50/50 split between membership subscription 
and education income (examination fees) to approximately 30% membership, 
20% education and 50% corporate revenue.  
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Appendix 2 - Researchers Pen-Picture  
‘It doesn’t have to be an either / or’  
Wife, mum, and empowered working woman, my rock in life is my family, 
my fascination is the human element and how to accept the perfect 
imperfections of everyday life.  
A lifelong learner I have progressed from school through the UK 
education ladder – stopping for breath at almost every step.   Qualifying with my 
masters in 2006 I thought I had had enough, but 6 years ago I decided that I 
needed to quieten down the chatter in my head that was constantly asking ‘how 
can just one person make everything turn on its head?’ and this brought me to 
my current journey - learning to understand the role of actors, agency, 
assumptions and beliefs in every day working life.   
 Initially ‘inducted’ into work by the UK military I was in hindsight, the 
stereo-typical positivistic manager, adopting the neo-institutional ‘one best way, 
cause and effect approach’, benefiting from elitism and the ‘status’ of my job-
role.   Nowadays, partly through this research, partly through meeting the love 
of my life and partly, just getting older, I enjoy and embrace the complexity that 
lies in each one of us.  At times, I am delighted, fascinated, frustrated and 
perplexed by the very nature of messiness of every-day intentions and 
interactions of us human actors –sometimes I even feel all those things 
simultaneously.   
What I do believe now that differs from my early career, is that there is 
very rarely, if ever ‘one best way’, there may be some ways that are better than 
others but that depends on the definition of success.   And there lies the 
colourful rub – there are probably multiple definitions of success in every 
conversation, initiative and work activity.  I try to remember and embrace that in 
my hectic life, and sometimes I even succeed, much to the frustration of my 
manageralist co-workers.   
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Appendix 3 – Research Notice (Bain C. , 2012) 
Wednesday, March 12, 2014 
 
Dear All, 
As some of you may be aware, [focal organisation] is sponsoring me on 
a Doctoral research programme.  I am currently researching organisational 
identity and image, traditions, practices and the dynamics of meanings and how 
they are interpreted to develop, maintain and change organisations.  I am 
delighted that [CEO] and the [Trustees] have agreed that I may use [focal 
organisation] as the basis of this research. 
This research is really exciting for me and forms the second half of my 
studies – I have already completed a two-year taught programme which I have 
enjoyed very much.  With a lot of hard work, I hope to complete my research in 
the next couple of years and the rest of this letter outlines how I intend to do this 
and what it means for you. 
About the study: The research is concerned with the nature of the work 
undertaken by [focal organisation] to maintain and transform its own practices 
and those of the profession.  From a research perspective, this is a complex 
issue and not something that can be dealt with in a short interview or 
questionnaire and my proposal is that I undertake a field work study which will 
allow me to study culture and processes within [focal organisation] 
The nature of my study means that much of the research will be 
undertaken in parallel to my role of [job title].  It will involve me observing key 
events and having formal and informal discussions with staff and volunteers 
such as the Trustees and yourselves.  These will help me to explore the 
rationale for the work and activities we undertake.  I aim to keep this activity to a 
minimum and not disturb daily work significantly.  At the end of my study 
(approximately 2016-17) I will produce a written business report for [CEO], 
which will summarise and report on the observations made.  I will also use the 
outcomes as the basis of my Doctoral thesis which will result in a formal written 
academic document.  In time, I hope that this will also translate and support 
academic papers. 
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Confidentiality and consent:  I understand that this research might feel 
sensitive and you may have concerns about how I will use this information in 
my role as [job title] and I want you to feel you can talk to me in full, and 
frankly.  In order to do this, you need to know that your data and the things you 
say will be protected and will only be used for the purposes of the study.  The 
name [focal organisation], its location and any other identifying features will be 
made anonymous; as will your own name and any details that will make you 
identifiable.  Nowhere in the research records will your name ever be entered; a 
reference will be used to record anything you say.  Whilst I cannot guarantee 
full confidentiality as the research is likely to be published, I will ensure anything 
said by you as part of the research has any trace of your identity removed from 
it to protect your anonymity, whilst allowing you to speak honestly and openly 
as part of the research.  The research records will also be kept in encrypted 
files, and in compliance with all data protection requirements.  I will give you a 
copy of the notes of our discussions and my reflections and you will have the 
right to withhold any information you choose, to opt out of the research 
altogether, or to withdraw from being a part of the study at any time. 
Next steps:  If you would like to discuss the research in more detail, or 
would like to opt out of the research, please feel free to contact me by emailing 
Carole.Bain2@shu.ac.uk or calling me on either internal ext. [number removed] 
or [number removed].  If you would prefer to contact my Director of Studies for 
any further information, [name removed and chair reference], can be reached at 
[email address removed]    
I look forward to meeting you and hope that you will enjoy the opportunity 
to have your views considered as part of the research. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Carole Bain 
Doctoral Candidate, Sheffield Hallam University 
And 
[job title and focal organisation removed]  
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Appendix 4 – Profile of interviewees / reviewers  
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Appendix 5 – Example of Internal Reviewers Feedback  
 
Making sense of a hybrid organisation – some thoughts 
Sections are numbered just for ease of reference, thoughts are in no particular 
order. 
 
1. It is interesting to consider how the twin nature of [focal organisation] 
institutional logic is manifested in the choices we have made in choosing our 
vision and mission statements and our corporate strapline.  In my view, in 
choosing the words we want to identify us to our stakeholders, we have 
made a conscious decision to emphasise lofty public good imperatives and 
de-emphasise commercial business success to form a construct which (we 
believe) will better meet the desires and preconceptions of our external 
stakeholders.  So, we could posit, are we being authentic (is this really the 
aspiration) or are we signing up to something that we know ticks all the right 
boxes to legitimise [focal organisation], but that we know does not fully 
match our experience of reality where public benefit is an almost intangible 
outcome or even an accidental by-product whereas business outputs can be 
measured and quantified?  
 
2. I definitely recognise your account of the tensions between competing tracks 
of public benefit and commercial success, and I would say with the benefit of 
a 25-year view of [focal organisation] that the balance between them is fluid 
and changes over time.  We have moved from being focused on 
membership and education with members as our primary customers in the 
1990s – when we had just got our charter and did virtually no marketing or 
PR activity (because advertising was a dirty word for a chartered 
professional body) and did very little promotion to organisational customers 
– to one where corporate revenue has become king and we are now actually 
pleased that we are reducing our reliance on qualifications and membership 
fees as a source of revenue, which we now see as a potential source of 
vulnerability. It seems to me there have been three main reasons for that 
change: 
 
a) Success in the charter application was wholly dependent on 
presenting a convincing message on public good. Everything we did 
at that time was geared towards orienting the institutetowards the 
public good agenda, the submission to the Privy Council was wholly 
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predicated on justifying our credentials as a public interest body.  
Financial success was only a factor in that it was the fuel to support 
sustainability and corporates were only important because they paid 
for exams and fees.  The Privy Council looks for evidence that the 
new chartered body is financially stable and will remain a going 
concern, but otherwise has no interest in how much money we make.  
We repeated the public good mantra so often at the time it became 
our mythology. This imperative characterised the launch of the new 
chartered body and influenced its culture for more than a decade 
thereafter. 
 
b) The 2009 SPADA report on UK professional bodies and the CCPMO 
report (earlier, can’t recall the date) into the value-add of professional 
bodies both identified that the professional landscape was changing 
dramatically and no professional body could assume it had a right to 
exist just because it had been around for years and claimed to serve 
the public good.  Bodies had to stay relevant, be more commercial 
and sell themselves to their stakeholders.  So, the move towards a 
more commercial mind-set was a necessity, a long-term survival 
strategy.  There was a general movement in the professional body 
world over the last decade to become more business-like in response 
to the threat of losing relevance, so it has been a defensive move to 
some extent. 
 
c) The third factor has been the professionalization of [focal 
organisation] itself. When I joined, most senior posts (other than the 
educationalists) were held by retired service personnel or others who 
had moved out of London and were looking for a quiet wind-down to 
retirement.  Very few members of staff had master’s degrees or 
professional qualifications.   Crucially, until around 1997 the CEOs of 
the institutewere non-business people, they were interested in the 
professional body but not the business per se.  My perception is that 
it is only really since 1997 when we started to have CEOs with 
commercial backgrounds and we started to employ managers with 
business qualifications and private sector backgrounds that the 
multiple identity of [focal organisation] has really become apparent. 
 
3. I think perceptions of [focal organisation] as charitable or commercial or both 
depend almost entirely on where a person sits in the organisation and what 
their KPIs are (bearing in mind that people who have been here longer tend 
to be more resistant to moving towards a commercial model because they 
have the corporate memory from the award of charter).  The face of [focal 
organisation] that you first see and interact with forms your world view. So, I 
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understand the comments from one director that they are the only director 
wearing both hats. When you think about it, everyone should wear both hats 
but if you drew a spectrum from charity to commercial enterprise and asked 
everyone to a) mark where on the line they think [focal organisation] sits and 
b) where on the line they think their job sits, there would be a wide variation 
in where all the dots were. It would be interesting to see where the [focal 
organisation] dots were and how they related to where the individual sits. 
 
4. The comments about the Foundation are revealing and ring true. For me, 
they confirm that for some people the Foundation has become a handy 
repository for all the charitable values. By hiving off the charity aspect to 
somewhere clearly identifiable as being for the public good, it is almost as 
though some people feel this box is now ticked and the rest of the 
organisation can now be more overtly commercial.   Before we had the 
Foundation the mix of charitable and commercial was more complex and 
subtle because it wasn’t possible to draw absolute lines between public 
benefit and business activities. There is a risk that people will over-
rationalise in a desire to simplify things and decide that everything that isn’t 
the Foundation is, by exception, commercial. I fully recognise your 
conclusion that the Foundation is for some a symbolic and low priority 
activity which ticks the charity box, freeing them to concentrate on making 
money.  
 
5. Reading your section on the effects of charter on the ethos and 
organisational logic of [focal organisation] I agree that the charter objectives 
do themselves create ambiguity and create the paradigm for a hybrid 
organisation.   There are 3 objects; two are for the public benefit, one isn’t. 
The objects talk about the public, about organisations and about individuals, 
and they aren’t prioritised.  So that already sets up a level of complexity and 
of internal competition even before we overlay the infrastructure of 
charitable entities and limited companies. How can we then be expected to 
rank those competing but co-existing objectives, and decide where should 
we focus our efforts?  Structurally, the limited companies are subordinate to 
the main body so it would be legitimate to view them as engines to deliver 
fuel to the parent. But then, the Foundation is also subordinate to the main 
body, and the main body itself engages directly in commercial activity.  No 
wonder people struggle to pin down what kind of organisation they are 
working for. 
 
6. You are right to identify that people often repeat the received wisdom (to 
justify revenue generation) that [focal organisation] makes money to do 
things that deliver our charter objectives, but then struggle to articulate what 
that means. In practice, all but a small proportion of our revenue in spent on 
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keeping the wheels turning, NFR is relatively small and we hold on to a lot of 
it in reserves. So, demonstrating that we reinvest what we earn to deliver 
our charter objectives more effectively is hard to do and I agree that people 
tend to fall back on this as a way of legitimising expansion plans without 
thinking through what this means.  For example, for me there is a dichotomy 
between what we say the purpose of international expansion is and with 
what we task it with delivering.  We set up the outposts to be commercial, 
they are not set up or positioned as not for profits, they are commercial 
companies which are to all intents and purposes sales offices where even 
membership is a product with a price tag.  We measure their success on 
revenue and net profit. They are treated as net contributors to [focal 
organisation] coffers (and if they don’t contribute cash they are judged to be 
failures). Yet we say, without any sense at all that this is disingenuous, that 
they are some sort of standards outpost carrying the [focal organisation] 
banner for the greater good.  For me, this is the fundamental problem for our 
international offices, we set them up, staff them and evaluate them as 
commercial enterprises but somehow expect them to fulfil the public benefit 
agenda and deliver the mission.   
 
7. But this is also true of [focal organisation]. The metrics are all about money 
and absolute numbers. We do not include softer measures based on the 
charter objects.  When setting strategy, the Trustees and its predecessors 
have asked us time after time to have a public good theme and to measure 
how well we are doing on these softer issues.  We don’t do that because it is 
just too difficult to measure things that can’t be easily quantified and 
commentaries are largely meaningless if scrutinised. But as long as 
measurement, success and reward is based on commercial metrics the 
essential dichotomy at the heart of [focal organisation] in its current form is 
irreconcilable. This will only change, in my opinion, if we split the 
professional body/awarding body from the commercial arm and maintain the 
professional body at zero profit/zero cost. 
 
8. I think the Trustees discomfort at the new bonus arrangements is a good 
illustration of the tension between what the Trustees think should be the end 
game and what the business leaders (well, most of them) think should be 
the endgame. [Name removed] strongly believes that financial success and 
financial reward is a major motivator, they bring that sensibility from their 
previous life, it is a strong driver for him personally, and it is shared by other 
Directors who have come from the same background. To be fair to them, 
they also see it as a way of celebrating and sharing success and cultivating 
a loyal and hardworking team.  Those of the Trustees who objected did so 
because the idea of commercial-rate cash rewards for staff of a charity didn’t 
sit well with their view of themselves as voluntary Trustees taking no reward 
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for their services to the profession.  This contrasts with their own business 
lives where they would feel no inhibitions about seeking maximum 
remuneration for their expertise.  So, it is their sense of what kind of 
organisation [focal organisation] is, and what its end game is, that conditions 
how they view the remuneration policy – not whether [focal organisation] can 
afford it.  You could argue that the Trustees should be the check and 
balance that prevents [focal organisation] tipping entirely towards the 
commercial end of spectrum and losing sight of its public benefit aims. 
However, this is in itself in tension with their fiduciary responsibilities as 
Trustees to ensure the charitable entity is financially viable and continues to 
generate surpluses to fund its mission. This is why they are so concerned 
about the financial status of the subsidiary offices and have never once, as 
far as I know, asked for a measurement of whether or not they are also 
delivering the public benefit agenda.  So by virtue of being a charity and a 
charted body the Trustees are legally obliged to balance two competing 
imperatives:  financial sustainability versus public benefit mission.   Thus, 
our own governance structure mirrors and perpetuates the internal 
dichotomy. 
 
9. Looking at the kind of language your respondents have used to describe 
‘doing more things’, I recognise the difficulty people have once you get 
beyond a certain point in the argument.  It is very difficult for anyone to 
identify a specific, quantifiable, public good outcome. The language gets 
fuzzy and imprecise.  The problem is that the reinvestment model is circular 
and virtually perpetual – we have never arrived at the end.  So, we earn 
money and then invest in in activities which generate more money which in 
turn we invest in more activities that earn more money, and so on.  As you 
have identified, it is the absence of any shareholders and the need to 
declare dividends that not only allows this to happen but also creates a self-
fulfilling pattern of corporate behaviour to which is almost impossible to say 
‘stop’. 
 
10. You talk about both sensibilities being diluted, noting that people who are 
naturally more commercial or public minded, depending on their role in the 
organisation, show awareness of the other point of view and its place in the 
culture.  That does chime with me too. People do seem to be sensitive to a 
need to move from antithesis to synthesis if [focal organisation]is to continue 
to prosper as a unitary structure encompassing both commercial and public 
benefit aims.  It is almost as if we are moving towards the other end of the 
pendulum swing, a realisation that we have almost gone as far as we can 
towards commercial logic and if we go much further those core values could 
be under threat and as a result we could lose our rights to the higher 
ground. 
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Appendix 6 – Focal Organisation Executive Report  
 
Interplay	of	intentions:			
	
An	ethnography	of	institutional	work	within	[focal	organisation]		
	
	
	
How	do	organisational	actors	(staff	and	Trustees)	at	[focal	
organisation]	deal	with	the	presence	of	multiple	institutional	
logics	and	what	implications	does	this	have	for	the	nature	of	
the	organisation	structurally,	politically,	symbolically	and	
rhetorically?		
	
	
	
Carole	Bain,	
	June	2017		
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Foreword		
	 .				
	
‘The	challenges	faced	by	us	as	
a	non-profit	organisation	are	
considerable	and	tensions	
between	making	a	sustainable	
income	and	staying	true	to	the	
mission	are	inevitable.		We	
recognise	and	embrace	the	
rival	metaphors	of	mission	and	
business;	our	driver	remains	
‘to	make	money	to	do	more	
things	to	deliver	to	our	public	
good	agenda’	(Strategy	2013,	
p.	6)	
	
I	am	writing	this	forward	at	the	end	of	what	has	
been	a	long	journey	which	started	in	2011	as	I	
embarked	on	my	first	day	as	a	Doctoral	student	
and	is	ending	in	the	summer	of	2017	as	I	begin	
my	final	two	weeks	as	an	employee	at	[focal	
organisation].		
This	report	has	been	written	to	provide	
an	overview	of	my	research	programme	which	
explored	the	nature	of	work	undertaken	within	
the	organisation	as	individuals	attempt	to	
make	sense	of	what	can	appear	as	competing	
objectives.		This	report	includes	my	key	findings	
and	a	summary	of	some	things	that	[focal	
organisation]	may	wish	to	consider.	
Carole	Bain,	18	June	2017	
		
	
	
	
	
Research	context	
	 This	research	considers	organisations	
as	patterns	of	logic	activity	routed	in	material	
practices	and	symbolic	systems	underpinned	by	
assumptions,	values	and	beliefs	by	which	
individuals	and	organisations	produce,	
reproduce	and	make	sense	of	their	lives.			
Within	this	context	there	is	a	type	of	
organisation	termed	a	hybrid,	-	hybrid	
organisations	are	presented	as	having	more	
than	one	set	of	organising	logics,	thereby	facing	
challenges	of	having	to	‘negotiate	the	rules	of	
the	game	in	multiple	contradictory	games	and	
having	to	be	so	many	different	things	to	so	
many	different	people	that	it	must,	of	necessity,	
be	partially	at	war	with	itself’.		This	war	is	often	
experienced	through	the	emergence	of	
subgroup	identities	that	exacerbate	tensions	
between	logics	with	the	potential	of	making	the	
combination	untenable.		As	such,	some	
theorists	suggest	that	hybrids	are	at	risk	of	
become	arenas	of	contradiction,	unlikely	to	
survive	over	time	because	they	become	blocked	
or	dysfunctional	from	an	inability	to	resolve	
tension	between	competing	logics.		
	Specifically,	this	research	looked	to	
understand	how	individuals	dealt	with	the	
presence	of	a	public	good	logic	and	a	
commercial	logic	and	what	implications	this	has	
structurally,	politically,	symbolically	and	
rhetorically.	Taking	place	between	April	2014	
and	August	2016	a	total	of	26	in-depth	
interviews	(14	-	current	employees);	1	previous	
employee;	2	Trustees	and	2	consultants)	were	
recorded	resulting	in	350	pages	of	transcripts,	
98	documents	(2853	pages)	including	charter,	
strategy	and	plans,	meeting	minutes	and	
website	were	reviewed	and	25	meetings	were	
observed.	
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Key	findings	
	
Central	to	an	organisations	survivability	is	how	
it	can	best	unleash	and	enable	human	potential	
and	capability.		[Focal	organisation]		on	a	
whole	tends	to	have	an	emphasis	on	
processes,	performance,	systems	and	
measurement;	this	is	not	surprising	given	the	
CEO’s	commercial	background	and	the	relative	
ease	of	measuring	commercial	outcomes	over	
social	impact.			
Many	staff	and	Trustees	come	to	[focal	
organisation]	because	they	have	clear	personal	
values	around	not-for-profit	and	giving	
something	back.		At	an	organisational	level,	
they	work	to	make	the	world	a	better	place	
through	education.		At	an	individual	level,	staff	
want	to	feel	they	are	stewards	of	the	
organisation,	valued,	trusted,	and	empowered	
to	make	a	difference,	they	want	opportunities	
to	‘do	the	right	thing’,	to	develop	themselves	
and	being	a	part	of	a	team	matters.		
Yet	what	many	of	them	feel	is	that	
making	money	is	increasingly	all	that	is	valued	
with	very	little	regard	given	to	the	purposeful	
use	of	this	money.			The	culture	is	described	by	
some	as	being	elitist,	individualistic	and	self-
serving	(growing	personal	financial	rewards,	
maximising	power	base)	with	little	
consideration	or	time	given	to	how	we	are	
delivering	to	the	public	good	agenda.		By	some	
it	is	depicted	as	one	of	self-preservation	with	
individuals	seeking	to	modify	their	behaviour	to	
be	more	commercial	as	‘it’s	the	only	thing	that	
it	recognised	and	valued’.		By	a	small	group,	it	
is	presented	as	a	great	place	to	work	because	
of	the	‘lack	of	shareholders’	and	individual	
owners	‘trying	to	bankroll	his	villa	in	
wherever’	which	means	there	is	greater	ability	
to	‘put	it	[money]	to	good	use’	although	just	
what	this	good	use	was	appears	open	to	
individual	interpretations.			
	
	
	
	
	
When	asked	to	describe	the	
organisation,	there	were	four	main	perspectives	
which	I	termed:					
(a) Charity	-	‘We	are	a	charity	devoted	to	
supporting	those	who	struggle	to	get	into,	
and	further	themselves	within,	the	
profession‘			
(b) Charter	-	‘We	have	got	a	royal	charter,	we	
are	here	to	do	public	good	and	it	explains	
in	the	royal	charter	the	four	ways	it’s	
supposed	to	do	it.’			
(c) Hybrid	-	‘We	need	to	be	commercially	
focused.		However,	it's	about	maybe	not	
being	too	commercial.		We	need	to	be	
aware	of	what	we	are	and	what	we	stand	
for	and	not	forget	that’	
(d) Commercial	–	‘The	end	game	…is	to	
maximise	the	net	financial	return	and	
make	that	as	big	as	possible’.		
From	these	framings	come	sets	of	
material	practices	and	symbolic	systems	
(logics).	Specifically,	I	identified	two	sets	of	
logics	namely	public	good	and	commercial.		
Both	are	underpinned	by	different	and	often	
opposing,	assumptions,	values	and	beliefs	
through	which	individuals	produce,	reproduce	
and	make	sense	of	their	work.			
Significantly,	rather	than	constructing	
a	single	framing	of	the	organisation	staff	
simultaneously	constituted	the	organisation	in	
multiple	ways	resulting	in	multiple	sets	of	
organising	principles,	material	practices	and	
symbolic	systems.		(See	figure	1	on	page	5).	
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Figure	23:	Organising	logics	–	how	people	make	sense	of	the	organisation	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Within	the	logic	of	pubic	good	delivering	public	good	is	positioned	as	the	raison	d’être	and	the	
‘end’	it	exists	to	achieve.	Decision	making	is	based	on	contribution	to	public	good	and	measurement	of	
performance	is	aligned	to	this	goal.		‘Commerciality’	has	a	place	in	the	institutional	narrative	but	its	
purpose	is	to	generate	surplus	to	invest	back	into	public	good	activities.		As	such	there	is	a	circular	
relationship	between	commerciality	and	public	good;	charter	objectives	are	privileged	and	guide	what	is	
deemed	to	be	legitimate	activity.	Strategic	conversations	focus	on	activities’	potential	to	deliver	on	the	
public	good	agenda.		
Figure	24:		Charter	as	the	means	and	the	end	
	
Within	the	commercial	logic	the	organisation		is	positioned	as	a	global	business.			Strategic	
discussions	are	focused	on	the	impact	of	decisions	on	growing	financial	returns	and	making	the	
organisation	unassailable.		There	is	emphasis	on	presenting	the	organisation	as	‘a	business’	where	the	
growth	agenda	is	the	main	objective	and	an	acceptance,	to	varying	degrees,	that	institutional	growth	
and	financial	strength,	is,	in	its	own	right	a	valid	way	to	deliver	public	good.	The	charter	has	become	the	
means	to	serve	economic	or	financial	ends.		
	
Social	Impact	is	what	drives	this	organisation Financial	Impact	Is	what	drives	this	organisation 
‘Charter	is	
our	reason	
for	being’ 
‘Growth	is	
our	reason	
for	being’ 
‘Charity	is	a	
discrete	
activity’ 
‘Revenue	
growth	to	do	
stuff’ 
PUBLIC	GOOD	LOGIC 
1. Doing	public	good	is	the	core	goal 
2. Success	is	measured	by	impact	on	delivering	charter	objects 
3. Trustees	play	a	governance	/	regulatory	role	 
4.		 Commerciality	is	acceptable	but	linked	to	a	need	for	
organisational	survival	‘it	is	oxygen’	 
5.		 Staff	rewarded	on	doing	things	the	right	way	against	several	
criteria	 
COMMERCIAL	LOGIC 
1. Growing	the	financial	strength	and	size	of	the	organisation	are	
the	core	goals	 
2. Success	is	measured	by	growth	and	financial	performance	 
3. Trustees	 are	 used	 for	 strategic	 advice	 and	 discouraged	 from	
governance	/	regulatory	role	 
4. Commerciality	for	its	own	sake	is	prioritised	in	the	strategy	 
5. Single	reward	criteria	for	staff	is	on	profit	generation		 
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Figure	25:	Charter	as	a	means	to	an	end	
	
Balancing	the	needs	of	making	money	and	staying	true	to	the	social	mission	(Charter)	does	
seem	to	be	problematic	for	the	organisation.	Through	this	research	I	found	a	complex,	inter-related,	
diachronic	and	often	messy	picture	where	individuals	were	unable	to	resolve	tensions	between	the	
competing	logics,	often	resulting	in	arguments,	disruptions,	additional	cost	and,	on	occasion	
stalemate.			In	the	following	section	I	give	examples	of	how	this	tension	played	out.	
Structure	and	power	
Through	this	study,	I	got	an	understanding	of	the	power	work	carried	out	by	elite	individuals	to	maintain	
their	dominance	through	structure.	
Being	able	to	coerce	other	Trustees	through	their	trustee	role	does	appear	to	be	a	factor	in	the	
CEO	seeking	trustee	status.		One	internal	actor	presented	the	motivator	as	the	CEO	wanting	to	have	an	
ability	to	influence	other	Trustees	during	a	voting	process.		
‘The	number	one…the	internal	logic,	which	wasn’t	the	external	logic…was	so	that	that	trustee	
could	have	a	vote	and	could…if	things	were	delicately	balanced	would	have	a	vote	and	that	
some	Trustees	would	be	highly	influenced	by	the	way	in	which	that	person	voted.		So,	sheep	
Trustees	or	the	jackal	Trustees	and	the	sheep	Trustees	are	going	to	wait	and	see	how	the	chair	
of	the	Board	votes	and	wait	and	see	how	the	CEO	votes	and	we'll	vote	according	to	that	
because	they	want	to	be	seen	to	be	good,	sporting	Trustees’		
The	use	of	informal	power	enabled	by	the	close	Chairman	/	CEO	relationship	was	used	to	
subvert	challenges	which	caused	concerns	to	be	raised	about	the	Chairman’s	impartiality.		For	example,	
when	the	proposal	for	a	new	bonus	scheme	was	not	initially	approved,	the	CEO	and	Chairman	of	the	
Board	unilaterally	approved	the	CEO	proposal	outside	of	a	Board	meeting.	This	action	was	challengeable	
in	that	the	Chair	exceeded	their	authority	in	that	they	acted	as	an	independent	privileged	voice	rather	
than	as	part	of	the	collective	trustee	group.		
	
Structure	is	used	to	protect	and	defend.	As	a	charity	by	organisational	form	[the	focal	
organisation]	has	always	had		ring-fenced	funds	(e.g.	Frank	White	Fund)	which	were	used	to	give	
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financial	awards	to	students	(e.g.	best	marks).		In	2011,	these	funds	were	allocated	to	a	new	Foundation,	
set	up	as	a	linked-charity	with	a	Board	of	Trustees,	separate	branding,	material	practices	and	symbolic	
systems	to	the	‘core’	organisation.		During	interviews,	individuals	made	sense	of	this	structure	as	(a)	
protecting	the	previous	funds	from	becoming	‘lost	and	mismanaged	in	the	main	organisation’	(b)	
enabling	[focal	organisation]	to	respond	to	challenges	that	it	has	become	‘overly	commercial’	and	(c)	
enabling	the	‘core’		to	not	be	overly	concerned	about	its	social	impact.		
	
	The	implication	of	moving	this	activity	to	a	separate	structure	is	that,	the	notion	of	charity	is	decoupled	
from	the	‘core’	and	positioned	as	a	discrete	activity.		As	such,	charity	is	expressed	as	an	organisational	
form,	reduced	to	a	function	rather	than	expressed	as	a	set	of	organisational	values	or	ethos.		For	many,	
charity	has	become	symbolic	and	something	‘we	do’	rather	than	something	‘we	are’.		
	
Furthermore,	[focal	organisation]	has	a	trading	arm	‘Corporate	Services	Ltd’	(CSL),	developed	to	
facilitate	the	creation	of	revenue	from	activity	not	directly	connected	to	furtherance	of	the	charter	
objectives	(e.g.	consultancy	register,	recruitment	service).		Whilst	these	activities	have	mainly	ceased	
CCSL	continues	to	be	used	as	a	contracting	vessel	when	[focal	organisation]		is	delivering	activity	to	
corporate	customers	(such	as	an	in-company	qualification	or	training	programme).			
The	implication	of	this	practice	is	that	commercial	activity	is	effectively	ring-fenced,	expressed	as	an	
area	of	the	organisation	that	has	less	integrity,	driven	by	financial	activity	and	not	concerned	by	the	
public	good	agenda.			
	
Decision	making	
	
The	hybrid	nature	of	the	organisation	means	
that	decision-making	and	action	often	occurs	in	
a	contested	field	of	tensions	where	actors	
appropriate	the	organising	principles	and	
symbolic	systems	of	the	proffered	logic	to	exert	
power	over	organisational	outcomes.	The	
resulting	challenges	to	legitimacy,	authority	
and	identity,	often	lead	to	serious	disquiet	
amongst	organisational	members	and	on	
occasion	has	ended	in	stalemate.		
In	one	incident	one	director	described	
how	they	‘defend	and	‘protect’	the	integrity	of	
the	organisation	by	preventing	others	accessing	
areas	of	activity	and	resources.		During	
interviews	relating	to	this	incident,	the	
organisation	was	presented	as	fragmented	and	
clunky,	subject	to	un-necessary	complexity,	
additional	costs	and	reduced	ability	to	offer	
services	to	some	of	members.		
	
The	impact	of	this	incident	was	such	that	one	
director	acknowledged	that	in	order	to		
symbolically	meet	the	regulatory	conditions	
they	are	required	to	keep	a	part	of	the	
offering	hidden	and	secret.		
	In	another	incident	related	to	the	bonus	
setting	process	Trustees	reacted	strongly	
against	a	proposal,	questioning	the	
appropriateness	of	a	bonus	within	the	context	
of	being	a	charity	(public	good)	organisation.	
This	positioning	of	the	organisation	of	a	charity			
diametrically	opposed	the	CEO’s	positioning	as	
a	business	underpinned	by	an	assumption	of	
the	‘moral	right’	of	staff	to	share	in	the	
financial	success.		Whilst	the	proposal	was	
finally	approved	it:		
• involved	several	additional	approval	
conversations;		
• resulted	in	the	re-forming	of	a	
Remuneration	Committee	to	ensure	trustee	
over-sight	and	remains	a	topic	of	
conversation	with	the	Trustees	who	are	
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seeking	to	ensure	that	said	scheme	does	
not	prove	to	be	self-serving	or	undermine	
the	public	good	identity.	
• Furthermore,	it	contributed	to	the	
departure	of	one	member	of	staff	who	felt	
the	proposal	was	inappropriate	and	one	
trustee	asked	for	a	formal	record	refusing	
to	be	associated	with	the	approval.		
	A	further	example	pertains	to	the		
Governance	setting.		In	this	example,	Trustees	
and	CEO	were	simultaneously			seeking	to	
increase	their	authority,	control	and	ability	to	
influence	governance	structures.		I	observed	
the	Trustee	/	CEO	interactions	over	a	period	of		
at	least	22	months	(it	was	not	resolved	by	the	
time	my	research	was	concluded)	bringing	
about:	
• several	changes	to	governance	sub-
committees;	
• challenges	to	legality	and	appropriateness	
of	CEO	Trustee	status		
• 	Board	refusal	to	approve	
recommendations	for	new	Trustees.			
The	impact	of	these	skirmishes	detracted	the	
Trustee’s	ability	to	govern	the	organisation	
and	resulted	in	an	unhealthy	Trustee	/	CEO	
relationship.	
Communication	
There	are	many	communication	activities	undertaken	by	managers	in	the	organisation	to	socialise	staff	
to	specific	logics.		Examples	include	corporate	planning,	staff	briefings	and	CEO	Taskforces.			Another	
example	is	the	creation	of	rhetoric	of	burning	platform,	personal	danger	and	war-like	speech.		
‘We	need	to	be	more	professional,	big	
business-like,	and	have	money-making	
activity	to	meet	the	significant	challenges	
with	the	continuing	effect	of	global	economic	
downturn’.		
‘Essential	to	our	ongoing	growth	is	a	
[financial]	war	chest’	for	potential	
acquisitions’	[Strategic	plan	FY14-16	p11-12]	
	‘The	ultimate	message	is	that	***	will	be	put	
in	prison	if	we	don’t	do	what	they	say’	
Whilst	much	time	and	effort	was	spent	
internally	by	senior	managers	through	spoken	
and	written	work	to	influence	the	adoption	of	
proffered	logics	such	was	the	intensity	and	
frequency	of	the	commercial	logic	that	the	
measures	of	the	organisations	success	were	
experienced	as		
‘Having			nothing	to	do	with	measuring	how	
we	performed	against	the	charitable	
objectives.’	
And	all	about	
	‘Maximising	net	financial	return	and	making	
that	as	much	as	we	can’		
Furthermore,	it	was	commented	that	even	
when	individuals	are	talking	about	a	public	
good	objective	(e.g.	number	of	individuals	
developed)	it	was	often	‘disguised’	as	a	
financial	indicator	as	a	‘self-preservation	thing’	
as	that	is	the	only	thing	recognised	and	
rewarded	‘by	the	boss’.		
Rhetoric	work	(the	art	of	effective	or	persuasive	
speaking	or	writing)	is	considered	by	scholars	to	
be	an	important	socialisation	process	enabling	
individuals	to	make	sense	and	therefore	adopt	
(or	not)	new	practices.				In	this	study,	I	noted	
one	phase	‘we	make	money	to…’	being	used	in	
several	contexts.	When	interviewing	staff	who	
had	been	at	the	organisation	more	than	10	
years	they	represent	the	phase	as	used	by	a	
previous	CEO	
	‘We	make	money	to	do	more	public	good	and	
the	way	that	we	do	public	good	is	defined	in	
the	charter’.			
In	this	context	making	money	is	purposefully	
but	only	as	the	oxygen	for	the	organisational	
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survival	and	not	an	end	in	itself.		Another	
presentation,	typically	used	by	those	who	had	
been	recruited	more	recently	was		‘we	make	
money	to	further	the	institute’	
Critically,	the	statement	has	retained	
the	opening	we	make	money	to		which	has	a	
high	degree	of	acceptance	with	long	standing	
staff	in	that	money	is	positioned	as	a	
purposeful	resource.		However,	the	narrative	
has	reduced	the	major	premise	that	defines	the	
use	the	money	is	put	to	(namely	achieve	public	
good	as	defined	by	charter).		In	more	recent	
use,	the	strapline	either	provides	an	opaque	
unspecified	account	of	what	represents	‘more	
stuff’	or	‘good	use’	or	moreover	the	focus	to	
being	in	the	service	of	the	instituterather	than	
the	profession	it	serves.	
	Furthermore,	by	removing	the	link	to	
charter,	the	purpose	for	which	funds	are	
generated	becomes	eroded,	enabling	space	for	
a	new	‘purpose	narrative’	or	indeed	no	purpose	
other	than	to	make	money.			
An	implication	of	money	making	being	
experienced	as	the	key	objective	is	a	
disconnect	between	the	organisations	
espoused	and	enacted	values.	The	greater	the	
difference	between	espoused	values	and	
enacted	values	the	greater	likelihood	for	
dissatisfaction	and	cultural	problems		
	
	
Hiring	and	incentivisation	to	encourage	adoption	of	proffered	practices		
Since	2011,	recruitment	was	focused	on	attracting	‘big-business’	people	as	‘big	business	people’	
represents	a	‘better’	type	of	person	(more	rounded,	more	business-like,	more	professional)	and	that	big	
business	people	would	make	the	focal	organisation		grow	and	be	less	‘dysfunctional’.		Underpinning	this	
approach	was	an	assumption	that	by	surrounding	themselves	with	individuals	who	had	similar	
interpretations	of	priorities	and	outcomes	as	themselves	the	CEO	would	reduce	challenges,	prioritise	and	
legitimate	the	commercial	logic.	In	the	event	this	strategy	does	not	appear	to	have	prevented	challenges	
or	coalitions	forming	and	notable	examples	are	the	resignation	of	one	individual	who	was	recruited	from	
‘big	business’	(who	did	not	agree	with	the	approach	to	incentivisation)	and	the	sustained	challenge	from	
a	group	of	Trustees	(all	from	big	business)	who	disputed	the	legality	and	appropriateness	of	several	
practices	and	structures.		
One	specific	practice	considered	in	this	research	was	that	of	incentivisation.			In	2010,	the	
bonus	structure	was	one	of	a	notional	‘thank	you’	to	the	2015	incentive	structure	that	was	based	on	the	
‘moral	right’	of	staff	to	share	in	the	financial	growth.		Under	the	2015	structure	bonus	became	individual	
(rather	than	a	collective),	based	on	achieving	a	single	financial	target	of	profit	(rather	than	on	work	
ethics	and	respect,	working	practices,	customers	care	and	quality,	use	of	ICT	and	financial	performance	
used	previously)	and	the	typical	value	grew	for	a	senior	manager	grew	by	over	300%	(from	£500	to	
£2,100).		
Making	changes		
In	my	thesis,	I	refer	to	a	tactic	that	I	term	‘edging	strategy’.				I	conceptualise	‘edging	strategy	as	
an	approach	to	change	that	uses	subtle	and	apparently	benign	changes	that	eventually	break	down	
previous	boundaries	and	create	new	lgoics	of	meaning	and	sense	making.			
This	process	happens	incrementally	over	time	in	a	way	that	the	risks	of	insiders	and	outsiders	
seeing	the	changes	as	illegitimate	are	mitigated	and	allows	the	instigator	to	test	and	respond	to	the	
reactions	of	stakeholders.		Typically	the	edging	strategy	firstly	makes	use	of	rhetoric	to	theorise	a	need	
for	change	(creation	of	a	burring	platform)	,	involves	some	form	of	external	validation	of	the	theorisation	
  227 
(e.g.	independent	experts	such	as	pay	and	reward	specialists)	and	often	catastrophized	the	impacts	of	
not	adopting	proffered	ideas	(I	will	lose	the	best	staff)	and	practices	to	ensure	adoption	of	new	ways	of	
working	(increase	the	value	of	financial	reward,	develop	celebration	events	where	‘great’	individuals	are	
recognised).		
Specifically,	in	the	context	of	[focal	organisation]	I	observed	the	edging	approach	being	used	to	
make	changes	to	governance	settings	and	changes	to	incentivisation	policies.		
Findings	summary	
Through	the	research	I	experienced	coalitions	and	silos	occurring	as	staff	attempt	to	defend	and	
privilege	their	proffered	logics.			This	results	in	significant	tension,	interruption	and	sabotaging	of	activity	
which	was	deemed	illegitimate	by	particular	subgroups.		Such	behaviour	led	to	agnostic	practices,	
organisational	inertia	and	entropy.		
Recommendations	
	 Significantly,	this	study	found	that	rather	than	individuals	constructing	a	single	framing	of	the	
organisation	they	simultaneously	constituted	the	organisation	in	multiple	ways,	making	it	more	difficult	
to	have	sets	of	organising	principles,	material	practices	and	symbolic	systems	that	meet	individual’s	
assumptions,	values	and	beliefs.			In	the	absence	of	a	single	internal	identity	the	organisation	continually	
faces	the	potential	of	divergent	sub-groups	forming	and	reforming.		As	such	having	to	negotiate	the	
rules	of	the	game	in	multiple	contradictory	games	has	become	a	daily	reality,	complexity	and	
dysfunctionality	has	become	normalised	making	organisational	survivability	more	difficult.		
This	is	not	sustainable	and	it	is	for	that	reason	the	key	recommendation	is	that		
[Focal	Organisation]	find	ways	to	represent	itself	
structurally,	practically	and	rhetorically	that	are	
attractive	to	all	staff	irrespective	of	their	proffered	
(public	good	and/or	commercial)	logic.			
It	is	critical	that	this	representation	is	congruent	with	
the	organisational	activities	or	discerning	staff	will	
reject	any	practices	and	behaviours	that	are	not	
deemed	to	be	authentic	or	legitimate.					
In	the	reminder	of	this	section	I	make	practical	recommendations	on	how	this	can	be	achieved.			
Importantly	however,	in	making	the	recommendations	below,	I	am	not	suggesting	that	each	should	be	
undertaken	in	any	sequence	or	in	isolation	from	each	other,	rather	that	they	should	be	undertake	in	a	
mutually	reinforcing	way.		
(1) Internal	identity		
	 Many	staff	and	Trustees	come	to	[focal	organisation]		because	they	have	personal	values	
around	not-for-profit	and	giving	something	back	yet	they	feel	that	making	money	is	all	that	matters	with	
very	little	regard	to	its	purpose.		Increasingly	people	feel	that	making	money	has	become	an	end	in	its	
own	right	and	this	is	causing	a	disconnect	from	espoused	values	and	enacted	behaviours.		
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		There	is	a	need	to	create	an	internal	identity	(that	is	
congruent	with	the	external	identity)	which	does	not	present	
public	good	and	commerciality	as	rivals.				
I	suggest	that	retaining	the	‘we	make	money	to	do’	rhetoric	would	be	helpful	as	it	has	a	high	degree	of	
acceptance	but	that	there	is	a	need	to	have	clarity	on	what	it	is	that	we	do	with	this	money		
The	impact	of	this	is	that	money	making	is	positioned	as	a	powerful	and	purposeful	resource	to	enable	
public	good	rather	than	an	end	game	in	its	own	right.	
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(2) Structure	
I	suggest	that	the	current	structure	is	un-necessarily	complicated	and	used	by	various	sub-
groups	to	marginalise	both	purposeful	commercial	and	charitable	activity.	
	Focal	organisation	should	consider	restricting	the	use	of	
Corporate	Services	Ltd	to	activities	that	do	not	serve	in	
furtherance	of	the	charter	and		
Review	the	presentation	of	the	Foundation	being	divorced	
from	the	core	business.			
There	is	a	dichotomy	in	the	current	structure	that	facilitates	a	perception	of	conflict	of	interest	
where	none	exists	which	enables	commercial	activity	to	be	marginalised	and	presented	as	lacking	in	
integrity.		It	also	enables	charity	and	public	good	to	be	marginalised,	reduced	to	a	function	rather	than	a	
set	of	organisational	values	or	reason	for	being.		
	
(3) Performance	measurement		
	 Currently	finance	is	presented	as	the	only	measure	of	success	‘recognised	by	the	boss’,	serving	
to	undermine	the	great	work	being	undertaken	for	example	educating	people,	building	a	community	of	
practice,	and	developing	and	disseminating	knowledge.			
[Focal	Organisation]	should	consider	developing	a	
methodology	to	measure	social	impact	whilst	retaining	money	
making	as	an	important	and	purposeful	resource).			
Consideration	should	be	given	to	the	various	formal	communications	to	ensure	alignment	against	what	
matters	the	most	rather	than	what	is	easiest	to	measure	/	talk	about.				Care	should	be	taken	to	link	
reported	activity	to	the	strategy	which	in	turn	should	be	explicitly	linked	to	the	charter	objectives	and	at	
the	same	time	continue	to	present	commerciality	as	a	critical	purposeful	resource.		
	
(4) Hiring	and	incentivisation	practices		
During	the	research	the	representation	of	‘big	business	people’	being	a	‘better’	type	of	person	
was	prevalent	as	the	CEO	sought	to	make	the	organisation	‘more	like	a	conventional	business’.		By	
surrounding	themselves	with	individuals	who	brought	to	the	decision-making	processes	similar	
interpretations	of	priorities	and	outcomes	the	CEO	looked	to	reduce	challenges	to	proposals	and	
opportunities	for	disparate	ideological	coalitions	emerging	and	reduce	opportunities	for	coalitions	
emerging.		I	suggest	that	this	was	an	over	simplistic	approach	as	it	failed	to	take	into	account	the	myriad	
of	life	experiences,	assumptions	and	values	that	make	up	an	individual’s	‘world-view’.		It	is	no	surprise	
therefore	that	the	strategy	did	not	achieve	its	objective.		It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	recommend	that:		
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Hiring	practices	should	include	recruiting	for	attitude,	values	
and.	Furthermore	it	should	consider	individuals	ability	to	cope	
with	hybridity	(complexity)	in	addition	to	technical	capability	
and	experience.		
	In	doing	the	organisation	should	become	resourced	with	individuals	who	are	able	to	bridge	
commerciality	and	public	good	narratives.		Additionally,	other	scholarly	work	reports	on	the	ability	of	
individuals	without	significant	work	experience	to	bridge	different	logics	(e.g.	they	do	not	experience	two	
competing	logics,	rather	one	blended		or	bridged	logic)	and	this	might	be	a	consideration	for	entry	jobs	
which	might	for	example	suit	new	graduates	and	apprenticeships.		
Job	descriptions	are	being	under-utilised	and	argue	that	they	
can	be	a	useful	resource	in	that	they	can	reinforce	the	
interdependencies	and	inter-relationships	with	other	roles.		
In	this	research,	I	found	that	most	job	descriptions	privileged	one	or	other	logic	and	rarely	
demonstrated	a	logic	combination.		This	created	an	‘either	/	or’	scenario	perpetuating	the	perception	
that	public	good	and	commerciality	are	rivals.		I	therefore	recommend	that	job	descriptions	are	reviewed	
to	reinforce	the	mutual	dependency	and	inter-relationship.		
Bonus	programmes	should	be	modified	to	include	value	/	
behaviour	standards	in	addition	to	financial	performance				
Alignment	of	delivering	to	public	good	and	personal	recognition	matters	to	staff	but,	the	current	
bonus	schemes	are	misaligned	in	that	they	are	based	solely	on	making	money.		This	is	leading	to	staff	
feeling	compromised	and	forced	to	behave	in	certain	ways	merely	to	achieve	a	bonus.		
‘We	are	measured,	we	are	rewarded	on	certain	metrics,	so	you	know	sales	
revenue	is	clearly	an	important	tone…	there	are	things	that	I	do	purely	
because	it	will	get	me	my	bonus’		
‘I	didn’t	feel	I	had	any	choice	but	to	lower	the	standards	[of	an	award]	
because	of	the	commercial	pressures’		
	Furthermore,	I	suggest	that	bringing	in	a	team	based	bonus	may	be	helpful	as	being	in	a	team	matters	
to	staff.		I	also	suggest	that	whilst	the	bonus	scheme	is	not	uncompliant	it	does	not	conform	to	societal	
expectations	of	a	not-for-profit	/	charity	and	therefore	suggest	that:	
Further	increasing	the	financial	value	of	individual	bonuses	
would	be	unhelpful	against	the	backdrop	of	the	non-for-profit	
and	charitable	status.									
End	of	document		
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Appendix 7 – Focal organisation definition of terminology   
Central Definitions used in this thesis  
Term Researchers definition  
B2B Business to Business.  A term used when the focal 
organisation is providing a service for a business / 
organisation. 
B2C Business to Consumer.  A term used when the focal 
organisation is providing a service to an individual.  
Board of Trustees Also, referred to as ‘The Board’, ‘Board’ or ‘Trustees’.  
These are the legal Trustees of the focal organisation 
governed under charity Law 
Chartered 
Organisation (The 
focal organisation is 
a chartered 
organisation). 
A form of organisation regulated by government (Privy 
Council) which signals that the organisation works for 
‘the public interest’. A royal charter is a way of 
incorporating a body that is turning it from a collection of 
individuals into a single legal entity with no single owner. 
A body incorporated by royal charter has all the powers 
of a natural person, including the power to sue and be 
sued in its own right. New grants of royal charters are 
typically reserved for ‘eminent professional bodies or 
charities, which have a solid record of achievement and 
are financially sound’. A body applying for a charter is 
expected to meet several criteria.  In the case of 
professional institutions, the main criteria are: 
(a) the institution concerned should comprise 
members of a unique profession, and should have 
as members most of the eligible field for 
membership, without significant overlap with other 
bodies. 
(b)  corporate members of the institution should 
be qualified to at least first degree level in a 
relevant discipline; 
(c)  the institution should be financially sound and 
able to demonstrate a track record of 
achievement over several years; 
(d) incorporation by charter is a form of 
Government regulation as future amendments to 
the charter and by-laws of the body require Privy 
Council (ie Government) approval. There 
therefore needs to be a convincing case that it 
would be in the public interest to regulate the 
body in this way; 
(e) the institution is normally expected to be of 
substantial size (5,000 members or more). 
http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royal-
charters/applying-for-a-royal-charter/ sourced 13 
Jan 16  
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Commerciality: Commerciality is described by institutional actors as:  
becoming bigger in terms of organisational size (move 
from SME (small enterprise) to ME (medium enterprise) 
stronger in terms of financial reserves, more global in 
terms of brand awareness and increasing the ‘footprint’ 
though new offices, the size of the community engaging 
with focal organisation, and the sharing of success with 
staff 
Elite actor  An actor within the focal organisation who can decide on 
the value, size and allocation of resources and 
determine the type of activity being undertaken by 
organisational actors.  Examples include Trustees, CEO, 
Directors, Heads of departments or functions 
The Foundation A sub charity of the focal organisation positioned as a 
separate charitable entity with its own brand; revenue is 
generated through donations one of which is an annual 
donation from the parent charity.  The foundation directly 
employs staff and has a separate governance structure 
to the main charity, which reports to the main Board of 
Trustees in terms of regulatory compliance.   
The National 
Council for 
Voluntary 
Organisations 
(NCVO 
NCVO champions the voluntary sector and volunteering 
as essential for a better society. A charity with a mission 
“To help voluntary organisations and volunteers make 
the biggest difference they can”.  Seen as representing   
the voluntary sector and volunteering to government – 
using the best research, we demonstrate their true value 
and help influence policy-makers. 
 https://www.ncvo.org.uk/about-us/our-vision-mission-
values 
Net Financial Return 
(NFR): 
Within the focal organisation making a profit is described 
as making a positive net financial return.  There is a 
general narrative that “we can’t use the term profit 
because we are a charity”  
P&L Reference to profit and loss account – each area of the 
business is classed as a revenue generation (profit) or 
cost (loss) centre 
Public interest  Also, referred to as public good and social impact.   
Used to describe the organisations public good agenda.  
Surplus Also, known as Net Financial Return.  See above 
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